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From the Editors

It is with great pleasure and excitement that we present to you the December 2010 issue (Vol. 4, No. 2) of *Africana.*

Over the past few months many of us have been following the news of forthcoming elections throughout Africa. We have been following the prospects for successful 2011 elections in Nigeria in particular, due to its great significance to the entire region. With this in mind we open this latest issue with several important contributions on Nigerian politics. The first, by Dr. Oarhe Osumah and Austin T. Aghemelo of Ambrose Alli University in Ekpoma, Nigeria, entitled “Elections in Nigeria Since the End of Military Rule,” emphasizes the recent challenges to the democratic process in Nigeria and the all-too-often brutal political divides (and allegedly democratic allegiances) that follow in the wake of democratic elections. Their observations on recent “democratic” experience in Nigeria are timely and struck us as well-researched and well-informed words of both “democratic” hope and caution. We were so impressed with this first piece that we included a second contribution from Dr. Osumah, entitled “Patron-Client Politics, Democracy and Governance in Nigeria, 1999-2007.” Once again, you will undoubtedly appreciate the wisdom of Dr. Osumah’s thoughtful observations; throughout, one hears his undoubted hope for Nigeria’s political future.

These words of caution and hope are followed by an article entitled “Money Politics, Political Culture of Godfatherism and the future of Democracy in Nigeria – Lessons from the 2007 Gubernatorial Election in Edo State, by Dr. Atare Otite and Nathaniel Umukoro of Delta State University in Abraka, Nigeria. Let us hope that Nigerians, of all political stripes, learn from these serious observations, lest their country fall into the trap of those unfounded optimisms of yesteryear. Nigerians await positive change, as do all Africans, and the world. Godspeed.

The following is but a partial list of the elections scheduled for 2011:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>ELECTION</th>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Presidential, National Assembly</td>
<td>March 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>April 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Presidential (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Round), National Assembly</td>
<td>November 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Presidential; Regional &amp; Local.</td>
<td>April 2011; March 2011</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Presidential, House or Reps &amp; Junior Senators.</td>
<td>October 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Presidential, National Assembly</td>
<td>July 2011 (Pres); April 2011 (Natl Assem.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Presidential, National Assembly</td>
<td>January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Presidential; House of Reps &amp; Sen; State Assemblies &amp; Governors.</td>
<td>April 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Sudan</td>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>9 January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Presidential, National Assembly</td>
<td>February 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Presidential, National Assembly</td>
<td>Before October 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Presidential, National Assembly</td>
<td>After May 2011 referendum on Constitution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa & other.

Dr. Stanley Naribo Ngoa, Senior Research Associate at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, of the University of Johannesburg, South Africa, reminds us of yet another recurring element in African politics that is scarcely addressed in the social sciences: the phenomenon of rumour. In his survey of the scant literature on the topic, Dr. Ngoa concludes that rumour is a significant factor in African politics and, as such, warrants further research and study. This is followed by a critical assessment of the funding strategies for tertiary education in Nigeria, Vol. 4, No. 2.
amidst growing demand. Few can doubt that most African universities are, and have long been, in a state of crisis. In his article, Dr. Nelson Ejiro Akpotu addresses the issue with vigor, new analysis, and hopes for change.

Sunny Ekakitie-Emonena, from the Asaba Campus of Delta State University in Nigeria, gives us another policy issue to contend with in “Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP): Issues and Challenges.” Here again, the focus is on Nigeria, but in a global comparative context and from the perspective of the rights and needs of the local Nigerian working masses. Readings of this kind remind us that there is danger in simply getting caught up in the grandiose debates over prospects for a smooth democratic election; very real issues are at stake that touch on the lives of multitudes.

The next two articles discuss the significant impacts of the media in two African contexts: Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Munyaradzi Mawere, of the Universidade Pedagogica, speaks to the ongoing challenges to local cultures by the media and globalization. Of course, this is far from being a problem unique to Mozambique, as there are many who share his concerns. Unlike most, however, Dr. Mawere suggests possible solutions to the ongoing problem. He tells us that a “framework is presented for studying socio-cultural issues that impact on how knowledge, ideas and values should be transmitted and developed from one generation to another for the good and posterity of the African cultures.” We wish Dr. Mawere all of the best in his quest.

In his piece, by Lecturer Tendai Chari of the University of Venda, South Africa, discusses the challenges to fair and equal representation of religion and religious issues in the Zimbabwean mass media. He suggests that, in the Zimbabwean context, “…concerns have been raised that the media subtly promotes certain religious ideologies while shunting others to the sidelines. By doing so, the media has been accused of sowing oats of suspicion and misunderstanding between different social groups.” Given the volatile nature of politics in Zimbabwe over the past decade, Chari could well be identifying an aspect of the problem that most outsiders have scarcely considered.
We then present to you Dr Akpomuvie Orhioghene Benedict’s piece entitled “Pan-Africanism and the Challenges of Development in the 21st Century.” As readers will know, pan-Africanist initiatives have a long history and, despite a few successes, there can be little doubt that the hopes and aspirations of so many have too often faltered, time and again. Yet, remarkably some would say, the spirit of pan-Africanist goodwill endures, as do the hopes for improved African security and development in the 21st-century. We are pleased to include this important discussion, if only to remind readers of this undying spirit!

The last piece for this issue comes to us from Oscar Edoror Ubhenin, a lecturer in Public Administration at Ambrose Alli University, in Ekpoma, Nigeria. Here we find that there are ongoing concerns regarding population policies in Nigeria which, alas, has become a regular part of their politics. We’ve also included a book review of Saturday Is for Funerals by Unity Dow and Matt Essex and is written by Jennifer Rosenbush, a graduate student of anthropology at Boston University. Finally, we would like to announce the start of Africana’s new Editor-in-Chief, Mr. A. Curtis Burton, whose bio can be seen at our web-page: http://www.africanajournal.org.

As always, we greatly thank you for your continued interest in our journal.

A. Curtis Burton
Yilma Tafere Tasew
Elections in Nigeria Since the End of Military Rule

Dr. Oarhe Osumah and Austin T. Aghemelo

Key Terms: Nigeria; end of military rule; civilian rule; 2003 elections; 2007 elections; PDP, INEC.

1.0 Introduction

Since the end of military rule in May 1999, the nationwide elections have been trailed with issues and incidents that generate a lot of anxiety, fear and trepidation. For the record, since the exit of the military from political power, there have been general elections in 2003 and 2007. The conduct and outcome of the elections have left Nigerians intensely divided, bruised and laced with dashed hopes for the practice of democracy. Furthermore, those who have been elected have failed to spread the fruits of democracy to the electorates. Thus, most Nigerians have encountered frustration, disillusionment and disenchantment with elusiveness of the fruits of democracy due to widespread patterns of corruption and unaccountable governance.

For all intents and purposes a lot of political heat has been generated which threaten to undermine the nascent democracy. Consequently, until there are dramatic changes in the course of future elections it feared that Nigerians could relive the traumatic experience of military ruthlessness and dictatorship.

The task of this paper is to examine the elections since the end of military rule in Nigeria in May 1999. To realize this objective, the rest

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part of the paper examines electoral experiences in Nigeria from the colonial era to 1999, subsequently, the paper examines the management of election since the end of military rule in 1999, thereafter, the paper analyzes the flaws associated with the elections and their implications for democratic practice now and the year ahead in the country.

2.0 Electoral Experiences in Nigeria

Election is the cornerstone of democracy. Election is a process vide, which the people choose their leaders and indicate their policies and program preference and consequently invest a government with authority to rule. Furthermore election is crucial to the resolution of conflicting interest in the political system. The first election in Nigeria was held in 1923 following the introduction of elective principle and the establishment of the Nigerian legislative council under the Clifford Constitution of 1922. The election was restricted to Lagos and Calabar, which had 3 and 1 member(s) respectively in the Nigerian legislative council. This was on account of the higher population of educated elites in both towns (Kurfi Amadu 1983). The elections of representatives were based on a limited franchise restricted to males with a minimum annual income of ₤100. Until 1946 the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) contested the elections into the four legislative positions in the Nigerian legislative council.

Under the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 the first nationwide indirect election, was held except in Lagos where the direct election through secret ballot were held, to elect majorities into the Regional Houses of Assembly and the federal House of Representatives. The elections were contested by the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) the Action Group (AG), National Council of Nigerians and Cameroon (NCNC) and the Northern People Congress (NPC) The NPC and NCNC won majorities in the Northern and Eastern Houses of Assembly respectively. Neither AG nor NCNC is the election had
majority in the Western House. But through carpet crossing the AG later had the majority.

In 1954, the first ever extensive direct federal election was conducted under a 50-50 representation between the North and the South. The only exception was that the indirect election was still held in the North. The NPC had majority seats in the Northern region and the highest number of seats, 79 out of 184 in the federal House of Representatives. The AG and NCNC won majorities in the Western and Eastern Regions respectively.

The first nationwide direct elections were held in 1959 following the appointment of October 1, 1960 as the date of Nigeria’s independence. The significance of the election was that it constituted the basis of the post independence government. The electoral process was active. The political parties campaigned actively and extensively with some of the major political parties aligning with the minority parties. The AG aligned with the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and the NCNC with the NEPU. Several other political associations, independent candidates, apart from the major political parties contested the election. The voter turnout was impressive (Kurfi Amadu 1983). But because no single party could win a single Majority the NPC and NCNC formed a coalition government. This saw Alhaji Tafawa Balewa of NPC as the Prime Minister and Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe of NCNC as the Governor General and the Senate president in Nwafor Orizor. AG became the federal opposition in the First Republic.

The various nationwide elections held in Nigeria before her independence were acclaimed to be relatively free and fair with isolated cases of violence, intimidation and repression (Larry Diamond 1988). Thereafter, virtually all the subsequent general elections had been characterized by violence, conflict and hostility.

The first acid test of democratization in independent Nigeria was the 1964 general election. The poor performance of the coalition
government made politicians other Nigerians to be keen about effecting a change. The NCNC and AG reached out by way of a coalition to NEPU, UMBC and Nigerian Socialist Workers and Farmers Party (SWAFP). This led to the formation of United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). In what seem to be a response to that alliance, the NPC aligned with the NNDP, Dynamic Party, Midwest Democratic Party and Republic Party to form the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA).

The electoral contest was marred with violence, conflict and hostility. In the North and West the UPGA loyalists and candidates and even electoral officers were assaulted and abducted. According to Ikpelegbe (1997)

There were so much irregularities, violence fraud, thuggery, molestation, resignation of electoral officials and fraudulently returned unopposed candidates that UPGA decided to boycott the elections …

President Nnamdi Azikwe refused to appoint Balewa of the NNA as Prime Minister on account of the violence and irregularities, which marred the 1964 elections. This sparked off a constitutional crisis, which took the intervention of the court for a peace to be brokered. Although through the intervention of the court peace was brokered and the constitution of a broad-based government headed by Tafawa Balewa the attendant crises, disillusionment, disenchantment and loss of confidence by majority of the population in the government, significantly motivated the military to usurp political power on January 15, 1966. After thirteen years of military rule the nation was returned to civil rule vide the nationwide elections held in 1979.

The Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) was empowered to conduct the 1979 general elections in line with the presidential system of government. The elections were held into the presidency, National Assembly, state governor offices and state Houses of
Assembly. The elections contested by five parties, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) the Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP), the People Redemption Party (PRP), Nigeria People’s Party and the United Party of Nigeria.

The political parties campaigned intensely for the election. They mobilized both religion and ethnic sentiments to gain support. The voter turnout was not impressive with the highest being 43% in Anambra State (Kurfi Amadu1983). FEDECO based on available result announced the NPN presidential candidate Alhaji Shagari as the winner of the presidential election.

From a comparative vantage the 1979 general election was acclaimed to be relatively successful Adamu and Ogunsanwo (1983) assessed the election thus:

*Within the context of bourgeois democracy and against the fiasco of elections the country had witnessed in the past, the 1979 exercise must be considered a higher level of success. The presence of a military government, which rounded up potential party thugs effectively, checked their activities, created a peaceful atmosphere for the elections. The willingness of the party leaders to utilize legal and constitutional devices to disputes contributed to the peaceful elections witnessed in 1979, none of these can be guaranteed in future elections.*

Four years later, in 1983, another general election during the Second Republic was held. Civilian government organized the election. Six political parties contested the elections. Nigerian Advance Party was registered by FEDECO in addition to the earlier five, which contested the 1979 elections. Thuggery, violence, massive rigging, irregularities, other malpractices and falsification of results marred the elections. FEDECO, police and other state agents colluded with the ruling party NPN to commit electoral fraud. The ruling-NPN conveniently won the presidential election, and obtained majority seats in the National Assembly and 13 states. The opposition parties on account of
irregularities rejected the outcome of the election. Thus, at the federal and state levels there were several litigations. Tension, uncertainty and insecurity characterized the period. In some states like Ondo and Oyo the gubernatorial elections resulted in large number of cases of arson and murder. As the nation was on the edge of a precipice the military on December 31, 1983 quickly intervened to salvage the situation.

On August 27, 1985 when Ibrahim Babangida took over political power in a counter coup, he declared that he would be brief in restoring civil rule. On August 12, 1987 the Babangida administration held elections into local government council on a zero party basis. In 1989, the administration lifted ban on partisan politics and imposed two political parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC) on the nation. In December 1990, local government council elections were held which the SDP won marginally. In December 1991 SDP won 14 governorship seats while the NRC won 16. On July 4, 1992 the National election was held. The SDP won convenient majority seats in both the Senate and House of Representatives. On June 12, 1993 came the presidential election. To many observers the election was the freest and fairest election in the annals of Nigeria political history. However, as part of the results had been released Babangida on June 23, 1993 annulled the election for reasons that were not too clear. The annulment of the June 12 election sparked off intense ethnic, populist and regional antipathy particularly in the South Western part of Nigeria. The intense political pressure within and from the international fronts against annulment compelled Babangida to step aside and cede power to an illegitimate Interim National Government (ING) headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan on August 26, 1993. But because the ING was seen as a subversion of a popular mandate, the clamour for the realization of the June 12 mandate persisted. The nation was brought again to the brink of ruination. It took the intervention of the General Sani Abacha led military for the nation to be saved from collapse.
The common promise made by the military on the usurpation of political power had been to re-engineer the political process and return the nation to democratically elected government in a jiffy. Under the Abacha administration the first election was held into local government councils in 1996 on a zero party platform. In 1997, elections were held into the local government councils, state and federal legislative councils. Five political parties, the Congress for National Consensus (CNC), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM) National Conscience Party of Nigeria (NCPN) and United Nigerian Congress Party of Nigeria (UNCPN) contested the elections. The elections were largely pantomime as the five political parties bore implicit stamp of military consent and cronyism. This was clearly evident in the adoption of General Abacha as a consensus candidate in April 1998 by the five political parties before his demise on June 8, 1998. Real oppositions were blackmailed, intimidated, and hounded into exile or assassinated.

General Abdulsalam Abubakar, the successor to General Abacha, on assumption of office announced his intention to return the nation to civil rule. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established and charged with the responsibility to conduct the elections of the registered nine political parties to contest election in the local government councils in December 1998. Based on the showing of the nine political parties in the local council election INEC registered three political parties; the Alliance for Democracy, All Peoples Party (APP) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). The three political parties in February 1999 contested the elections into the states and federal legislative councils, governor offices and presidency. The AD won six governorship seats, APP won nine and PDP twenty-one. The PDP won the presidency and majority seats in both the Senate and House of Representatives.

The elections were characterized by widespread electoral abuses such as horse-trading, undisguised financial inducement of voters, falsification of votes, stuffing of ballot boxes with pre-marked
ballot papers, snatching of ballot boxes and violence. The opposition party, APP in the presidential election rejected the result of the election on account of brazen electoral fraud and went to court to contest the outcome. Although the court threw out the lawsuit, it took much pressure and appeal from Nigerians and the international community for the APP to accept the election results just to avert the bitter experience of another annulment (Olayanju 1999:33).

The above outline on the pattern of political developments in Nigeria revealed that the country was yet to fully embrace the tenets of democracy. Furthermore an election in which any government has been an interested party has never been credible election. The next section reviews the electoral process of the 2003 general elections with a view to determine the extent to which it reflects previous political developments in Nigeria.

3.0 Elections in Nigeria Since The End of Military Rule in 1999

Since the end of military there have been two general elections. The elections were held in 2003 and 2007.

3.1 The 2003 Elections

The 2003 general election was crucial in various respects. First it attracted much more international attention than any other election in the political history of Nigeria (Kew 2003:13). Furthermore, it was a test case for the nation’s nascent democracy. The election if free and fair was anticipated to solve the problem of a political future for Nigeria, as least on the interim.

The preparation for the 2003 election started with the initiation if electoral bill intended to correct the legal defects of the 1999 general election. But the electoral bill, which was passed in 2002, generated a lot of controversies as the original objective was subordinated for selfish interest. The Presidency and National Assembly in pursuant of second term mandate contrived an electoral law to regiment the political
process of political parties’ registration. It took the intervention of the Supreme Court for the political space to be liberalized. The number of political parties was increased from three to thirty. The emergence of the newly registered parties from December 2002 relieved the country of the heat which disappointment could have provoked.

However, with 120,000 polling stations across the country the task of managing the elections to ensure success was beyond the staff strength of INEC. Thus, the INEC decided to recruit ad hoc personnel to assist in the management of the elections. The moral integrity of most of the personnel was suspect and the opposition parties question their impartiality. The opposition political parties alleged that many of the personnel (ad-hoc and Resident Electoral Commissioners) of the INEC were card-carrying members of the ruling PDP.

