Nigeria returned to constitutional democracy anchored on the presidential system in 1999. Under the new fourth republic constitution, while there are three distinct institutions of government, each organ of government is vested with certain responsibilities. To avoid disruption in the running of the state’s affairs, certain constitutional obligations and duties are given to the executive and the legislature. This is particularly so with respect to the exercise of executive‐power in the absence of the elected president. However, the absence of the Nigerian president from the country without complying with the provisions of the 1999 constitution did not only put the country’s democracy on the path of reversal in early 2010, but it also exposed the weak disposition of the politicians towards constitutionalism. Thus, this study examines executive‐ legislative handling of the executive‐power vacuum that was precipitated by the absence of the ailing Nigerian president between late 2009 and the first quarter of 2010. The study combines both primary and secondary sources, and argues that while the provisions of the constitution are clear on power succession, the politicians have trampled the provisions for private gains and sectional interest