The INEC preparation for the election was shoddy. This was partly due to the delay by the ruling-PDP in the release of funds to the commission for reasons not too clear. The INEC seemingly became unease following the delay to release fund to it that the INEC boss, Dr. Abel Guobadia, threatened to resign his appointment. When eventually fund was released to INEC perhaps due to limited time, it could not comply with certain schedules on the transition programme. INEC ignored delimitation of constituencies and relied on the defunct National Electoral Commission (NEC) delimitation. The disappointment arising from this, by those who alleged political domination in some parts of the country sparked off conflicts. The most spectacular case is the clashes between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri ethnic groups in the Warri area of Delta State.

Within the limited time under the transition programme schedule, INEC embarked on the registration of voters. The registration of voters is a definition of citizenship and an empowerment, which enables qualified citizens to choose their leaders (The Guardian Editorial October 4 1998:16). INEC undertook a computerized voter registration perhaps to check its manipulation by some typically
corrupt Nigerians to secure unfair advantage in the elections. However, the exercise was rife with mistakes, irregularities, and fraudulent practices such that a considerable number of qualified persons who attempted to register were disenfranchised (TMG 2002:57).

The party primaries, preparatory to the 2003 elections, were held by the various parties to choose credible candidates for the different elective offices in the country. In virtually all the party primaries, standard democratic norms were circumvented. Some parties imposed atrocious fees to edge out many aspirants. Some tinkered with party constitution to pave wave for the emergence of certain candidates as party nominees. Others imposed their candidates as party nominees on the various constituencies (Odion Akhaine 2003:). These flaws sparked off a lot of conflicts to the point that some party national secretariats (e.g. PDP and ANPP) became theatres of violence (Uko 2003:12). Also the witnessed numerous inter-party clashes, violence, bloodbath, attacks and killings. The high frequency and dangerous wave the political violence assumed compelled the president on March 19, 2003 to convene a meeting of all the thirty political parties commit them to peaceful conduct in the election and to eschew violence. The INEC also made the political parties to sign a pact banning violence during and after the elections (Okoror 2003:8). Some states like Delta, Anambra, Benue, Borno, Kwara, Enugu, Ondo, Imo, Abia Katsina, Rivers, Kano and Plateaus were identified as the most volatile which required special security attention to ensure a successful election (Okoror 2003:8). These measures seem to have had some effect on calming tempers and fears.

The campaigns for the elections were not quite vigorous as the anxiety generated by electoral violence in the pre-election period preoccupied the minds of most of the contestants.

The 2003 elections were staggered for three days, April 12, April 19 and May 3. The April 12 poll was the first in the 2003 general elections. It was held to elect the members of the National Assembly,
comprising the Senate and House of Representatives. Fourteen out of the thirty registered political parties presented no candidate. As it were, Nigeria was the cynosure of all eyes around the world on the April 12 poll. The election was acclaimed as generally peaceful with isolated cases of violence (Ogunsawo 2003:C8). The voter turnout was quite low perhaps for fear of violence

The ruling PDP won over two thirds seats of the National Assembly, both the Senate and House of Representatives. Besides, winning the majority seats in the National Assembly, the PDP made gains in the South West hitherto regarded as AD political enclave. The ANPP and AD won some seats in the two chambers of the National Assembly with the ANPP as the largest opposition. None of the new political parties won a seat in the Senate. And only few of the new parties won seat even in the House of Representatives.

After the April 12 poll came the presidential and governorship election held on April 19. Following the results of the April 12 polls, the ANPP tried to reach out to other parties in form of alliance to have a formidable opposition to stall the re-election bid of President Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP. The alliance, however, could not be perfected as it came belatedly (Adebayo 2003:26). On its part the ruling PDP struck an alliance pact with the AD in the presidential election.

The commitment of the Nigerian public during the April 19 polls was acknowledged as appreciable as they demonstrated general orderliness (The News 5/5/2003:27). Voter turnout was far higher than the turnout recorded during April 12 polls (TMG 2003:17). There were also considerable improvements on certain area of the electoral process compared with the National Assembly poll (TMG 2003:17). The ruling PDP candidate president Olusegun Obasanjo won the presidential election. Below is a summary of the presidential election result as released by INEC.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Polled</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olusegun Obasanjo</td>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>24,456,140</td>
<td>61.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammadi Buhari</td>
<td>ANPP</td>
<td>12,710,022</td>
<td>32.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emeka O. Ojukuru</td>
<td>APGA</td>
<td>1,297,445</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim I. Nwobodo</td>
<td>UNPP</td>
<td>169,609</td>
<td>0.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ganiyu Fawehinmi</td>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>161,333</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah N. Jubril</td>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>157,560</td>
<td>~0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ike O.S. Nwanchukwu</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>132,997</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris O. Okotie</td>
<td>JP</td>
<td>119,547</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Centre for Democracy and Development Briefing on Nigeria’s Elections

As indicated in the above table, the Presidential candidate of the PDP Olusegun Obasanjo won the presidential election of the April 19. The PDP also dominated in the governorship elections of April 19. Out of the 36 states in Nigeria PDP won 28, while ANPP had 7 and AD 1. This result represents a tectonic shift in the country’s political equation. In 1999 the PDP controlled 21 states, the ANPP (then APP) 9 and AD 6. In 2006, through court pronouncement the PDP lost the governorship seat in Anambra state to All Progressive Grand Alliance. The PDP maintained its lead in all former strongholds but one. PDP lost Kano state to ANPP. However, the PDP won three states (Kogi, Kwara and Gombe) formerly controlled by the ANPP. The PDP also won in all former AD strongholds (Ogun, Ondo, Osun Oyo and Ekiti) except Lagos, which was retained by the AD. The outcome of the election generated furious reactions from the opposition parties. The defeated AD in the southwest threatened to re-enact the operation wetie of the First Republic (Oshunkeye and Orimolade 2003:24). The opposition parties severally and collectively under the aegis of the Conference of Nigerian Political Parties rejected the election result, and called on the international community not to recognize any government constituted on the basis of the 2003 election.
Amidst protest of the outcome of the April 19 poll came the May 3 poll, which was held to elect members of the states Houses of Assembly for the 36 states of Nigeria. Apparently, due to the general disappointment with the conduct and outcome of the April 19 poll, many of the opposition parties threatened to boycott the May 3 poll and in fact dismantled some of their campaign structures before the date of the poll. As was the case of the April 19 polls, there was improvement in the electoral process. However, the voter turnout was low across the country (TMG2003:26-27).

In the May 3 election, like the earlier ones the ruling-PDP continued its winning streak. Most seats in the Houses of Assembly of the 36 states were by the PDP. In fact, in some states like Edo there is no opposition member in the house of assembly. Over 56% of the 2003 nationwide election outcome was challenged in court (Haruna 2003:7). Except for the Anambra State governorship election that was upturned, the courts upheld the results of most of the election.

It took a long time for the ripples of the 2003 general election to completely settle. On July 10, 2003, the Anambra state governor, Dr. Chris Ngige was abducted and forcefully out from office in a plot masterminded by Chris Uba who allegedly claimed to have bankrolled his election. Also the defeated ANPP presidential candidate General Buhari on September 23, 2003 in deference for refused police permit organized mass rally in Kano to support his legal battle against the election of president Obasanjo of the PDP. In December 2003, the CNPP continued to rally for international support against the government constituted on the basis of the 2003 nationwide election. The CNPP called on the Commonwealth to ostracize president Obasanjo until a credible election is held in Nigeria (Bisi Abidoye 2003:C3). There were also various calls by many Nigerians for electoral reforms, recommendation of a single-five year term for governors and the president, convocation of a sovereign national conference.
The response of the ruling PDP to the criticisms and condemnations of the 2003 general election has been militaristic, hostile and bellicose (Oba and Ubani 2003:53). The EU Election Observers team was accused of plotting to destabilize the country base on its reports on the election. Leading opposition parties about to hold rallies have been hounded either by refusal of police permit or imposition of prohibitive sums of money to be paid for the use of venues. In fact the actions and utterances of opposition parties have been likened to “coup” (Ogbodo 2003:12). This tension soaked atmosphere was carried through the second term tenure of President Obasanjo and into the preparation for the 2007 nationwide elections.

3.2 The 2007 Elections

The 2007 general election is significance in several respects. First it was the first second consecutive elections under any civilian administration. Furthermore, it is the first election intended to ensure the change of leadership from one president to another. Thus, the election can be regarded as a test case for deepening Nigeria’s nascent democracy. Also, the successful conduct of the election was a matter of international concern. As the saying goes, “How goes Nigeria, so goes the rest of Africa” (Ibrahim 2007). Thus, with the conduct of the 2007 election Nigeria became a cynosure of international attention.

The preparatory for the 2007 general election like the 2003 general election, generated a lot of political heat and distraction. First, the polity was heated by President Obasanjo declaration that the 2007 election would be a do or die affairs (Chidiebere Onyemaizu 2007:14). In addition and more particularly, the attempt to amend the Nigerian constitution in order to elongate the tenure of the serving president and the governors heightened the tensed atmosphere in the country. The ill-famous plan failed on account of the strong opposition against it by many Nigerians, some members of the National Assembly and the international community (Chidiebere Onyemaizu 2007:14). Instructively, the supporters of the tenure elongation popularly referred to as third term agenda were assured re-nomination in the 2007 election.
while the opponents of the project were hunted about with security agencies such as the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (Ibrahim 2007). After the failure of the attempted third bid, there was perhaps virtually no much time left to improve on the weak electoral law used in the 2003 election. In fact, only little amendments were made and passed in June 2006.

Thereafter, dangerous signals of an unsuccessful conduct of the election unfolded as expressed in the electoral and political shenanigans of both the INEC and some of the political parties. The preparation of the INEC for the 2007 election was shoddy. The voter registration exercise was characterized by a lot of inadequacies, lapses and irregularities, which crystallized in the disenfranchisement of many qualified persons who attempted to register (Osa 2006:3A). Besides, some leading PDP members in connivance with INEC were alleged to have hijacked the process (Osa 2006:3A). The INEC refused, neglected and ignored the relevant sections of the Electoral Act. The INEC failed to display the voters’ register as required by the electoral law. These developments resulted in numerous litigations against INEC. There were also numerous litigations against INEC over its ill refusal to include the names of some candidates for the election. The many rulings of the courts in these cases raised some anxiety about the possibility of holding the election. The National Democratic Party (NDP) sought in court to stop the 2007 election (Ulayi and Ige 2007:1&15).

Furthermore, the party primaries in the lead up to the 2007 general election were characterized by undemocratic conducts, internal wrangling, contradictions, which resulted in carpet crossing and defection from the leading parties to newly registered parties such as the Action Congress, ACD, DPA, Peoples Progressive Alliance, Labour Party and Accord. At the same time most of the state legislative assemblies such as Anambra, Oyo, Plateau State were embroiled in constitutional crisis of impeachment. In case of Ekiti the tension
generated led to the imposition of emergency rule for six months. The campaign for the election generated a lot of anxiety and fear. There were few inter-party clashes. Between June and August 2006 three gubernatorial aspirants were assassinated. The tension generated in the lead up to the 2007 election led to the identification of states such as Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Anambra, Sokoto and Plateau as most violence prone (Omonobi 2007:1&15).

The election, which was staggered for April 14 and 21 was organized amid heavy security presence. The April 14, 2007 poll was held to elect the 36 state governors and members of the state Assembly across the country. The conduct of the elections in most states of the federation was said to have totally failed to meet the basic requirements of an election. Across the country, most polling stations did not open at all, with none officials and voting materials. Where voting did occur, it was reported that the voting in key states including Anambra, Cross River, Delta, Ekiti, Enugu, Katsina, Lagos, Osun, Oyo, Rivers and Zamfara was fundamentally flawed (Umunnakwe 2007:34).

In spite of the heavy security presence in some polling stations, the security forces and the government officials did little to protect the rights of voters and the integrity of the process. Several voters were deprived of the opportunity to cast their ballots, some stayed away from the polling stations and some died due to election related violence. The election was allegedly rigged in favour of the ruling-PDP. According of some observers such as the Human Rights Watch was marred by non-availability of voting materials, late commencement of voting, massive disenfranchisement of potential voters, brazen rigging, intimidation and violence (Onyemaizu 2007:14). Owing to the flurry of imperfections and irregularities, which marred the elections the INEC had to reschedule re-run elections in the most affected areas.

In the election, the INEC announced or awarded victories to the PDP in 28 governorship seats, APGA 1, ANPP 5, AC 1, and PPA I. The PDP was also announced as controlling majority seats in most State
Assembly across the federation. The outcome of the gubernatorial election and state assembly election seemingly reinforces the PDP stronghold of the national political landscape. Apart from only in few states the pre-election status in most states in terms of party dominance and balance of power did not change significantly in the post-election. The ruling-PDP lost the governorship seat in Bauchi state to the ANPP and took control over the governorship seats of the ANPP in Kano and Kebbi states respectively. A further revelation of the election was that some of the states also maintained the voting tradition and pattern, which first manifest during the patently controversial 2003 nationwide elections. Like the 2003 election, the most outrageous figures were recorded from the states such as Rivers in the south-south region. The local populace in several states such as Edo, Ekiti, Oyo, Kaduna and Katsina owing to the general disappointment and dissatisfaction with the announced results of the election embarked on wild protest. Following the deterioration in the orgy of violence over the election led some of the state governments to impose dusk to dawn curfew (Onyemaizu 2007:14).

Amidst the anxiety and tension arising from the conduct and outcome of the State Houses of Assembly and Governorship elections came the April 21 elections held to elect the President and members of the National Assembly comprising 109 in the Senate and 360 in the House of Representatives in all parts of the country. Sequel to the conduct and outcome of the April 14 election there was heightened tension across the country. On April 17 the leaders of about 18 political parties including Abubakar Atiku and Muhammedu Buhari called for the postponement of the Presidential election, disbandment of INEC and cancellation of the April 14 election and they threatened to boycott the April 21 election. The possibility of holding the election was raised with the last minute Supreme Court ruling against the INEC decision of excluding the name of Abubakar Atiku as the presidential candidate of the AC on the ballot paper on the ground of fraud charges against him. Shortly, before the commencement of voting on April 21 there was heightened tension across the country following reports of alleged
attempt to assassinate Good-luck Jonathan, the Vice Presidential candidate and then Governor of Bayelsa state and attempt to destroy the INEC headquarters in Abuja with a struck of bomb. Furthermore, arising from the delay in the commencement of voting due to the late arrival election officials and materials, there were frustration and tension across the country (Onyemaizu 2007:14).

In the conduct of the April 21 election, there was no significant improvement on the lapses that were noticeable in the April 14 elections. Although there was visible presence of heavily armed security personnel at various polling stations, the election was not without hitches. The election was marred by late arrival of electoral materials, ballot box snatching, illegal thumb printing, intimidation and outright violent confrontations. There was low voter turnout and apathy. The election was allegedly rigged in the favour of the ruling-PDP. During the election, the leading political parties budgeted huge sum of money allegedly widely used for the political manipulation voters, the INEC officials, and security agents deployed to provide security in the political process. For instance, it was alleged that one of the leading political parties in certain areas paid each INEC presiding officer at the polling station #3,000 and his clerk #2,000, each policeman #1,000 and about #200 for each voter (Democratic Social Movement (DSM) 2007).

In the elections, the ruling-PDP won majority of the elective seats in the National Assembly and the presidency Democratic Social Movement (DSM) 2007). Here is a summary of the April 24, 2007 presidential election results.
Table 1: Official Results of April 24, 2007 Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of candidate</th>
<th>Name of party</th>
<th>Vote polled</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umoru Yar’Adua</td>
<td>People Democratic Party (PDP)</td>
<td>24,638,063</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammadu Burhari</td>
<td>All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)</td>
<td>6,605,299</td>
<td>18.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atiku Abubakar</td>
<td>Action Congress (AC)</td>
<td>2,637,848</td>
<td>7.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orji Uzo Kalu</td>
<td>Progressive Peoples Party (PPP)</td>
<td>608,803</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attahiru Bafarawa</td>
<td>Democratic People Party (DPP)</td>
<td>289,324</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chukwuemeka O. Ojukwu</td>
<td>All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA)</td>
<td>155,947</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pere Ajuwa</td>
<td>Alliance For Democracy (AD)</td>
<td>89,241</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Okotie</td>
<td>Fresh Democratic Party (FDP)</td>
<td>74,049</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Utomi</td>
<td>African Democratic Congress (ADC)</td>
<td>50,849</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambrose Owuru</td>
<td>Hope Democratic Party</td>
<td>28,519</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel Okereke</td>
<td>African Liberation Party (ALP)</td>
<td>22,677</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence Adedoyin</td>
<td>African Political System (APS)</td>
<td>22,409</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habu Fari</td>
<td>National Democratic Party (NDP)</td>
<td>21,934</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maxi Okwu</td>
<td>Citizens Popular Party (CPP)</td>
<td>14,027</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barthelomew Naji</td>
<td>Better Nigeria Party (BNP)</td>
<td>11,705</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel Obayuwana</td>
<td>National Conscience Party (NCP)</td>
<td>8,229</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olapade Agoro</td>
<td>National Action Council (NAC)</td>
<td>5,752</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mojisola Obasanjo</td>
<td>Nigerian Masses Movement (NMM)</td>
<td>4,309</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Nigerian General Election, 2007

The indication from the table shows that the presidential candidate of the ruling-PDP polled 70% of the vote cast to emerge winner (Democratic Social Movement (DSM) 2007). Quite correctly, the opposition parties alleged that the victory of the PDP was obtained not
on conditions of free and fair election. However, the failure of the leading opposition parties can plausibly be explained in several ways. One of such plausible explanations is the reliance of the opposition parties on false strategies such as massive rigging, thuggery and money influence, which tilt in favour of the ruling-PDP which controls the greater public fund and state instrument of coercion and manipulation to beat the PDP. Furthermore, the leading opposition parties had been involved in internal crisis, which left them even more irrelevant than the PDP. Moreover, the opposition parties like the PDP in the last eight years failed to produce any positive example in the few states they controlled that the masses should expect if voted into power.

Nevertheless, the outcome of the election generated dangerous reactions across the country. Leaders of the opposition parties under the platform of the Conference of Nigerian Political Parties (CNPP) the rejected the outcome of the election called for the constitution of Interim National Government of Unity with threat to cause civil unrest on the handover date. Besides, the organized labour and civil society groups rejected and protested against the malpractice, which attended the conduct of the election. On Friday, May 18, 2007 members of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) stayed away from courts and election tribunal in protest over the flaws, which characterize the election (Ise-Oluwa Ige et al 2007:5). The Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and some civil society groups such as the Campaign for Democracy embarked on protest march in various parts of the country over the malpractice that marred the election.

The coalition comprising seventeen political parties are in the court challenging the outcome of the presidential election (Balogun and Ajakaye 2007: B1&3). The fallout of the flaws and failures of the election was a myriad of petitions at the election tribunals. About 60% of the election results are being contested at the various election tribunals across the country (Access for Credible Election (ACE) 2007). Many of the controversial victories have been reversed, from governorship, House of Assembly, House of Representatives to the Senate. In some,
the tribunal or court called for the immediate installation of the rightful candidates, and in others the re-run. Thus, far, the re-runs such as the Kogi and Ekiti state governorships have not been any better. They were usually marred by flurry of irregularities, malpractices, violence, thuggery, and ballot hijacking and stuffing. There has been lack of change in attitude of the politicians to do or die politics (Anaba & Abdulah 2009).

4.0 Flaws in the Elections since the End of Military Rule
As noted earlier since the end of military rule in 1999, Nigeria has not organized a credible election. To many observers and analysts the nationwide elections in 2003 and 2007 suffered so many shortcomings, which make them perhaps the most controversial election in the nation’s political history. INEC that was vested with the responsibility of superintending over the elections displayed low level of competence. The preparation of INEC for the elections since the end of military rule has been shoddy, inadequate and unprofessional (Oshunkeye and A. Orimolade 2003:24). Throughout the 2003 and 2007 nationwide elections lack of secrecy of votes, problem of logistic, shortage of election materials, and late opening of polling have been recurring features. This poor performance formed the basis for which all and sundry have been calling for the reform of INEC if future elections are to be credible and acceptable.

Another pitfall of the post-1999 elections is poor security. During the 2003 elections, INEC offices were also reportedly invaded for ill-conceived intentions. Some electoral officials were allegedly manhandled and stripped of electoral materials. The security arrangement during the elections in the various parts of the country was allegedly lopsided. Moreover, there were cases of police complicity in malpractice, reluctance to intervene in glaring cases of electoral misconduct by some agents (TMG 2003: 27-28). Similarly, in the conduct of the 2007 nationwide election, there was no significant difference in the security arrangement and conduct of the security agencies. As noted
earlier, the presence of heavy security in some polling stations did only little to protect the rights of voters and the integrity of the political process. Political thugs using strong-armed tactics had seemingly unhindered access to electoral materials and unleashed terror.

Gargantuan fraud has also been a major pitfall of the post 1999 nationwide elections. Throughout the 2003 and 2007 nationwide election a flurry of brazen electoral banditry and absurdity has been a noticeable feature. In the 2003 nationwide elections, there were multiple voting and stuffing of ballot boxes in unauthorized locations and private homes. Other irregularities and fraud recorded included ghost voting, under age voting, snatching of ballot boxes and falsification of results. Some electoral officials were alleged of forming part of the scheme for fraudulent practices during the elections (Okomu 2003:18). According to official statement by INEC chairman, “we have also received reports from some of our staff of attempts to compromise their integrity through bribery and other forms of corruption” (INEC 2003). By the same token money and other gift items such as clothes, rice, fish, salt were un-disgustingly used to influence voters days before or on polling day. The observers’ reports in the 2007 nationwide election were not significantly different. The leading political parties were allegedly involved in the use of huge sum of money for political manipulation of voters, the INEC officials and security personnel in the polling stations.

Several explanations can be ascribed for the failure of the elections since the end of military rule in 1999. One of such explanation is the frequent military usurpation of political at the slightest mistakes committed by the politicians and it subsequent prolonged ruler-ship. Through its frequent intervention, the military disrupts the learning process of democratic culture. Thus, whenever the game was restarted the politicians resume “singing old tunes” and “moving old dance steps”. Apart from the disruption of political learning process, the long stay of the military in power saw many Nigerians assimilating the military culture. Oni noted thus “as a people we have become so militarized in our thinking and behaviour such that we believe in the
use of conflict rather than consensus and adjudication methods” (Oni 2001:8) This judgment is aptly applies in the respective elections since the end of military rule. The attitudinal and behavioural patterns of the politicians were militaristic. This manifests in their pronouncements and deployment of violence before, during and after the elections.

Another reason that can be adduced for the failure of the elections since the end of military rule is the character of the Nigerian state, which places high premium on politics. The power structure of the Nigerian state bestows on those who control state power easy access to wealth and social aggrandizement. By this character couple with its lack of adequate investments, the state becomes the only contested terrain. Elections into public offices serve as the only opportunity to acquiring state power and the mobilization of its the resources. Thus, the political contest is perceived as do or die affairs, case of dog eat dog and notoriously intense. As Obasanjo noted, “the electioneering has meant times of heightened passion for individuals as well as groups and communities who push for victory. A large number of people come out of election feeling hurt. Regrettably, there had been physical wounds and even death” (Koko 2003). Drawing a similar concern Olurode (Not Dated) remarked that to win an elective office is like running a life long fortune as every stage of the electoral process such as votes registration, polling, vote counting and announcement has always been a war to finish. Clearly, Olurode’s comment aptly captures the political behaviour of the politicians at the various stages in the electoral process since the exit of the military from political power in 1999. The politicians relied on unconventional democratic behaviour including recruitment of thugs and use of armed tactics, violence, and assassinations at every stage in the 2003 and 2007 elections respectively to gain electoral victory.

The overwhelming power structure of the state makes failure in political contest hard to contemplate. Failure in the political contest means losing everything (material and moral benefits) associated with the control of power (Ake 1993). This political equation manifests itself
in intolerance distrust, fanaticism and unwillingness to compromise or accept defeat (Diamond 1988). In the same vein, due to the high stake of the state power those who control state apparatuses manipulate them in order to retain political offices. As was the case with the nationwide elections in the first and second republics, in the elections since the end of military rule the power of incumbency has arrogantly been used to manipulate state agencies such as the INEC and security agencies including the police, SSS, EFCC and ICPC for the purpose of retaining power and ensuring the election of preferred candidates into political offices.

5.0 Implications of the Elections for Democratic Practice
So far the elections held since the exit of the military from political power in 1999 have been acclaimed locally and internationally to be manifestly fraught with flaws and fraud. The courts and election petition tribunal ruling on most of the cases confirmed the flurry of massive and the gargantuan electoral arbitrariness, which characterized the elections. Instructively, though the courts and election tribunals have raised hope for electoral democratic practice, the issues and incidents the elections have generated portend grave dangers now and in the future.

One of the fallouts of the elections since the end of military rule in 1999 is that they bestow in majority of those government mandate without popular support of the citizens. Thus, the post-military elections tell a story of the moral depravity with the disenfranchisement of many Nigerians owing to unconventional electoral conduct before, during and after the elections. Consequently, there is the possibility that the people would hardly accept the government as neither legitimate nor accord it any support. Thus, there is the likelihood that the electoral brigandage could result in the radicalization of violence and revolutionary struggles against the government. On another plane, there is the possibility that there would be massive electoral apathy on the apart of the voters.
On the other hand, those who the gargantuan flaws and frauds, which fraught the election have benefited may continue to rely on them in future elections. Although the courts and electoral tribunals have reversed some of the electoral flaws and frauds, the conditions and institutions and agencies, which were contributory to the electoral arbitrariness, are yet to be reformed.

Another scenario that can be constructed from the character of the post-military elections is the likelihood of severely overheating the polity and distracting the attention of the elected or selected leaders from state official duties. As noted earlier, over 56% of the 2003 election results were challenged in courts many of which were resolved in few months to the conduct of the 2007 election. In the 2007 election, over 60% of the 2007 election results are being contested in courts. Apparently, there is the likelihood that the welfare and living standard of the ordinary citizen would further deteriorate in the years ahead.

Furthermore, the conduct and character of the elections since the end of military rule in 1999 have and would unimaginably continue to threaten social order and internal security of Nigeria. As noted earlier the conduct of the elections since the end of military rule in Nigeria have resulted in the proliferation of private militias and sophisticated dangerous weapons. With the emergence of private-militias and proliferation of dangerous arms in the hands of thugs used during the election, there is the possibility that such weapons may be retained by them and could be used to perpetrate horrendous social vices such as youth gangsterism, restiveness, terrorism, criminality, robbery and assassinations. In the scenario, where the Nigerian State is fast losing monopoly of instrument of violence to thugs and private-militias there is the possibility that if future elections are not well managed the nascent democracy could be truncated and the country may drift into anarchy.
6.0 Conclusion
This paper examined the elections in Nigeria since the end of military rule in 1999. The paper revealed that the elections have been fundamentally flawed and fraudulent. The net effect of the elections is a myriad of electoral and social problems hunting the country. The governments formed at various levels across the country on the basis of the elections have been seriously enmeshed in deep legitimacy crisis. Thus, the nation has largely remained in limbo since the end of military rule due to the inability of the civilian government to conduct successful election. The only institution sustaining the nascent democracy is the judiciary. No doubt the judicial pronouncements and rulings on some of the elections have raised the audacity of Nigerians to hope for better elections in the years ahead. By design or default, the election tribunals have nullified some of the elections and there is the possibility that many more may follow in times ahead. Unless the Appeal Courts upturn the verdicts of the election tribunals the implication is that fresh poll will be conducted in such elective offices.

However, out of a feeling of insecurity, many of the ruling-governors in most states are in a hurry to plant their stooges as vassals in the local government councils by organizing infamy council polls so as to gain a head start in the event that fresh elections are called. This presupposes that the mere nullification of the elections is not enough. It does not change the mindset of the beneficiaries of electoral fraud. In Nigeria, the elected political executives are hardly held accountable. Since politics is the quickest gateway to wealth and self-aggrandizement the mere nullification of their elections may not serve as strong disincentive to the desperate political officers. Thus, there is the possibility that any re-run election may not be better than the earlier elections.

The question then is what practical steps need be taken to ensure a true electoral contest in Nigeria in the future. First, there is the need for the judiciary to take further steps such as treating the beneficiaries and his conspirators as criminals. Any person found to
have benefited from election manipulation should be made to refund the financial benefits that may have accrued to such impostors. Furthermore, the incumbent political officers found guilty of electoral manipulations should be treated as a criminal and disqualified from participating in the re-run election that may subsequently follow. Secondly, there is the need to re-examine the structure of power of the Nigerian state with a view to create auspicious conditions for an engagement in a genuine democratic order. This can be done through a constitutional conference, which would involve all the stakeholders in the Nigerian state. Furthermore, the operations of all state institutions such as the INEC, Police, SSS and EFCC need to be re-examined and overhauled with a view to enhance their effectiveness and efficiency in compliance with the minimum requirements of an engagement in a truly free and fair election. Finally, if the desired true election can take root there the need for the politicians should have attitudinal change. They learn to respect the rules of the games. They should allow themselves to be guided by the axiom, “he who fights and run away lives to fight another day”.

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Patron-Client Politics: Democracy and Governance in Nigeria, 1999-2007

Dr. Osumah Oarhe

Key Terms: Nigeria; patron-client politics; godfatherism; patron-client relations; democracy; governance; rentier state; rent seeking.

Abstract
This paper will examine patron-client politics in the context of democracy and governance in Nigeria with special focus on the first phase of the Fourth Republic, 1999-2007. This paper, which is essentially based on study of secondary source data, reveals that the politics is neither historically new nor peculiar to Nigeria. Its evidence abounds in older democracies, emerging democracies and even authoritarian regimes. In Nigeria, its evidence abounds in the pre-colonial political system through the colonial era to the previous civil administrations in the country since independence. This paper reveals that pecuniary motivation and the deployment of primitive tactics to settle political scores make the patron-client politics a unique phenomenon in the recent political history of the country. The paper will further reveal that the contemporary practices of patron-client politics negate the fundamental values and principle of democracy and governance. The plausible explanation adduced for the influx and changes in the patron-client politics include the structural character of the Nigerian state, which creates large stakes for the control of state power and other factors such as political decay, weak party structure and discipline, imperial presidency, political immaturity and lack of political charisma among office seekers.

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Introduction
In post-independent Nigeria, as in many African states, the political elites have deployed various instruments to gain relevance and have access to or consolidate state power. The most vital of instruments ranged from coercion to political patronage. Political incumbents have used patronage opportunities to purchase loyalty and consolidate their hold on to power. However, the dynamics of patronage generate adverse effects. It results in the manipulation of government policies in favour of political allies at the expense of common good (Mwenda and Tangri 2005). Patronage mechanisms also undercut and undermine the tenets of democracy and governance such as transparency, accountability, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, rule of law, and fair competition.

In Nigeria, as has become evident, patron-client politics was at the heart of the collapse of the democratic experiments and even authoritarian regimes in Nigeria. Yet, patron-client politics remains prevalent in Nigeria’s nascent democracy since its inauguration in 1999, as this article attempts to show. The political elite who have access to state power and resources have used them to serve personal interest as well as enhance their political dominance. Nearly everywhere, top government appointments have been made based on patron-client connections. Governance has clearly been in the hands of close political associates and there has been virtual administration of the institutions of the state, largely in a chaotic and Hobbesian manner.

To set the tone of the discourse, this article raises two fundamental questions. Why do the political elite resort to destructive behaviors that undermined democracy and governance? What are the damaging effects of patron-client politics for the legitimacy of democracy and mechanisms of governance?

This paper specially focuses on the Fourth Republic, 1999-2007 because of the need to document emerging new data on the destructive dimension, dynamics and mechanisms of contemporary patron-client
politics and their adverse implications for the tenets of democracy and governance. It adopts as explanatory tools the rentier state, rent seeking and rational public choice theories to explain the dimension, dynamism, mechanism and destructive behavior of the patron-clients that undermine the tenets of democracy and governance.

To achieve this objective this paper is decomposed into the following six sections. The first introduces, the second examines the central concepts and theoretical framework of analysis, as well as patron-client politics and the nexus of mercenary in Nigeria. The third section examines the profile of patron-client politics in the from 1999 to 2007, the fourth section analyzes the implications of contemporary patron-client politics for democracy and governance in Nigeria. The fifth section centers on the explanations for the prevailing situation of patron-client politics in Nigeria, and the six section concludes.

Before we proceed to address the central issue of the paper, it is imperative to begin with the examination of the central concepts, patron-clients, democracy and governance.

1.0 Conceptual and Analytical Notes
Patron-client relations are associated with particularistic exchange transactions. It has been essentially conceived as a personalized relationship between actors or set of actors wielding asymmetric affluence, status or influence, based on qualified loyalties and involving political dealings (Lemarchand 1972; Chaine 2007). There are two main variants of patron-client relations, the traditional and modern (Chaine 2007, Folarin 2005). In the traditional perspective, patron-client can be decomposed into four sub-categories: patrimonial (king-chief), feudal (noble-serf), mercantile (trader-customer), and saintly (religious leader-follower). On the other hand, patron-client in the modern perspective deals with the relationship or exchange transaction between various actors in contemporary institutions such as bureaucracy and political party systems. The major features of patron-client exchange
transactions are summed up as follow: first, it assumes a kind of lopsided friendship. The exchange transactions between patron and client are highly asymmetrical and based on power differential. Also, it may involve reciprocity but not essentially two-way traffic communication, unidirectional and dyadic. The patron, with his social position, influence and other attributes offers protection and economic or material benefits to the client, while the client in return promises or exchanges loyalty and obedience. Furthermore, the number and extent or strength of the exchange transactions (benefits) is a function of the distributive capacity of the patron. The relationship between the patron and the client can become strain if the distribution of resources is lopsided and not mutually satisfying. The conflict between the patron and client arises quite often from control of state resources or political influence in government appointment rather than ideological difference. Also, the patron-client relation may cut across ethnic divide.

Patron-client ties exist not only within the formal system of government or authority. It is essentially an informal relationship based on influence. It exists between persons with an unequal authority, yet linked through ties of interest and friendship, who manipulate their relationship with the bid to realize their ends. It may be characterized as a kind of relation between king or chiefs and subjects in a lineage society, landowners (feudal lord) and peasant or tenants (serfs), boss and worker in a bureaucratic set up, master (slave-driver) and slave in slave-driven society, religious leaders and followers in a saintly society.

Patron-client politics is analogous concept of political machines in America, Sicily and Mafia in Italy, big man or godfather in Nigeria.

**Patron-Client in Nigeria**
In Nigeria, patron-client denotes godfatherism. It can be understood when mainstreamed from the traditional and contemporary perspectives. In the traditional perspective, a political patron in Nigeria is essentially an experienced statesman expected to mentor, guide,
direct and counsel upcoming politicians on how to engage in political activities such as campaign and contest for election in civilized and constitutional manner, as well as manage the affairs of the state for the realization of common good if given the opportunity to serve. A political patron is a person with history, derivation and purebred. In the traditional sense, political patrons exert power and influence not for personal but group interest. Thus, the political patron is a benevolent, an altruistic, development oriented, and missionary and not mercenary politician. The patrons offer leadership, ideas, expertise, knowledge and wisdom to their clients. The relation they maintain with their political client is mutually beneficial and based on commonality of interest (Odivwri, not dated). The activities of the political patron are ideological, civilized and constitutional. The activities are intended to ensure the affairs of the state are managed in a manner that promotes necessary development in the interest of the ordinary man (Folarin 2005:37). The traditional concept of patron-client focuses on the enthronement of the principles and values of democracy and governance. It intended to arm or equip the political client with necessary expertise for management of the affairs of the state to ensure growth, stability and common welfare.

The contemporary conception can be regarded as a redefinition, distortion and transformation of the traditional conception. It perceived the political patron as a “mercantilist or mercenary politician” ready to offer sponsorship to office-seekers to the extent the individual accepts to be manipulated for the consolidation of his power-base and sustenance of his political dominance of the affairs of the state. Instructively, the power of the patron does not merely lay in his sponsorship of political campaigns. Largely, the power and influence stem from the ability to deploy primitive tactics, patronizing political violence, silencing of political opponents, electoral fraud and manipulation of state machinery in favour of the client. In reciprocation, the patron expect to largely determine how to run the government he helped enthrone by exerting pressure on the client not on how to formulate and execute people- and development-oriented policies but to siphon state resources
for the extension and consolidation of his political influence and control. The patron deploys various forms of political weapons such as propaganda, blackmail, thuggery, hooliganism, kidnapping, threat and political assassinations or other silent means in order to ensure the continued influence and control over the client and the machinery of the state (Folarin 2005:37). The patron-client connection in the contemporary era smacks of criminality, malevolence, oppression, selfishness, self-serving and parasitism (Obia 2004:c6). In some instances, political patrons are officials in government who deploy the resources and instruments of the political community in favour of their clients.

**Democracy**

Democracy is another concept central to this discourse. It is a very popular concept in the literature particularly of political science that yet has no generalized definition. It is defined variously to suit contextual usage. Thus, in the context of this discourse, democracy can be defined as a form of government and philosophy based on active participation of the largest possible number of citizens and intended to promote common good of every member of the political community. It is neither merely a government which exists for itself nor merely set of assumptions of the organization of government. It is a set of thought and a mode of action propelled by common welfare and directed by a large majority of the adult members of the political community. It is neither the ascendancy of self-serving interest nor unrestrained accumulation of public funds for personal aggrandizement of a select few smart thugs (Ehusani 2002:10)

Another aspect of democracy is that it entails the idea of constitutional supremacy. It is a government guided by laws and not the whimsicality of men. Furthermore, democracy emphasizes compromise in the face of diverse and desperate opinions. Also fundamentally essential about democracy is the active popular participation in the political process in terms of voting and
representation in government by qualified persons vide free, fair and credible election. Still, democracy is about freedom and protection of personal liberties, as well as affirmation and promotion of equality in politics and governance.

**Governance**

Governance is an imprecise concept. Its meaning and processes are difficult to specify. Nonetheless, it is essentially synonymous with good government and sound development management (Osumah and Ikelegbe 2009). Essentially, governance is concerned with the management of the affairs of a state based on the organic or supreme law of the land for the purpose of realizing common good. This presupposes that it is governing based on constitutional provisions and statutory law rather than the whims and caprices of individual or groups. Also, it is aimed at serving utilitarian interest, which in the Jeremy Bentham’s felicific calculus is referred to as “the greatest number of the greatest majority”. Thus, governance is expected to provide the mechanisms, processes and institutions for changing and for citizens and groups to articulate their interest, exercise their rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences (Pryor 2003; B4).

It entails essentials attributes such as an efficient public service, an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts, transparency, the accountability of administration of public funds, compliance with due process, prudent management, popular participation, control of rulers through electoral process, effective separation of powers, decentralization of power, assurance of adequate and responsible representation in relevant institutions, and assurance of legitimacy in the conduct of rulers (Osumah and Ikelegbe 2009).

**Conceptual Linkage**

Having conceptualized the three central concepts in this discourse, it is necessary to show the links between them. Governance and democracy
have recognizable resonance. Governance signifies the employment of both legitimacy and authority derived from democratic mandate and normally entails a pluralist policy with responsible representative government and commitment to promotion of common welfare. The fundamental objectives of good governance and democracy are the championing of ethical behaviour in business transactions and promotion of greater transparency and accountability. These fundamental objectives are realizable when political contest is rooted in civilized and constitutional conduct such that will bring about necessary development in the interest of the citizenry.

In the traditional conception, political-client connection can be supportive in the building of democracy and promotion of the values of good governance as it repudiates arbitrariness, extremism, oppression, crass opportunism, insensitivity, irresponsibility, arrogance and corruption. The connection can engender systematic application of rules in the recruitment of political leadership and management of the affairs of the state for the fulfillment of common welfare. Indeed the philosophy of the patron-client in the traditional sense was driven by the desire to perpetrate democratic style and values of governance. However, when the patron-client connection assumes negate transformation as it is in the contemporary politics in Nigeria, it becomes dysfunctional to the interest of the whole. An in-depth understanding of the dynamics and costs of contemporary patron-client politics are illuminated through theoretical lens explored in the next section.

**Theoretical Expositions**
The proliferation, dynamics and mechanisms of patron-client politics in Nigeria can be explained within theoretical frames of rentier state, rent seeking and rational public choice.

The theory of rentier state holds that nations derived externally substantial amount of their revenue from oil on regular basis and thus
become autonomous and unaccountable to their citizenry. Oil dominates the economy. Only a few participate in the production processes in the oil economy while the greater majority of participate only in the distribution and consumption of its revenue. Only a few are involved the generation of the rents while majority are involved in its distribution and consumption. This presupposes that the leaders of the government make a deal and collect the rents then allocate it to the citizenry, which do not participate in the generation of the wealth. The government engages in public spending without recourse to the citizenry. In this way, the government is essentially an allocation state (Beblawi: 1987).

The rentier economies are under the control of the elites. They are in charge of the distribution of the accruable rents derived externally from oil, which translates into political influence. In the rentier economies, the sharing of oil rents is hardly based on any ethical rationality of work and meritocracy in representation. It engenders a rentier mentality, which violates the doctrine of hard work and encourages parasitic and predatory behavior (Yates, 1996).

Also, the rentier state is vulnerable to external price volatility and shocks. Account of its vulnerability to external shocks, it often experiences what is referred as the Dutch Disease, which is the adverse effect of over expansion of and reliance on the exports of one sector of the economy of a nation leading to the distortion and relegation of the other sectors. Since those in the government in a rentier economy control the distribution of oil benefits, the opposition, rather than being concerned about the underlying rentier state dysfunctions, rattles on about how benefits are distributed (Yates, 211.) In a rentier economy labor suffers distortion. In the period of oil boom or wind fall their wages are artificially jerked up rather than being based on market rationality.

The Nigerian state is an archetypical example of a rentier state. Since the discovery of oil, it has remained the mainstay of the nation’s
economy. Agriculture, which, prior to the ascendant of oil as the kingpin, has been relegated to the background. This character of the Nigerian state strongly influences and shapes the image, dynamism and mechanisms of patron-client politics that have adverse consequences on the tenets of governance and democracy. Those who are in government or seek to assume its control are essentially driven by the desire to allocate and consume accruable rents from oil.

The rent seeking theory holds that public officials are inherently vulnerable to the use of institutions of the state for extraction of rent for self-seeking goals rather than collective interest. All over the world bureaucrats and people in authority manipulate their position for personal gains. The manipulation of the bureaucracies is intended to acquire access to or control over opportunities for earning rents. It does not totally characterize the engagements of public officials as illegal, illegitimate and unethical action. The behaviors of public officials are not naturally illegal or even immoral. In a more general sense, their actions are both legal and illegal attempts to obtain and create monopoly rents. The behavior of public officials is fuelled by the search for personal gains can significantly influence the level and type of government intervention in economy. There is link between official desire or personal financial gain and the creation of opportunities for rent seeking.

The study of rent seeking is reflected in the public choice theory, which ascribes the features of government on the self-interest of politicians, bureaucrats and private individuals. The sources of rent include tradable regulatory system, financing capital projects, support for corruption in bureaucracy, privatization and subsidies with high pay offs for rulers, price distortion and foreign exchange restrictions (Dia 1996:25). Rent seeking results in waste of resources and can lead to economic inefficiency.
Patron-Client Politics and the Nexus of Mercenary in Nigeria

Patron-client politics is not historically new in Nigeria. In Nigeria, the phenomenon of patron-client politics predates the advent of colonialism. Evidence of patron-client relation abounds in the traditional political systems of Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani. In the traditional political system, political patrons played several roles ranging from settlement of disputes to provision of training in the art of warfare, politics and administration to their client. In reciprocation for such services, their clients pay tributes, taxes, respect and pledge allegiance (Nnamani 2007). Clearly, the patron-client relation in the pre-colonial era was symbiotic and mutually beneficial. Thus, the relation was hardly disruptive to the process of politics and development.

This nature of patron-client in traditional political system was perhaps shaped by the subsistent nature of the economy, and several principles of legitimacy such as primogeniture (ruler-ship based on inheritance), divine vocation of legitimacy an understanding that rulers are ordained by God, and charismatic powers of the leaders.

These notions of legitimacy were distorted following the introduction of colonial rule. Colonialism redefined the traditional patron-client politics through the adoption of indirect rule, which eroded the influence of traditional rulers (the traditional ruler where reduced from being patrons to clients). However, during the period of colonial rule, the former patrons (traditional chiefs) were merely turn instruments for the administration of law and order in the fulfillment of the exploitative mission of the colonialists. In the course of time, particularly owing to the emergence of western education, the old patrons were gradual pushed to the background and replaced with new ones comprising the educated elite. The educated elite consolidated their political dominance unlike the traditional rulers based on modern institutions and structures such as party structure for their political dominance and control over their clients.
By the 1950s when active party politics began a new set of patrons emerged. At independence, the politicians of old such as Alhaji Ahamedu Bello, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Aihaji Aminu Kano and Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe became the political patrons. Respectively, they were patrons of Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, Lateef Jankande, Alhaji Balarabe Musa, and Jim Nwobodo. Only in few cases were deep rifts generated between the patrons and their clients as a result of the struggle for the sharing of state resources. A famous example of patron-client politics with pecuniary undertone in the First Republic was the struggle between Azikwe and Eyo Ita of the NCNC. The Sir Strafford Foster-Sutton Commission of Inquiry revealed the former had attempted to get the latter to lodge local government fund in the Africa Continental Bank where his relation were shareholders (Odion 2007). It has been suggested that the accumulative tendencies of the political elite at independence was on account of the inherited colonial structure, and weak economic base of the political class (Szeftel 2000, Osoba 1996). However, there is no available record to the knowledge of this author that indicates relationship between them assumed Hobbesian character. This is perhaps because Azikwe, the dominant political leader in the region did not want to make it vulnerable to strong external political influence from the other regional political parties. It was almost at the same time that the Action Group crisis of 1962 paved way for the NPC-led federal government to penetrate and weaken the party.

During the Second Republic patron-client politics maintained virtually the same modular frequency with that of the First Republic (Odion 2007). Only a few cases of rifts between patrons and clients were recorded. A classic reference was, in Kwara state Chief Olusola Saraki helped installed Governor Adam Attah. However, before the 1983 general election they had serious disagreement over sharing of state resource, which cost Attah his re-election. Sarki supported the candidacy of the opposition UPN, late Josiah Olawoyin.

The patron-client politics with pecuniary nexus particularly underwent rapid changes during the military administration of General
Ibrahim Babangida. These changes came as a result of the move by the administration to rid the political turf of old breed politicians whose political activities were believed to be detrimental to the promotion of good governance. The administration introduced the politics of newbreedism, which further galvanized the upsurge of corruption, entrenched interest and moneybagism in politics (Isekhure, 1992:25). As soon as the ban on politics was lifted for the transition to the Third Republic Isekhure (1992: 17&50) noted that “certain categories of Nigerians who themselves constituted persona-non-grata to the politics and collapse of the previous republics were desperately looking for associations to buy...” Others sponsored delegates to participate in conventions of some associations while the activities of certain individuals contaminated and hijacked “the formation of the political parties from their infancy through the avenue of money to install themselves in power...” “The group solidarity was mortgage for personal reward and propensity to make quick money and unholy alliance”. This laid the fertile ground for reinforcement of patron-client politics with commercial undertone after the exit of the military in the Fourth Republic, 1999 to 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Patron-client</th>
<th>Forms of Relation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>Chief Olusola Saraki vs Governor Mohammed Lawal</td>
<td>Strained, involved deployment of violence, and eventually resulted in the deposition of Lawal in 2003 poll</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>Enugu</td>
<td>Chief Jim Nwobodo vs Governor Chimaroke</td>
<td>Strained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>Chief Emeka Offor vs Gov Chinwoke Mbadinuju</td>
<td>Strained, involved the deployment of violence and dropping of Mbadinuju in 2003 poll due to performance failure</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>Bornu</td>
<td>Modi Sherif vs</td>
<td>Strained, Modi deposed</td>
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<td>S/No</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>Gov Mala Kachalla</td>
<td>Kachalla in the 2003 poll to become the governor</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>Alhaji Abubakar Rimi vs Gov Rabiu Kwankwaso</td>
<td>Strained</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>1999-2007</td>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>Chief Anthony Anenih vs Gov Lucky Igbenedion</td>
<td>Warmed but later turned cold after Anenih single-handedly endorsed Igbinedion for the 2003 poll. Involved recrimination, accusations and counter-accusations</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu vs Gov Rasheed Ladoja</td>
<td>Strained and involved the deployment of violence, impeachment of Ladoja but later reinstated by the court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>Chief Chris Uba vs Gov Chris Ngige</td>
<td>Strained and involved the deployment of violence, police abduction and deposition of Ngige through the court ruling based on the confession of election fraud by Uba</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>Osun</td>
<td>Chief S.M. Afolabi vs Gov Olagunsoye Oyinlola</td>
<td>Warmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>Chief Barnabas Germade vs Gov George Akume</td>
<td>Strained and resulted in the sack of Germades political loyalties from the state executive council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>Alhaji Atiku Abubakar vs Governor Bonu Haruna</td>
<td>Warmed and resulted in the re-election of Haruna in 2003 poll</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compiled by the author from various Nigerian Newspapers*
3.0 Profile of Patron-client Politics in the From 1999 to 2007

Since the exit of the military from governance and with the enthronement of civil rule in 1999, the patron-client politics with strong commercial alliance and networks witnessed a re-emergence, mushroomed and become a permanent presence in the country’s political turf. Evidence of patron-client political phenomenon abounds at various levels of government and in many of the dominant political parties in the federation. The phenomenon of patron-client politics is also practiced at the senatorial districts, federal constituencies, local government and ward levels. In a non-exhaustive search of literature the table below shows some of the states where patron-client politics has been a seemingly permanent presence.

Instructively, the table above only showed some representative cases of patron-client connections between political godfathers and state governors. The relations between the acclaimed patrons and their clients have largely been crisis-ridden characterized by disagreements, antagonism, accusation and counter-accusations, blackmail, bizarre manipulation of party and state machineries, uncanny and weird manipulation of electoral process with aid of thugs, threat and actual deployment of violence and brigandage to secure and consolidate political advantage. The major sources of most of these crises are the sharing of public funds, political patronage and personality cult. The patrons usually desire to secure absolute loyalty, political patronage in terms of appointments of key political officeholders, award of contracts and enjoyment of a large share of the financial allocation to the state from the clients. Notably, it is only in few states such as Lagos, Osun and Adamawa that there was a semblance of sanity. These were states in which the patrons (godfathers) have not been overbearing (Williams 2009:7 Emphasis Mine).

The phenomenon of patron-client politic is not peculiar to Nigeria. It is a global phenomenon. Evidence of patron-client abounds in older democracies, emerging democracies and even authoritarian regimes. Several countries where strong patron-client connection exists
include Mexico and Kenya in the 1980s and 1990s (Grindle 1996), Bangladesh (Kochanek 1993), the Soviet Union in the post-revolutionary period (Ackerman 1999), the Sicilian Mafia in Italy patronize and sponsor candidate for elective positions and in return get compensation in the form of patronage (Gambetta 1993), America in the pre-world war II era (Odion 2007:75), in South Africa in the post-apartheid regime (Folarin 2005). Other democracies where patron-client politics has evolved are Australia and Bolivia. Instructively, the patron-client politics in most of the old and emerging democracies has positive value of accountability, citizenship consciousness and equality. In most of these countries, the citizens have avenue to supplant a party that fails to perform up to their expectations with a rival party (Philp 2001, Lazar 2004, Omobowale and Olutayo 2007: 425-446). Also in those societies, those who want to belong to any of the dominant party have equal chance of joining the party and being given the post they are qualified. Neither the godfathers nor moneybags are allowed under any guise to dictate to others as far as the policies are concerned. Thus, their politics are able to prop up the best candidates for public offices and governance (Daniel 2008:64). In Nigeria, the patron-client relation is based on master servant relation and motivated by commercial interest at the detriment of public interest. The patrons foist charlatans or hooligans on the rest of the people and help to ensure that they stay in office for as long as they desire. The clients in return device perfidious schemes aimed at boosting the residual interest of the cabal (Daniel 2008:64).

4.0 Implications of Contemporary Patron-Client Politics for Democracy and Governance in Nigeria

Patron-client relations serve as veritable means to consolidating the position of political incumbency, maintaining active political party organization, promoting intra-party cohesion, attracting political loyalty and allegiance, and maintaining support, financing political party and its candidates and creating discipline in policy making (Mwenda and Tangri 2005, Weingrod 1968). In advanced democracies such as America
the political machines strengthen democratic culture. In Nigeria, particularly in the current democratic dispensation, the dimension and dynamics of patron-client politics has proved highly damaging, uncommon and antithetical to democracy and good governance.

Although the phenomenon of patron-client politics is not peculiar to Nigeria, the dimension it assumes seem quite unique and uncommon and antithetical to democratic growth and survival. Democratic principles involve among other things free and fair elections, constitutionalism, and the right of majority to choose leaders and mandate them to make decisions and perform functions aimed at realizing common good. The contemporary notion of patron client politics negates such principles. Elections are said to be free and fair when devoid of electoral malpractices. According to Folarin (2003:37) the political patrons in contemporary Nigeria educates the political clients “to engage in perfidious and treacherous acts in winning elections – gaining the mandate of the people, silencing oppositions, patronizing, purchasing and lobbying stakeholders, orientation on looting”. In Nigeria’s Fourth republic the patron-client politics resulted in the brazen manipulation of state machinery in the process of political recruitment in favour of preferred candidates of the patrons. For example, Chris Uba openly confessed in the court how he masterminded the rigging of the Anambra state governorship election held in 2003 in favour of erstwhile governor Chris Ngige. While it may be difficult to ascertain the veracity of his claim but the subsequent annulment of the election and declaration of Peter Obi as the legitimately elected governor by the court tells the tale of how the electorate have been shut out from democratic interaction and limitedness of their ultima ratio of power due to patron-client political relation in the contemporary times.

Furthermore, the contemporary increasing dysfunctional patron-client politics stifles electoral contests, as the patrons are willing to do anything to frustrate and neutralize opposition from securing seats in government in order to get maximum return for their
investment. Although political violence is not historically new in Nigerian political contest, the swift from the traditional weapons such as accusation and counter accusations and use of light weapons to huge deployment of sophisticated guns and the establishment and use of armed gangs is new and unique development. The heightened political violence and extremism that characterized the general elections held in 2003 and 2007 are rooted in the dysfunctional patron-client politics. In fact, the July 10, 2003 political gangsterism against Governor Ngige in Anambra state with the aid of police led by AIG Raphael Ige is clearly a new development in the patron-client relation in Nigerian politics.

The pervasiveness and increasing dysfunctional of contemporary patron-client politics heat up politics and threaten democracy through the show of brinkmanship. The various political weapons they deploy explain this. They deploy political weapons such as propaganda, thuggery, hooliganism, kidnapping, abduction, blackmail, threat, and political murder against their clients when they renege on agreement. A case of the extremism of the patron-client politics is exemplified in the July 10, 2003 political gangsterism against Governor Ngige in Anambra state with the aid of police led by AIG Raphael Ige.

Like democracy, the contemporary practice of patron-client politics in Nigeria subverts principles of accountability, transparency, prudent management and common good, which is a vital to governance. It lays the foundation for the privatization, ransacking and personalization of public funds and failure to utilize state resources to meet the genuine and legitimate needs of the people. The patrons offer their clients assistance as capital investment to which they expect high returns. This orients the political clients to looting, corruption and sleaze in the management of the affairs of the state at the expense of the electorate. In the 1990s, the World Bank ascribes poor performance of public enterprises in Africa to political patronage, which drains off public finances (Mwenda and Tangri 2005). In Nigeria, as in many African countries, the state resources have been used to consolidate
political support by apportioning benefits and economic preferences to politically influential. Evidence abound that a number of decisions within the purview of government especially relating to political appointments, creation of new specialized agencies, award of contracts, granting of credit and concession have been made in favour of the politically connected persons who contribute to generously to campaigns, and mobilize support for the incumbent in several other ways.

Thus, it can be asserted that the pervading underdevelopment, collapse of infrastructure and service, socio-economic deprivation, anxiety and insecurity have been more acute in the states where the patron-client politics became a major feature. An instance may suffice. In Anambra state, crisis of development and governance under governor Mbadinuju manifested in owing of civil servants and teachers several months of salary. The situation resulted in protracted strike action by the civil servants and teachers in the state. It also generated critical comments and agitations by the civil society. The Anambra state chapter of the Nigerian Bar Association was very critical of the sordid state of affairs during this period. This cost the lives of the state chapter of the association, Barnabas Igwe, and his wife who were murdered by suspected political assassins (Uwehejewe-Togbolo 2005).

The dysfunctional patron-client politics in the recent times increased the cost of governance. The crisis, power play, intrigues, bad blood, antagonism between the patrons and their clients cost a lot of fortunes in terms of waste of state resources, disruption of government business. The destruction and burning of government properties in Anambra state is a case in point. Besides, the patron-client relation led the constitution of top-heavy executive councils in most states with not less than 50% of the appointments as protégés of the patrons. The public appointments have not been given on the basis of merit but principally on the consideration of loyalty. Thus, many of these appointees who have been the hands of the patrons serve in the government of the state with an eye to engender political advantage as much as possible. Some of the appointees, in the face of power struggle between the patrons and
their clients initiate and superintend projects aimed at embarrassing and frustrating the clients. An instance may suffice to justify this assertion. Governor Gabriel Suswan of Benue State blamed some members of his executive for several non-performing projects. These non-performing members of the executives are loyalties of his godfather, Senator George Akume, the immediate past governor of the state. It is only in few instances the clients are able to muster the political will to sack such non-performing nominees of the patrons (Nwakaudu 2009:73).

The pervasiveness and increasing dysfunctional patron-client politics spawn catastrophic consequences on the institutions such as the political party, police, legislature especially the state legislative assemblies and the judiciary that are required to strength democratic growth and effective governance. Political party is a critical element of democracy. It is in fact the political machine for nurturing democratic growth. Patron-client political relation fuels intra-party squabbles and wrangling as well as political crises in the steering of the affairs of a state. In most states, there was the establishment of parallel party secretariats and proliferation of party officials at the ward, local government and state levels. More so, the dysfunctional patron-client politics was essentially a symptom and a major cause of the factionalization and conflict between the executive and legislature that permeated the process of governance in the country. Legislature-executive conflict is not a recent development in politics and governance in Nigeria. However, the parliamentary irresponsibility and rascality in the greater part of the period between 2003 and 2007 in several states which crystallized into unwarranted change of leadership in the state assemblies in Anambra, Oyo, Plateau, Edo and Delta and impeachment of the chief executives in Plateau and Osun States were function of the dysfunctional patron-client politics. The dysfunctional patron-client relation also resulted in the use of the police as instrument for achieving self-serving end. A case in point is the July 10, 2003 police involvement in the coup and political gangsterism against Governor Ngige in Anambra state. The a team of police personnel led by AIG
Raphael Ige was said to have acted on the script of Chris Uba without consultation with the Inspector General of the Police to abduct Governor Ngige.

Also, the kind of structure, social norms, mindset and cosmologies developed in the patron-client relation that has prevailed under Obasanjo presidency is capable of discouraging people suffused in the public interests, problems, and needs from indicating interest or vying for elective positions. Given the instruments and extremism involved in the patron-client political relations in the first phase of the Fourth Republic people of integrity are abound to steer clear from politics and governance. This may rob the nation of patriotic leadership and allows for the enthronement of a larger number of mediocre, treasury looters and kleptomanias. Thus far in the current dispensation, the mismanagement, wastefulness, licentiousness, parsimoniousness and squanderism of state resources could be adduced to lack of credible and responsible representatives in government.

5.0 Explanatory Notes
The pervasive and increasing dysfunctional patron-client politics since 1999 is not an independent phenomenon. Several explanations, some structural and others behavioural can be constructed for the nature patron-client politics. To recapitulate the patron-client politics because of the commercial nexus during this period was characterized by destructive intense violence, brinkmanship, gangsterism, illegality, maliciousness, accusations and counter-accusations, intimidation of opposition candidates to gain unfair advantage, abuse of office, corruption and failure to dispense democratic dividends to the people. At the root of these tendencies and deployment of crude and primitive tactics in the contest for political office is the structural character of the state. As Claude Ake (1996:7) observed much of what is uniquely negative about politics in Africa arise from the character of the state, particularly its lack of autonomy, immensity of its power, its proneness to abuse, and lack of autonomy and lack of immunity against it. The
character of the state rules out a politics of moderation and mandates a politics of lawlessness and extremism for the simple reason that the nature of the state makes the capture of state power irresistibly attractive.

The rentier and structural character of the Nigerian state creates high premium for state power and so much reliance on the state for access to the good things of life. In Nigeria, political office offers the possibility of ransacking the public treasury for the benefit of a select few. As Larry Diamond posits power has replaced effort as the basis for social reward. The net result of the high premium of the state power as the quickest gateway to accumulation, progress and cheap popularity conditions political profiteering, investment of huge capital for political campaign with the anticipation to plough back the invested capital as well as turnover. It also encourages the deployment of primitive tactics in the face of disagreement or renge in negotiated terms in order to secure for capital investment and selfish interest.

The Nigerian state is extremely authoritarian and repressive in nature. Governance of the state is seemingly a privatized and personalized rule. It revolves round the personality cult of the chief executives at various levels of government. The state hardly keeps faith with the constitution. It is not guided by the norms of democracy such as negotiation, consultation, accommodation and compromise. By its nature, vast majority are politically powerless and sidelined from the mainstream of political activities. It lacks commitment to democracy, nullifies democratic processes and entrones the regimes of the privileged few (Ojo 1996)

These distinctive character and tendencies of the Nigerian state creates an enabling environment for commercial alliance and network such as patron-client connection in the process of political recruitment, acquisition and control of state power. The game of politics attracts the investment of the moneybags and patrons because the state serves as the surest avenue to accumulation of wealth and actualization of fame.
Furthermore, the weakness and ineffectiveness of party structure and lack of party discipline contributed to the influx and change in the patron-client politics. The prolonged military dominance of politics have murdered the development of political ethos, party system, structures and discipline and matured and charismatic politicians required for true democratic interactions. Studies have suggested that attitudes are conditioned by regimes and historical experiences and political socialization As Larry Diamond noted the cognitive, attitudinal and evaluation dimensions of political culture are to regime performance, historical experience and political socialization (Ikelegbe 1995). The primitive and uncivilized political tactics and weapons that have characterized the patron-client relations in the first phase of the Fourth Republic admirably reflect the level of political amateurish and pre-maturity as well as undigested orientation of democratic values and conduct perhaps due to long years of military rule.

Other factors, which can be ascribed for the growth of pecuniary motivated patron-client politics between 1999 and 2007, included imperial presidency, political decay and corruption.

6.0 Conclusion
Recent history and development of patron-client politics with mercenary nexus in Nigeria have been a growing concern. Nigeria is familiar with isolated cases in the past; the current democratic order enthroned in 1999 has awakened the reality of highly organized dimension of destructive or chaotic patron-client politics. It involves the huge deployment of primitive tactics in the face of disagreement. As a result the development of the nascent democracy has been exposed to ominous dangerous threats. The personalized rule, privatization of state resources, deployment or adoption of primitive tactics, lack of accountability and exclusion of the civil society or vast majority in mainstream of politics coupled with insensitivity to common welfare
nullify the democratic possibility and effective governance. Several factors have been identified as plausible cause for growth of the pecuniary motivated patron-client politics since 1999. These include rentier or structural character of the Nigerian state which creates large stakes for the control of state power and other factors such as political decay, weak party structure and discipline, imperial presidency, political immaturity and lack of political charisma among office seekers. Thus, it is the position of the author that it is only in the context of a reconstructed and legitimate state and re-orientations of the political actors to the minimum values of democratic governance that the pervasive and increasing destructive dysfunctional practice of patron-client politics in recent times that our nascent democracy can be consolidated and the problems of effective governance frontally resolved

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Key Terms: Nigeria; godfatherism; Edo State; democracy; 2007 election; money politics.

Abstract
Nigeria is one of the African countries that is responding to Western pressures to make its states acquire a liberal and democratic culture. Over the years, Nigeria has practiced what can be described as fraudulent democracy. This democracy has been characterized by obnoxious acts such as indiscriminately using money and by very powerful and influential members of the elite class, popularly called “political godfathers,” imposing political leaders on the people. This situation has already become a culture in Nigeria because many politicians who want to contest and win elections always look for such persons to support them. This means that they no longer depend on the electorates to win elections, but instead rely on the political godfathers. This political culture was truncated in the 2007 gubernatorial election in Edo state, Nigeria. This paper examines how the problem of money politics and political godfatherism can be eliminated from Nigeria’s politics in order to strengthen democratic governance in the country. The methodology of the study is essentially analytical and based on lessons from the 2007 gubernatorial election in Edo State. The paper argues that Nigerians are becoming more conscious of their political

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rights and the need to shun illegal electoral practices. Moreover, this study highlights, among other things, the importance of prosecuting and punishing any one engaged in electoral fraud, including political godfathers. The use of election petitions tribunal should be refined in order to ensure the speedy trial of cases.

Introduction
The role money plays in politics has constantly remained an issue because of allegations of abuse and lack of control. It is generally believed that politics is an expensive venture and that only those people with the proper wherewithal can successfully navigate the murky waters. This is because of the claim that money contributes to the purchase of electoral votes that ensure victory. This claim is particularly prominent in developing countries, especially in Nigeria. Money politics have made it impossible for many individuals without access to huge financial resources to participate in and win elections in Nigeria. Money politics and political godfatherism have undoubtedly ruined democratic governance in Nigeria. This contention is supported by the London-based Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy index (2008). The report classified Nigeria, alongside 51 other countries, as an authoritarian regime. Moreover, with an overall score of 3.53 out of the maximum 10 points, Nigeria placed 124 of the 167 countries ranked (Atakpu 2008:1).

Money politics and political godfatherism, which have become a cultural element in Nigeria’s politics, are certainly problematic to the practice of democracy. Using lessons from the 2007 gubernatorial elections in Edo State, Nigeria, this paper examines the effects that these illegal practices have on the future of democracy in Nigeria. The first section conceptualizes money politics and political godfatherism, while the other sections discuss issues in money politics and political godfatherism including lessons that can be learned from the Edo State 2007 gubernatorial election.
Money Politics and Political Godfatherism – An Overview
Money politics refers to the excessive use of financial resources to encourage illegal activities or behaviours in politics, especially during periods of election. On the other hand, political godfatherism describes a situation in which very powerful and influential members of the elite class use their power, money and influence to determine who should rule or occupy a given political office and who impose these leaders on the people. The leaders are generally forced upon the masses through intimidation, harassment and an excessive use of money. Political godfathers act as the financial backbone for politicians who want to occupy political offices at all cost. Such political office holders usually become tied to the apron string of their godfathers. According to Igbuzor (2002:66):

Political godfatherism is a term now reserved for God forsaken criminals who will go to any length; I mean any length to achieve their set goals of wielding political power including arson, intimidation, warning, flogging and sometimes assassination’. With the money diverted from the coffers of the Nigerian or State governments, they equipped their ‘army’ with the latest weapons with which their foot soldiers or political thugs recruited from amongst numerous jobless graduates and undergraduates from Nigerian and state universities to terrorize, kill and main their kits and kin who oppose them. There may have been numerous killings by orders from these political godfathers. Assassinations reported as armed robbery gone wrong are so numerous to count, and these killings go unsolved by the Nigerian ill equipped police. The modus operandi of the Nigerian political godfather is clear even to the blind. The godfather or the godson occupies an exalted position in government, rather than spending the available fund to establish a factory or set up a process that will employ the youths like school leavers and university graduates, the money is diverted to Swiss or other European or American banks. School leavers and university graduates are therefore made jobless and provide fertile ground for recruiting foot soldiers that will do the evil bidding of these godfathers. Godfatherism is an evil building block for corruption, retrogression, under development, mediocrity, backwardness and perpetual poverty of the people.
Money politics and the political culture of godfatherism have turned Nigerian democracy into the government of godfathers by their sons, or puppets for the enslavement and destruction of the people. According to western definition and practice, this is really a negation of liberal democracy.

Looking at the Nigerian political terrain, one can observe that the electoral process has been bedeviled by many intractable problems that have been perpetuated by political godfathers and their allies. These problems include violence, intimidation, abusive language, political assassination, rigging elections, disseminating falsehoods, and manipulating the government owned mass media and the Nigerian police force for partisan political ends. Money politics and political godfatherism have also resulted in the illegal printing of ballot papers, the illegal manufacturing of ballot boxes, the denial of electoral rights, citizens falsifying election results, false announcements of candidates and the beating, killing or maiming of political opponents. During election periods, politicians who want to win at all cost use money to buy their votes. This is achieved in the following ways:

- Sharing money or gift items with the electorates
- Giving money (bribes) to officers charged with the responsibility of conducting free and fair elections
- Paying law enforcement agents either to intimidate anyone who fails to vote for the ‘chosen candidate’ or to remain aloof when they witness illegal electoral practices, and
- Employing thugs to intimidate or coerce voters to vote for a particular candidate, preventing elections from taking place in certain areas or encouraging other acts that could prevent the conduct of free and fair elections
The use of money for illegal activities during periods of election often results in electoral fraud which impinges on democratic governance in Nigeria.

**Antecedents to Money Politics and the Political Culture of Godfatherism**

Before the introduction of British colonialism, in the territorial entity that is now known as Nigeria, there were various ethnic groups who lived and interacted with each other mostly through trade and, in some cases, through conquests marked by warfare. Apart from this contact, they existed as autonomous socio-cultural, political and economic units that held some cultural patterns in common. For example, the monarchical feudal system existed both in the Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria amongst groups including the Hausa-Fulani emirates, the Yoruba and the Bini chiefdoms (Anikpo, 2002:51).

Despite these similarities, pre-colonial ethnic groups maintained their respective autonomies in the governing and economic exploitation of their resources. This situation existed until the British colonialists forced them to become nations in 1914. During the colonial era, the British practiced an organization style of ‘divide and rule’ in which they ruled the people. This system did nothing to correct the divisive barriers that existed between the various ethnic groups relating to ethnicity, religion and class. Rather, these elements were reinforced and used as instruments, by the colonialists, to gain competitive advantages in the new political order. These advantages allowed them to fulfill their economic desires to exploit Nigeria’s collective resources and to dominate Nigeria in the governing process, without any commitment to building up the ideals of democracy or respect for human rights in the nation. During the colonial and post colonial periods in Nigeria, the dividing categories of ethnicity, religion and class became intense and hardened. In turn, class configurations became interwoven with ethnic alliances, which enabled factions of the
ruling class to strive to gain competitive political and economic advantages over other contenders in their quests to govern the nation.

The colonial legacy has turned the state into an indispensable instrument of capital accumulation. As such, the state thus constitutes the principal instrument for private appropriation of capital. Moreover, different factions of the petty and comprador bourgeoisie engage in fierce battles gain control over the instrumentality of the state so they can utilize its allotted and distributive powers for their own private ends. Furthermore, as various factions of the dominant class struggle to capture state power, they pay little attention to the economic and social concerns of the ordinary citizens. Moreover, because their material needs have been neglected and the government has become unstable, ordinary citizens have become alienated from politics. Politics has thus become the dominant classes’ exclusive domain, which is manifested in the political culture of godfatherism (Agbese, 1990:27).

Elites came to view acquiring state power as the only way to secure life, property and some level of freedom. This accounts for why power from Nigeria’s independence until now has been sought out with such desperation that political competition tends to degenerate into warfare. This was gloriously manifested in Oyo State following the power tussles between governor Lodoja and Adedibu over a share of security votes, the crisis between Dr. Chris Ngige (former governor of Anambra state) and his erstwhile godfather Chris Uba that brought mayhem into state, as well as the impeachment crisis that rocked the Ekiti, Plateau and Anambra States of Nigeria, respectively.

Effect of Money Politics and Political Culture of Godfatherism on Democratic Governance in Nigeria

In its modern usage, democracy denotes a representative government which attempts to stimulate a sense of attachment to policies and programmes of the government amongst the governed. This suggests that the ultimate power rest with the people in a democratic system of
government. In advanced democratic states, Berman and Murphy (1996:6) espoused the view that:

Voters are free to propose a wide currency of public policy options and to join groups that promote those options. Voters may even directly determine through referenda which policy will become the law of the land. This pattern contrasts sharply with that of an authoritarian regime in which government stand apart from the people, oppressing citizens by depriving them of their basic freedom to speak, associate, write and participate in political life without fear of punishment.

From the above information, it is obvious that the form of democracy being practiced in Nigeria, under the influence of money and godfatherism is in the real sense an authoritarian regime. The following are specific effects that this form of government has on the political system:

i) It makes the conducting elections very expensive. In other words, politicians who want run in and win elections must have huge sums of money before they can ‘buy’ political power.

ii) The huge expenditure incurred in purchasing political power prevents political office holders from delivering quality services to the people. This is because public funds are used to settle the debts incurred by candidates during election and for giving rewards to those who aided or abetted electoral fraud.

iii) It allows political office holders to dismiss their duty to be responsible to the electorates since they were not elected by them. Instead, they feel accountable to their political godfathers. This is because they installed them and can guarantee that they stay in office.
Money Politics, Political Godfatherism and Democratic Contradictions in Nigeria

Democratic governments ensure that the power the people entrust to their representatives is transformed into authority through elections. The authority therefore becomes the right to govern in any democratic setting. It thus follows that those who cannot procure the mandate of the people by gaining the majority of the votes in an election do not have the right to govern or represent the electorates. It is equally true that it is elections that provide governments with the legitimacy or acceptability they require from the people to govern successfully (Adejumobi, 2004:3-6; Omadjohwefe, 2007:68). From the foregoing information, it is obvious that situations in which political godfathers use money and influence or in which they side track the electorates during elections creates illegitimacy in governments and contradictions in democracy.

In Nigeria, democratic values and expectations are contradictory and are compromised as political office seekers view the election process as a do or die affair. In their desperation to emerge winners, they employ unlawful methods, some of which actively manipulate the entire electoral process to their personal advantage (Omadjohwefe, 2007:68).

Money politics and political godfatherism have increased the occurrence of electoral fraud in Nigeria. Moreover, electoral malpractice is becoming more sophisticated with each democratic experience. As Zabadi (2003:16) noted, every stage of the electoral process, from the registration of political parties and voters up to the declaration of results, is fraught with electoral fraud.

Using wealth to gain control of government mechanisms in Nigeria is a pathetic situation. Joseph described the experience (1999:155) as follows:
Nigerian elections are practically a competition for the control of the electoral machinery and secondarily, a competition for individual votes. Any party which fails to win control of this machinery in a particular area, or to neutralize the influence of its opponents over the personnel operating the machinery, risks losing elections regardless of the actual support it enjoys among the electorates.

Another way in which democratic contradiction manifests itself is by having political godfathers impose candidates on the electorates in party primaries or general elections. Although this situation was very rampant in almost all the states of the federation during the 2007 elections, the case of Edo state and the lessons that can be learned from this case will be examined in this paper.

The 2007 Gubernatorial Election in Edo State, Nigeria
On April 14, 2007, the majority of the people of Edo State, Nigeria came out *en mass* to perform their civic duty i.e. electing a new governor for the state. During the election, many people experienced incredible situations during attempts to exercise their political rights. The intimidation, brutality and savagery to which the electorates were subjected left much to be desired. During the election, many people were dehumanized while others lost their lives.

Before the election, opinion polls conducted across Nigeria favoured Adams Oshiomhole of the Action Congress to win the election. This is because of Lucky Igbinedion of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), perceived shortcomings during his eight years as governor of Edo state. As a result, the people decided that they needed a clean break from the old order, including the influence of political godfathers such as Tony Anenih and Dr. Samuel Ogbemudia. However, the role that both Chief Tony Anenih and Dr. Samuel Ogbemudia played in the final analysis of the election is generally part of another question altogether.
On the day of the election, it was a straight battle between Professor Osarieme Osunbor and Comrade Adams Oshiomhole. Two days after the election, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) could not announce the results for Oshiomhole’s supporters, apparently acting on hints from inside INEC, barricaded the commission’s office in Benin City and threatened to destroy the building if the results were not released according to their desires. The tension in the state forced the electoral body to relocate to its National Headquarters in Abuja where they declared Osunbor the winner of the election on April 18, 2007, which was four days after the election (The Guardian, 2008:4).

Declaring Professor Osarieme Osunbor as the winner of the election caused protests to break out in Benin City, the state capital, and other parts of the state. The people protested because they were aware that the declaration made by INEC did not reflect the votes of the people, but instead represented the desires of political godfathers. This caused the people to decide to fight and even die for their votes. In order to prevent violence and allow the rule of law to take its course, believing that the problem would be settled peacefully by the Edo State Election Petitions Tribunal, the assumed winner of the election Comrade Adam Oshiomhole told the people to remain calm.

On May 20, 2008, following serious investigations, the Chairman of the Edo State Governorship Election Petition Tribunal, Justice Peter Umeadi, declared Adams Oshiomhole governor of Edo State. Ruling on the petition filed by Oshiomhole, Action Congress Governorship Candidate on the 14th of April, 2007 governorship election in Edo State, against the election of Prof. Osarieme Osunbor, Umeadi declared that Oshiomhole polled the highest number of valid votes during the election. The tribunal then directed the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to “withdraw the Certificate of Return issued to Osunbor” and to issue the same to Oshiomhole as Governor of Edo State who scored a quarter of the total votes cast in 12
of the 18 local government areas of the state. As reported by The Guardian (2008: 18):

The tribunal headed by Justice Peter Umeadi had, in its 6-hour ruling, declared Mr. Oshiomhole winner having polled 166,577 votes against Prof. Osunbor’s 129,017. Mr. Oshiomhole, it added, secured one quarter of the votes cast in 12 local government areas of the state, pointing out that the petitioner had proved beyond reasonable doubt malpractices and non-compliance by INEC with the Electoral Act of 2006 in the 12 local government areas of the state. It held that the petitioner had been able to prove its allegations of multiple voting, rigging and outright electoral fraud and multiple accreditations during the election. After reviewing the votes cast at the election, the tribunal said it found 51,534 invalid for the PDP because they were not stamped at the back while it recorded 13,610 invalid votes for the AC bringing the total to 65,144. These invalid votes were cancelled out right by the tribunal. Similarly, the tribunal cancelled all votes scored by both parties on account of over-voting, and said the total number of votes scored by the AC candidate in the four local government areas of Oredo, Egor, Ikpoba Okhai and Etsako East which were not challenged by the respondents stood at 84,893 for the AC while PDP scored 29,657.

In the two contentious local government areas of Akoko Edo and Etsako Central, the tribunal held that contrary to INEC’s claim that elections were held in the two local government councils, no election took place and, therefore, discountenanced the evidence of INEC’s Director of Operations in Edo State, Mr Kayode Olawale, and the results issued.

Immediately after the tribunal made its decision, Professor Osunbor appealed to the Court of Appeals to reconsider the case. On the November 12, 2008, the Court of Appeals declared Comrade Adams Oshiomhole, the Action Congress (AC) candidate, as the winner of the election. In a swift reaction to this judgment, Professor Osunbor said "it is a victory for rule of law." Most legal experts described the judgment as a historical judgment. After reviewing the judgment of the election petition tribunal and the reduction of the 82 grounds of appeal from Oserhieme Osunbor to four, the President of the Court of Appeals,
Justice Umaru Abdulahi, delivered the three and a half hour ruling in which he declared that Oshiomhole received over 23 percent of the votes cast in 16 local government councils and that the two councils of Etsako Central and Akoko Edo were cancelled. The Court made its ruling proclaiming that, “The Court is in total agreement with the tribunal that Comrade Adams Oshiomhole scored the highest number of votes cast in the April, 2007 governorship election”(The Guardian, 2008). Immediately following the judgment’s declaration, the streets that were earlier deserted out of fear of violence became flooded by broom carrying youths, women and supporters of the AC. While the jubilation continued, the large number of people located along strategic areas of the state capital for securing, including the popular Ring Road, later joined in the euphoria of the victory dance. However, the dance was nearly marred by a ghastly motor bike accident which led to the deaths of two people at the Ikpoba Slope area of the state capital.

Commenting on his victory, after a victory ride from the venue of the appeal to the state party secretariat along Airport Road, Benin-City, Oshiomhole said the judgment by the Court of Appeals was a "victory for the people of the state, the judiciary and the entire democracy of the nation." His lead Counsel Wole Olanipekun (SAN) described the judgment as "an epic one, a watershed in jurisprudence as far as electoral petition is concerned" saying "it left no stone unturned; it is a fantastic judgment. The judgment of the Court of Appeal just affirms what the lower court said earlier. They have demonstrated that any where we are or go, the rule of law should be supreme"(The Guardian, 2008:2).

The Impact of the Electoral Tribunal Judgment and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria
The impact of the electoral tribunal judgment is far-reaching, especially when the judgments in cases made after it, in places such Oyo, Ekiti and Ondo, are considered. This shows that there is no place for people who illegally occupy political offices to hide. Some of these occupants would
find themselves in the political wilderness if the Court of Appeals removes them from their office. The decisions of the tribunal and of the court show that the days of election rigging in Nigeria are over and that for those people who thought of illegally holding office as a veritable means of livelihood should begin looking for alternative jobs. For the governors of the state, where appeals are still pending, it is not over until it is over.

The greatest achievement that resulted from the judgment is that it cemented a place for democracy in Nigeria. The rule of law has now taken a firm stand in the polity. This is because one cannot talk about democracy without talking about the rule of law: they are interwoven. There are no successful democracies without the rule of law for it is the axle upon which successful democracies stands.

The judgment is clearly a warning that godfatherism is no longer going to be accepted as a part of Nigeria’s political culture. Once there is evidence that an election has been rigged, the tribunal will now invalidate such an election and to ensure that the rightful candidate wins the election. Apart from this, the court has sent the further message that apart from putting an end to the era of godfatherism, they are also putting an end to the era of money politics in which people believe that justice can be purchased. If it were not for the judiciary, Oshiomhole would not be in office today. No society progresses when you ostracize the right people from the realms of governance.

Moreover, the judgment rekindles hope for the legitimacy of democracy, the rule of law, and the ability of the judiciary to correct wrongs done by INEC in Nigeria. INEC must be re-organized and it must rededicate itself to Nigeria. It should be noted that INEC has subscribed to what democracy means and what it should be and consequently, it should stop causing dislocations for Nigeria democracy. INEC should stop acting as a landmine that blocks democratic development and progress of Nigeria.
Conclusion
During the course of the study, it was noted that money and godfatherism played a prominent role in the political affairs of Nigeria, especially in the electoral system. To enforce this point, particular reference was made to the 2007 General Elections in Edo State which, to a large extent, truncated the true democratic system of administration. This is because a democratic system of government that does not allow for true democratic practices will not make foster a strong government or strong development for society.

In light of this information, this paper recommended the following recommendations that will create a true democratic system of administration in the country, especially in Edo State:

i) Political education should be encouraged by civil society organizations. It should be encouraged because to be successful, democracies require citizens who not only accept democratic decision making as a core value, but who are also willing to assume an active role in the process of self government.

ii) Electoral reform should include political finance reform. This will help to ensure money is properly used in political activities especially during the elections. Before such reforms are made, adequate research is essential.

iii) Anyone whose election is nullified or made void either on the grounds of rigging, fraud or because that person was not the duly accredited candidate, must pay back the state coffers all the salary and other prerequisites of office he received as a result of being an impostor.

In order to curtail electoral fraud, people involved in illegal electoral practices should be prosecuted and punished.
References


Politics of Rumour and Rumour in the Power Dynamics

Dr. Stanley Naribo Ngoa

Key Terms: politics; rumour; democracy.

Dedication: To Dr. Stanley Macebuh; who died an avoidable death.

Abstract
Rumour is generally viewed as suspect evidence because, it is supposedly, communication constructed on unverified information. However, rumour, has seemingly transcended this generalized negative connotation and has acquired some air of importance with news value placed on it. This paper attempts an examination of rumour as a political manipulation tool, its social relevance and potency as well as its effect on the bureaucratic flow of policy decisions. The paper argues that rumour as an agent of political power dynamics possesses powerful effects; concluding that, there is the need for new research that moves beyond the old media treatment of rumour and its associated negative connotations.

Introduction and Theoretical Approach
Rumour as a concept lacks a precise definition both in the study of the humanities as in the social sciences. But the general consensus amongst scholars and experts of different hues is that rumour involves information/messages whose veracity is quite often notoriously difficult

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to confirm. Rumour, then, can be referred to as communication constructed on unverified information and thus hearsay, normative or suspect evidence.

The theoretical framework for this paper will therefore anchor within the following propositions: (1) Jason Harsin’s examination of several key transformations in mediated American politics that promise the efficacy of rumour as well as encourage its use as a privileged communication strategy whose truthfulness could be in doubt (2) Rosnow & Fyne’s argument that rumour could be a ‘vital curative for society’ on the one hand, while on the other equally viewed as distasteful, harmful and vile (3) Allport & Postman’s concept of rumour that becomes ‘embroidered’ and (4) Stephen Ellis’ observation that some rumours eventually turn out to be not just part of the truth but accurate.

Rumour is generally associated with the negative connotation of falsehood. Harsin (2006) in his examination of several key transformations in mediated American politics that promise the efficacy of rumour as well as encourage its use as a privileged communication strategy confirms rumour as a claim whose truthfulness is in doubt; adding that, even if its ideological or partisan origins and intents are clear, rumour’s sources often remain unclear.

But, whereas Pendleton (1998) citing Berenson corroborates Harsin’s view and defines rumor as a persuasive proposition that lacks ‘secure standards of evidence’, Ellis (1989) observes that some rumours eventually turn out to be not just part of the truth but accurate, providing a voice for the poor and powerless; and quite often serving as a channel this author elsewhere (Ngoa, 2006) refers to as, of ‘deviant communication’; that is, the timed release of unusual piece of information concerning an opponent – especially in political contests.

Rumour, as an agent of manipulation and as such a sub-set of propaganda in politics represents a sad commentary not just for its
victim but also, sometimes, for the promoter too. Irrespective of the purpose of the message, rumour could work like a double-edged sword if not properly handled and carefully positioned. Put differently, just like a double-edged sword would cut from both ends when in motion, so could rumour backfire if not carefully planned and executed. A rumour designed to negatively affect its intended victim may in the diffusion process gather momentum and change course against its perceived original perpetrator. Rumour as a double edged sword seem to confirm the old adage that, ‘words begot words’ and that those who live in glass houses should not throw stones.

For example, during the General Ibrahim Babangida military government experimentation with democracy in Nigeria, the camp of an aspirant to a local government chair in a south-south state was alleged to have spread rumours of impropriety against their candidate’s opponent. It did not take long before the rumour gathered negative momentum in the direction of the aspirant from whose camp the alleged rumour of impropriety emanated. According to this reversing rumour, our aspirant is an ex-convict. During his days as a student in London he had been found guilty of some impropriety related offence and sentenced to serve a prison term by a south London magistrate’s court. True or false, the victim of this reversed order of rumour, seem to have left partisan politics for good.

The above narrative may have the semblance of what some people would describe as revenge rumour, but it fits more of what Allport & Postman (1947) would refer to as the rumour that becomes ‘embroidered in the telling’ and got enlarged like a ‘rolling snowball’. Buckner (1965), Peterson & Gist (1951) suggest a ‘snowballed’ or ‘snowballing’ rumour as one with increasing enlargement and implies that details are retained as new ideas are superimposed. The result, the authors note, is a ‘Gestalt of interrelated rumours, probably derived from a common origin and differentiated into a profusion of details …’ But, Marques et al (2006) also argue that, most information arises from different sources and in different forms and versions, from which,
receivers may select and evaluate by appraising their common as well as ‘distinct components and sources’.

Although rumour is usually associated with false and damaging accusations against its victim and quite often dismissed by victims as bits and pieces of lies sometimes interjected with half-truths, contemporary rumour is curios enough not to be viewed from the perspective of lies interjected with half-truths. Rumour is now laced in suggestive language, carefully timed and filtered to: ‘whom it may concern’.

Rumour is as old as human society itself and has been a subject of interest for as long as it has flourished; arousing in interpretive experts and scholars amongst other interest groups, diverse viewpoints, equaled by diverse areas of inquiry.

One scholarly definition of rumour locates it in the pioneering work of the German psychologist Louis William Stern who in 1902 experimented on rumour with a ‘chain of subjects’ instructed to simply diffuse some information/message. The ‘chain of subjects’, while passing their information, message or story in a process described as from ‘mouth to ear’, were also required not -‘permitted’- to ‘repeat’ nor ‘explain’ details of their story. Louis Stern’s experiment found that the story became shortened as it passed through the ‘chain’ and finally changed structure and content by the end of the ‘chain’.

In their seminal work – The psychology of rumour (Robert Knapp had in his 1944 categorization of rumour used the same title) - , Gordon Allport (himself, a former student of Stern) and Leo Postman (former student of Allport at Harvard University) corroborate and confirm Louis Stern’s findings that, as rumour travels it grows shorter and easier to tell.

Allport & Postman (1947) based their judgment on the movement of rumour being guided by factors which they describe as
leveling, sharpening, and assimilation. Leveling refers to the loss of detail during the transmission process, sharpening is the selection or isolation of certain details for transmission; and assimilation describes the distortion in the message during the transmission process.

Like Louis Stern, Allport & Postman studied the process of message diffusion between persons and found that between the first 5 - 6 persons in the message transmission ‘chain’, a significant amount – about 70% - of details were lost in the message; a confirmation that assimilation has occurred as test subjects describe what ought to be rather than what things were.

Whereas Allport and Postman’s basic law of rumour seem to suggest that the strength of any rumour will vary according to thematic importance and ambiguity, Rosnow (1980) offers a possible synthesizing proposition. Rumour, Rosnow postulates, results from combinations of uncertainty and anxiety.


Feldman-Savelsberg, Ndonko and Schmidt-Ehry found that rumours of public health workers administering a vaccine to sterilize girls and women led to aborting the vaccination campaign of the Year of Universal Child Immunization in Cameroon. The 1990 vaccination campaign in Cameroon was part of the Year of Universal Child Immunization project but contrary to its original purpose, rumour spread throughout Cameroon that government intention was to sterilize girls and women and render men impotent with the vaccine as a policy of birth control. According to the study, schoolgirls leapt from windows to escape the vaccination teams. An action that can best be described not just as a demonstration of the peoples’ mistrust of
government and its ‘hegemonic’ vaccination project, but also an expression of uncertainty and anxiety.

Rumour’s diverse viewpoints may also be responsible for the diverse opinions on its worth and affective value. Thus while some experts (Rosnow & Fyne, 1976: 9) argue that rumour is a ‘vital curative for society’ on the one hand, it is on the other equally viewed as distasteful, harmful and vile.

But rumour, traditionally a product of face-to-face encounters amongst close communities seemingly has transcended its earlier negative connotations and has acquired some air of importance in which the news value placed on it as well as the source arguably moderate the level of arousal and the diffusion process. Thus Rosnow & Fine confirm that, the greater the news values of an event, the more rapid the diffusion processes; adding that, while some rumours occur spontaneously, others are carefully constructed to serve a purpose (Rosnow & Fine, 1976: 32, 5).

With the above as a backdrop, this paper will now attempt an examination of the role played by rumour - that unofficial, unverified, quite often factual and sometimes invented piece of news or information; exploring its influence as a manipulative tool, its effect on the bureaucratic flow of policy decisions and the political power dynamics. The paper employs Nigeria as its discursive unit of analysis, treating rumour, first as a factor in political manipulation in the context of objectives and intentions. Manipulation here refers to the attempt to control a situation, opinions, attitudes or emotions of others to one’s advantage. The aim is to situate rumour as a neglected but valid agent of power in the political power dynamic equation.

The Politics of Objective or Intentional Rumour
The politics of objective rumour is often associated with the timed release of appropriate rumours into the political system. These include
well spiced and accurately embellished pieces of objective or intentional rumours bordering on impropriety, credibility and personal conduct of individuals or groups with the ultimate aim being to discredit, ridicule, disfavour or simply put them in disrepute and perhaps a compromised position - even more so if and where those affected are political opponents.

For example, in Nigeria, Iornem (1998:73) recalls that Godwin Daboh who was considered a political ‘enemy’ of then Governor Aper Aku of Benue State, in 1982 facilitated spread of the rumour that, Governor Aku maintained foreign bank accounts; knowing of course that Nigeria’s laws frown at public officers holding foreign bank accounts, because, public officers are alleged to be infamous for serving as conduits for laundering of monies stolen from the public vault.

At the end of the investigations, the rumour turned out to be completely false, as newspaper reports confirmed that the alleged foreign accounts belonged in fact to ‘Newsweek’. Although ownership of the alleged foreign account has been clarified, the rumour had already inflicted considerable damage.

This spread of falsehood, seemingly objectively planned and intentionally well executed by the perpetrator did not only dent governor Aku’s image, but also led to some cabinet officials in the government raise issues of moral authority and embarrassment for serving under governor Aku. One such example was that of Mvendaga Jibo – a Commissioner in governor Aper Aku’s cabinet – who had to resign because he felt the damaging allegations hanging over the governor’s ‘head’ were also affecting his own reputation.

In the end, the truth did prevail; nevertheless, governor Aku was probably never able to completely clear his name of rumours of impropriety before his death in 1988 (Iornem (1998:73).
On June 12, 1993 Nigeria conducted what is considered to be the most peaceful and fairest in its electoral history. General Ibrahim Babangida (IBB)’s government annulled the results of that election, while its acclaimed winner, M.K.O. Abiola, died in detention seeking the revalidation of his mandate (Ngoa, 2006:221). Rumours were timed and released to coincide with the eventual cancellation of the election results. The rumours, which were intentional and official in appearance, accused Chief M.K.O. Abiola, the undeclared winner of the presidential elections, of tax evasion, bribery of party delegates at the Social Democratic Party (SDP) convention in Jos, and of a questionable source of wealth. According to rumours, Abiola’s Concord newspapers and a bread-baking factory would not have made him the billionaire he was; and although not a military personnel, Abiola was also rumoured to be a beneficiary of the military in politics as well as making ‘promises’ to unnamed outside interests in order to raise money for his campaign (Maier, 2000: 60, 69 & 71).

The ‘official’ appearance of these rumours seem to have been confirmed by General Ibrahim Babangida (then military president) in an interview with Karl Maier – the Africa Correspondent for the Independent – during which the military president (Babangida) was quoted to allege that Abiola had supported in cash and kind - editorial support from his Concord Newspapers group - two previous military coup d’états in 1983 and 1985 respectively. Maier, (2000:60) quotes Babangida as follows: ‘... he did. He said so. ...We relied on him a lot for that. So there was both the media support and the financial support’.

In the interview with Maier (2000:72), although the former military president revealed that he was the single largest donor to Abiola’s presidential ambition, Babangida was also quick to add that Abiola would have made a ‘lousy President’ would not have lasted six months’ and would have been toppled in a ‘violent coup’.
Intentional rumour as a manipulative activity was also manifest during the ‘terrorist’ government of General Sani Abacha. On seizing power in November 1993, Abacha penetrated the opposition camp and even appointed some of its leading lights as cabinet ministers. However, rumour continued that many amongst his appointees remained nocturnally active members of the opposition. The rumour came to light when no sooner had Abacha dissolved his first cabinet and some of them returned to the ‘Pro-June 12’ groups, seeking revalidation of the annulled elections. Then, objective or intentional rumours questioning the democratic credentials, credibility and personal conduct of some of the agitators (Babatope, 2000:157) started flying around, in conjunction with rumours of state-sponsored assassinations and unidentified threat phone calls.

One such example was the rumour of a minister who, having been relieved of his ministerial post for stealing from the public vault five million US Dollars swiftly returned the money to the government treasury when faced with threats of a long jail sentence. This rumour (Babatope, 2000:156) eventually made its way into the Champion newspaper.

The story, which was published in a gossip format (by one Idon Mujiya), was, according to Ebenezer Babatope (Abacha’s first Transport and Aviation minister) a ‘ghost writing’ planted by the government. Babatope (Babatope, 2000:157) who admitted that the rumour and the Champion story referred to him, described it as ‘a deliberate falsehood designed to ‘disparage’ his character. He said that he started receiving life-threatening calls when the rumour did not seem to have achieved its objective. In Babatope’s case the rumour may have failed to achieve its intended goal, but rumour is regarded as fact in societies and communities where most people do not have the means by which stories can be authenticated. Babatope (2000:154) himself confirms that, ‘in Nigeria when rumours start to circulate, one must give such rumours sixty percent validity’.
Below, this paper employs four specific, rumour generated manipulative incidences and events to demonstrate the politics of objectified or intentional rumour and its seeming impact on the political power equation; even more so in the context where the individuals involved have ‘... news value ...’ (Rosnow & Fine, 1976: 32) and the manipulative rumour ‘carefully constructed ... to serve’ an intended purpose (Ngoa, 2006). These case examples below are used to typify how rumour has been used in various power struggles within the Nigerian political landscape.

The Speaker and the ‘Toronto’ Certificate
Alhaji Salisu Buhari, a young man in his early thirties from the northern city of Kano, was the first Speaker of the House of Representatives in post-military Nigeria (1999). Buhari’s political enemies perhaps did not consider him worthy of this exalted position and started up a commonplace rumour and gossip that the Speaker was a 'Toronto graduate', an ironic statement aimed at ridiculing Buhari’s academic qualifications.

As a requirement, all public office seekers are expected to file copies of their academic credentials; Buhari had accordingly filed a degree from Toronto University, but the rumour persisted that Buhari couldn’t have had a qualification from a university – Toronto University - that never existed.

The Speaker threatened to sue whoever was responsible for the spread of what he considered false information; and a sizeable number of the media spoke up for him too. But the political pressure behind the rumour was quite intense and Salisu Buhari owned up to filing a ‘faked’ degree and was charged to the court of law for forgery, subsequently found guilty and sentenced to prison with an option of paying a fine. Although he was later given a presidential pardon, Ngoa (2006:90-94) confirms that, Buhari not only lost his exalted position for
what began as a common-place rumour turned manipulative and intended to disgrace him out of the office of the Speaker, he also left the House and had been politically quite ever since.

The Priest, the Goat and the ‘Guber’
In 1998, during the electioneering campaign to return Nigeria to the fold of democratic nations, rumour spread in one of the south-south states against a gubernatorial candidate – the ‘Guber’- who also doubled as a priest in a white garment religious sect. The ‘Guber’ was rumoured to have named his male and bearded white goat after a prominent family in the area, with the prefix ‘Elder’ - i.e. - an elder of the sect; and, the same goat was rumoured to have died just before elections and was accorded a human burial by its owner - the ‘Guber’ - and the white garment sect as a ‘church elder’.

Rumours of the ‘church elder’ and his human burial (true or false), transformed into gossip and soon after became a political issue. The manipulative rumour seems to have worked as the ‘Guber’ not only lost at the polls; he was also labeled ‘fetish’. The political implication here is that, like the Speaker, the ‘Guber’ too had gone rather very quiet but for a different reason. In an unsophisticated traditional environment like the one in context, the people take serious exception to what they consider to be untraditional or cultural taboos. Untraditional or cultural taboos such as, not just giving an animal human identity but a known and localized prominent name with the prefix ‘elder’, ordinarily, amounts to committing political suicide for an aspirant to political office. Although, viewed also from the angle of a polity chocked with allegations of vote-rigging and all, the ‘Guber’ could equally argue that he did not lose at the polls to intentional rumour but was simply ‘rigged’ out.

The Senate President, the Mace and the Cave-Python
Nigeria’s erstwhile Senate President (now late) Chuba Okadigbo and the country’s then President, Olusegun Obasanjo, seemingly disliked
each other with passion. The President considered Okadigbo confrontational while the Senate President viewed Obasanjo as being dictatorial. This hostile state of affairs led to rumours that President Obasanjo was bent on impeaching from office the Senate President for the latter’s alleged arrogance. The result was the disappearance of the senate president’s symbol of authority - i.e. - the mace, on an equally rumoured ‘D-Day’ planned for the impeachment of Okadigbo.

Security agents of the state (the police) searched the Senate President’s official residence for the mace to no avail and when questioned, Dr Okadigbo explained that the mace had been taken to his home-town (Ogbunike) where it was kept under custody in his ancestral place of worship. The latter turned out to be a cave by the river ‘Oyi’, allegedly occupied by a king-sized python (Ngoa, 2006:90-94).

Chidi Amuta6 who worked very closely with Okadigbo during their Platform magazine publishing days recalls that the late senate president, revered in some quarters as the Mozart of Nigerian politics ‘adopted the tortoise as a personal totem, carried a fly whisk, poured libation to the ancestors and generally believed in the efficacy of the often less than obvious relationship between cause and effect in African cosmology’; but Amuta equally acknowledges, like many others who are closely familiar with Chuba, that the quintessential Okadigbo believed in God as he probably did in his ‘Ikenga’7 and may have been bluffing about this story of the ‘mace and the cave python’.

But this Okadigbo’s could-be bluffing story of the ‘mace and the cave python’ nearly snowballed against the late Senate president, as the rumour mill was at full throttle on Okadigbo’s beliefs and mode of worship; as against the somewhat favourably sympathetic rumour of the Obasanjo presidency’s resolve to oust Chuba Okadigbo for amongst other touted reasons, his political sagacity. But, perhaps, there was also a probability that, this turn-around rumour about beliefs and mode of
worship was equally all in pursuit of the presidency’s strategically objective rumour to impeach Okadigbo.

Okadigbo survived this episode, but another manipulative rumour of impropriety which he in his characteristic manner dismissed as ‘slipping on banana peels’ eventually got him removed from office.

Eighty-one of ninety-four senators of the Federal Republic of Nigeria voted to impeach the flamboyant senate president on the bases of what ordinarily started as unverified rumour of impropriety of which Amuta (2003) recalls that close friends of Okadigbo came to the ‘unsavoury conclusion that his tenure was over because the price on his head was too heavy and his adversaries too powerful and determined’.

But Nigeria’s 7th Senate president who said the overriding interests of all Nigerians was the top of his legislative agenda confirmed to Chido Nwangwu in a 2002 interview that his insistence to work ‘constitutionally on the principle of separation of powers’ was at variance with the presidency’s desire to control the senate and thus the negative rumours to have him impeached.

**Sunshades, Bowl of Water and ‘Awo…’ in the Moon**

‘Sunshades, Bowl of Water and Awo… in the Moon’ is about one of Nigeria’s founding fathers, the late Obafemi Awolowo around whom there were and still are so many myths, to the extent that when he died, it was rumoured that he died giving the legendary ‘V’ – victory – sign as confirmation of his political victory even in death (Abati, 2005).

Although until his death Awolowo remained the president Nigeria never had, one intentional rumor about him and the effect of that rumour on his Yoruba9 kinsmen during the 1979 electioneering campaign in which he vied for the presidency is instructive within the context of this paper.

It rumoured on presidential Election Day 1979, that Awolowo was going to appear in the moon to his Yoruba kinsmen at a certain
time in the evening of that day - perhaps to predict and announce the anticipated victory at the polls to his followers and admirers. All people needed to do in order to see him was to wear a pair of sunshades and in the case of those who do not have a sunshade as prescribed, a simple bowl of water positioned outside under the gaze of the moon will do just fine. They must not look up towards the moon but rather into the bowl of water; and there would be Awolowo, smiling at them live, with the legendary ‘V’ sign.

According to Rueben Abati whose most striking memory of the late politician was during this incident, nobody questioned the wisdom of using sunshades at night or ‘the chemistry of water as a reflector of images or even the possibility of anyone appearing in the moon’. But they moved from one end of Abeokuta to the other chanting ‘up Awo-o-o-o’ until as predicted a full moon stood out in the sky. Rumour has also been passed around that the neighbouring people of Ibadan and Ilesa among others had seen Awolowo in the moon as was predicted.

Abati who joined the sky gazing exercise confessed that he ‘looked and checked’ and did not see any human form in the bowl of water and as such was not convinced that ‘Awo’ had appeared in the moon. Abati did not have the courage to say so; but was concerned however that as soon as someone announced that he had seen Awolowo and that ‘the man was waving and smiling, and toasting his admirers with his famous victory sign’, all others joined by confirming that they too had seen their candidate in the moon.

Such is the potency of rumour as a political manipulation tool that in the eyes of his fellow Yoruba, Awolowo carried with him the image of an icon and a legend of uncommon ability his opponents did not posses. They believe (according to Abati) that Awolowo was capable of all things; including a rumoured appearance in the sky during electioneering campaigns; an objective rumour designed
perhaps to assure his teeming followers (‘Awoists’ they prefer to be called) that victory at the polls was a foregone conclusion.

This paper has so far attempted an examination of rumour in the context of objectives or intentions. It now examines the politics of situational rumour.

The Politics of Situational Rumour
Whereas a well spiced and embellished piece of objective rumour simply sets out to disparage the targeted opponent or curry favour, situational rumour as a political manipulation tool reacts to the political circumstances on ground, by identifying often with the positives of the situation. In the context of this paper, it becomes prudential as politic to identify with the power source that gratifies being associated with.

Thus during the Generals Babangida and Abacha eras for example, most elective political office seekers sought to be tagged ‘government candidates’ as those so labeled quite often, carried the day by simply being ‘cleared’11 on instructions of the powers that be.

Rumours of who would or not be ‘cleared’ circulated as a manipulation strategy by the military to checkmate the political elite from who they had seized political power by exploiting situational rumours of corruption. Iornem (1998:65) observes that, the military used the situational rumour as a political manipulation tool to secure public support in its ‘treasonable acts’ because, Nigerians are very emotional when it comes to issues of corruption.

And so it became current and vital for political office aspirants to associate with the power structure and be rumoured to have secured ‘clearance’ as either the ‘government candidate’, ‘the General’s man’ or the ‘Party choice’.
With situational rumours of ‘clearance’ and ‘official candidates’ circulating, quite a sizeable number of aspirants and office seekers – though covertly not in support of the military authorities monopolizing the political space – fell over each other to be associated and identified as ‘cleared’; which probably was what the rumour was intended to achieve – i.e. - penetrate the ranks of the opposition, create disorder by identifying and ‘clearing’ some hand-picked willing dissenters - and that, MacMillan (1978:9) notes, is ultimately, where the key to manipulation lies.

Whereas the politics of objective rumour is often associated with the timed release of appropriate rumours into the system with the ultimate aim being to discredit, ridicule, disfavour or simply put an opponent in disrepute, situational rumour reacts to the political circumstances on ground, by identifying often with the positives of the situation.

On the other hand, rumour in the political power dynamics mix seems to oil the decision-making process by appealing to the emotions and exploiting the vulnerability of decision-makers who are said to be sensitive to rumour but lack the patience to authenticate their information. Below, this paper examines the effect of rumour in the power decision-making process.

**Rumour in the Power Dynamics Mix**

Stanley Macebuh, presidential senior special assistant on public communications to Nigeria’s immediate past president – Olusegun Obasanjo -, ascertains that, rumour lubricates the power engine. According to Macebuh, rumours, ‘definitely play a role’; but wonders whether the exact role rumour plays within the power circuit is measurable and quantifiable in any scientific way. ‘That’, he ruminates, ‘is the big question’; adding that, in unsophisticated communities ‘rumour plays a very significant role in the process by which decisions are made’ (Ngoa, 2006:246-249).
Macebuh advances that most husbands will be hard put to claim that they are hardly ever influenced by the sentiments expressed by their wives at home, as quite often such sentiments are derived from rumour. The presidential Special Assistant hypothesizes the situation where a presidential appointment is in the works and in his privileged position he is privy to the information. At home, Mrs. Macebuh opens a conversation about the potential candidate and ends with: ‘they say he treats his wife very badly and so for that reason he is not qualified to take-up the job’.

The husband could presumably afford to ignore his wife’s opinion or sentiment but quite often it sticks; because, according to Macebuh, sometimes, the husband comments on the attitude of the nominee gentleman in question when asked to make an input. And that domestic conversation based on rumour may affect a presidential decision. ‘Quite often’, he recollects, ‘it does; especially when the boss-man is also interested in the gist’.

Ray Ekpu, Chief Executive Officer of Newswatch - one of Nigeria’s leading news magazines - insists that rumour is important in political power dynamics because most people in positions of authority are ‘very’ sensitive to rumour but hardly cultivate the patience required to cross-check whatever information at their disposal, and thus creating the fertile grounds for more rumours.

Ekpu explained to this author that someone who ‘runs a very powerful government intervention agency’ (Ngoa, 2006:246-249) narrated to him how ‘the President believes and reacts instantly’ to rumours. According to the Newswatch Chief, the President reacts the way he does because, in Nigeria ‘the worst is believed about people in certain positions, particularly where it concerns money … but the big man springs to action’ without verification.
Recalling his days as Chairman of the Editorial Board of The Concord newspapers published by the late rich and powerful M. K.O Abiola, Ekpu remembered how some people who ‘were in competition … and looking for higher positions’ would go to the publisher and tell him the Editors of the newspaper were doing ‘all the wrong things’; and Abiola would gratify them with cash gifts and ‘put them a few notches up in his own calculations of who should assume higher position’. Mr. Ekpu concluded by declaring that ‘people in authority are very vulnerable to rumour (Ngoa, 2006:248)’ and that to a large extent is responsible for the role of rumour in the decision-making process.

Conclusion
Beyond the theoretical abstract of rumour being an agent of manipulation in politics, Jayson (2006) posits that, when a policymaker or a candidate is forced to expend time and energy to respond to his/her damaged image/character, when rumour as a political manipulation tool force people to resign or be impeached from powerful positions because of claims that may just be a hoax, when communication constructed on unverified information and thus a hearsay – normative or suspect evidence – warrant presidents to drop from the list of contenders otherwise perfect candidates for public office, rumour do have powerful effects; and therefore calls for new research that moves beyond the old media treatment of rumour and its associated negative connotations.

Notes:
1. The word ‘objective’ is here used as a clear representation of rumour as something deliberate, disseminated with intentions.
4. MKO Abiola, presumed winner of the annulled ‘June 12 1993’ presidential elections died in detention while seeking the revalidation of his mandate.
5. General Sani Abacha, second to the last of post-independence Nigeria’s serial military rulers is famed to have been involved in virtually every forceful take-over of government in the country. Before his coup d’état that took him to power in 1993 as the kalifa – ultimate ruler-, he served as Defense Minister in the General Babangida military presidency.


7. Ikenga’ is an Igbo word representing at different levels the material, symbolic and the spiritual. At the material level, ‘Ikenga’ is a human being endowed with authority. Symbolically it represents power and authority that is usually exercised within the ambits of justice; whereas spiritually it represents some sort of personal god and perhaps a guiding spirit. The word is here used at the spiritual level.

8. Okadigbo confirmed to usafriaconline in a 2002 interview with usafrica publisher, Chido Nwangwu that Obasanjo’s presidency was bent on removing him as the Senate President because his insistence to work ‘constitutionally on the principle of separation of powers’ was at variance with the presidency’s desire to control the senate.

9. Yoruba people are kinsmen of Awolowo; they are one of the largest ethnic groups in West Africa and are predominantly situated in the west of Nigeria.

10. Rueben Abati is Editorial Board Chairman of the Guardian newspapers (Nigeria) and a leading newspaper columnist in the country.

11. ‘Cleared’ was the word in currency for public office seekers approved by the military government as eligibility criteria.

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A Critical Analysis of Funding Strategies for Repositioning Higher Education in Nigeria

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Key Terms: funding, strategies, Nigeria, higher education.

Abstract
There has been continuously declining budgetary allocations to higher education in most countries in the midst of increasing demand and awareness of its important contributions to global competitiveness, economic growth and sustainable development. This new trend has remained a contending challenge to educational planners and development economists to develop sustainable strategies and techniques for the financing of higher education. This forms the basis for this paper, which attempts to identify measures of ensuring that existing funds to higher educational institutions in Nigeria are efficiently managed and alternative sources not previously explored and tapped are identified, through stock taking of the existing researches on the financial management and sources of education funding in Sub-Saharan Africa, South African countries like Botswana, South Africa; Europe, Asia, and the United States of America. In particular, the paper suggests, based on empirical evidences, and among other things, the need to adopt a market oriented model of Higher educational provision and funding that relies heavily on student and family contributions with different and varied aids models to support students to pay the cost of education, thereby helping to attain

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equity and maximum participation, which are the most promising directions for the development of higher education worldwide.

Introduction
The notion that investing in education, particularly the tertiary level pays rich dividends to individuals and creates enormous dividends to nations abounds in development literature. (Harbison, 1973; UNESCO, 2003; World Bank Group, 2009). Both developing and industrial countries benefit from the dynamics of the knowledge economy; as the capacity of countries to adopt, disseminate, and maximize rapid technological advances is largely dependent on a relatively adequate, reliable, effective and functional tertiary education. In the modern era of information technology, knowledge has become the driving force for economic growth and development and higher education is the main source of that knowledge; it is at the heart of development, the most potent means of personal and social transformation; the critical nexus between all the goals on the development agenda, the critical factor that links all the items on the development agenda (UNESCO/IIEP, 2002, 2007). Indeed, an educated population is a springboard for jumping to high economic performance, and higher education remains the engine of creativity, innovation and social mobility.

Investment in higher education complements investment in physical capital. Education not only strongly affects economic growth, but that general investment has less effect on growth rates when it is not supported by educational investment or human capital development (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1997). In fact, this accentuates the fact that investment in physical capital and infrastructure will not and can never achieve its full potential without investment in the people who are ultimately responsible for the successful operation of that physical capital. Indeed, it is only human beings, the active agents of development and modernization among the four factors of production, labour and entrepreneurial ability that lend themselves to improvement by education (Harbison, 1973; Folayan, 1983); hence education is often regarded as the investment in human
capital. Education is almost always an investment, a profitable investment for the individual and the public (Blaug, 1980). In the same token, governments and people of Nigeria have also acclaimed education as both an individual and a national investment over the years.

The increasing demand and relevance of tertiary education has resulted in critical crises revolving round funding and financial management issues, which authorities consider as the biggest problems confronting tertiary education in Nigeria (Nwadiani, 1993; Adeniran, 1999; Babalola, 2001; Olaniyan, 2001; Utulu, 2001; Nwadiani and Akpotu, 2002; Akpotu and Nwadiani 2003; Teferra and Altbach 2003; Okebukola, 2004; Akpotu 2005; NUC 2005; Akpotu and Akpochafo 2009). The legions of problems in the tertiary education system such as strikes, cultism, inadequate infrastructural facilities for modern day university teaching and research, poorly furnished lecture halls, ill equipped laboratories, lack of befitting library complexes, that are poorly stocked and not able to seat at least 30% of the student population; epileptic electricity supply, inadequate water supply, low level of telecommunications and ICT infrastructure, inadequate and poor state of students halls of residence, excess demand/limited supply/access and severely limited faculty complexes without decent offices for lecturers and administrators; the overblotted class sizes and excessive work load for lecturers revolve round the twin problem of poor funding and poor management of the always scarce available resources. For example, Nigeria is the only odd nation in this modern world where university lecturers and school teachers engage in endless strikes in demand for better salaries and increased funding, while the public watches helplessly.

In the next section of this paper attempts will be made to examine whether or not there has been formulated funding policies that guide higher education delivery in Nigeria and the amount of funds allotted to education in relation to other social services over the years.
Education and Budgetary Allocations

As upheld by UNESCO and adopted by many developed countries, it is important to compare a country’s size of education budgets in relation to that country’s ability to generate wealth (GDP) and also to compare the share of education budgets with the overall state budget. This breakdown highlights the relative importance attached to education compared to other priorities, such as defense, military, security, health, agriculture and infrastructural development. The extent to which the public sector is able to give priority to education in her budgetary allocations helps to account for the differences in GDP growth and expansion in public education across countries. However, while available resources help to define the parameters for public education spending, the political will to re-distribute income and allocate investments to the sector differs greatly among countries and states. Indeed, from all indications, the level of funding and efficient utilization of scarce resources of an educational system is reflected largely on the state of available facilities and equipments, the environmental conditions under which staff and students learn and carry out research; and their general welfare.

Tertiary educational institutions are highly capital and labour intensive investments that require huge capital outlays in infrastructural facilities, equipment and personnel that must be aligned to the modern private sector employment if they must be functionally relevant. Unfortunately however, this is not the case. According to the FME (2009) the physical state of classrooms is very poor, and the level of infrastructure, equipment, laboratory and library facilities at all levels are grossly inadequate, obsolete, dilapidated, and non-functional. Indeed, NUC (2001) survey indicated that only about 30% of the students in universities could have access to classrooms, lecture theatres and laboratories. Also, academic staff are grossly inadequate in quality and quantity.

As shown in Table 1, there is acute shortage of academic staff in all tertiary institutions in Nigeria. The figures in pare tenses, which
represent teacher-student ratio indicate that there is a ratio of 42 students to a lecturer in Nigerian universities. The situation where a lecturer has to contend with as many as 42 students and yet, more than

**TABLE 1: STAFF STRENGTH IN TERTIARY INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Acad Staff Strength</th>
<th>Non-Acad Staff Strength</th>
<th>Total Staff Strength</th>
<th>Student Enrolment</th>
<th>Acad. Staff Req’d</th>
<th>Acad. Staff Shortfall</th>
<th>Acad. Staff % of Total Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coll. of Education.</td>
<td>11,256</td>
<td>24,621</td>
<td>35,877</td>
<td>354,387 (1:32)</td>
<td>26,114</td>
<td>14,858</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polytechnics</td>
<td>12,938</td>
<td>24,892</td>
<td>37,830</td>
<td>360,535 (1:28)</td>
<td>22,702</td>
<td>17,078</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities.</td>
<td>27,394</td>
<td>72,070</td>
<td>99,464</td>
<td>1,131,312 (1:42)</td>
<td>46,942</td>
<td>19,548</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>51,588</td>
<td>121,583</td>
<td>173,171</td>
<td>1,846,234</td>
<td>98,816</td>
<td>51,484</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: FME, 2009.*

**TABLE 2: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS (1990- 2006)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agric. % of Total</th>
<th>Educ. % of Total</th>
<th>Defense% % of Total</th>
<th>Internal Security % of Total</th>
<th>Gen. Admin % of Total</th>
<th>Def. &amp; Int. Security % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CBN, 2006*
70% of staff are non-academic is most unproductive and retrogressive for the actualization of the ideals of tertiary education in the 21st century.

As shown in Table 2, the Federal Government budgetary allocations to education since 1990 have been far lower than the 26% recommended by the World Bank. The fluctuations in the allocation also show a lack of defined funding policy, which is often at the discretion of the political leaders, military or civilian. Indications are that poor funding remains a major challenge that has continued to blight the development of education in Nigeria (Utulu, 2001; Ayeni, 2007). Total expenditures on education have lagged behind other regions since 1990s, just as allocations to education have lagged behind other sectors of the economy and largely fluctuated over the years. Per pupil and per student expenditures that were relatively higher in the 1970s as a legacy of early efforts to emulate the European education systems gradually began to fall and since the 1990s fallen below the regional average.

As rightly remarked, NUC (2005) indicated that over 30 % of state universities are starved of funds by their proprietors and the universities are compelled to augment staff salaries from revenue sources that are unhealthy for the academic life of the institutions. In 2004 for instance, the federally-funded universities could only receive about 24.7% of their budget requests from the Federal Government (FME, 2009). In such a situation where universities are grossly underfunded, capital and development projects, research, teaching and learning are bound to be minimally attended to, or ignored completely. Funding a university goes beyond paying salaries to include provision of adequate infrastructure, equipment and facilities; enlarged capacity utilization, state-of-the-art library and laboratories; and the funding of research and staff development. All indications point to the obvious that lack of adequate funding results to limitation of basic infrastructure, over stressed facilities, overcrowded classrooms or excess capacity utilization, dilapidation of infrastructures; un-conducive
learning environment, inadequate staff development and research activities, reduction in staff morale, all culminating into devastating effects on quality of products.

As shown in Table 3 and Figure 1 the entire universities in Nigeria, except the private universities, exceeded their capacity utilization for

### TABLE 3: CAPACITY UTILIZATION OF NIGERIAN UNIVERSITIES (2004/2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of University</th>
<th># of Universities</th>
<th>Total Enrolment</th>
<th>Enrolment Capacity</th>
<th>Deviation from Enrolment Capacity</th>
<th>% of Deviation from Enrolment Capacity</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Federal Univ.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>386,958</td>
<td>303,414</td>
<td>+83,544</td>
<td>127.5%</td>
<td>Over-Enrolment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fed Universities of Technology</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55,876</td>
<td>38,635</td>
<td>+17,241</td>
<td>144.6%</td>
<td>Over-Enrolment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional State Univ.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>211,614</td>
<td>125,931</td>
<td>+85,683</td>
<td>168%</td>
<td>Over-Enrolment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Universities of Technology</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>53,552</td>
<td>37,655</td>
<td>+15,897</td>
<td>142.2%</td>
<td>Over-Enrolment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>708,000</td>
<td>505,635</td>
<td>+202,365</td>
<td>140%</td>
<td>Over-Enrolment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Universities</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19,740</td>
<td>28,548</td>
<td>-8,808</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>Under-Enrolment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>727,740</strong></td>
<td><strong>534,183</strong></td>
<td><strong>+193,557</strong></td>
<td><strong>73.4%</strong></td>
<td><strong>Over-Enrolment</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: NUC, 2005.*

the year 2004/2005 by 202,365 enrollees or (140%). In the first instance, that there are only 727,740 undergraduates in a country of about 140,000,000 people (0.5%) attending university shows the extent of limited access, which is further depleted by inadequate resources. This over-enrolment in both conventional and technology-based universities arising from under funding has devastating implications for access and quality university education in Nigeria. Perhaps, with increased
funding enrolment capacity of the universities can be increased and problem of access addressed in part.

Global Trends in the Funding of Higher Education
All over the world, funding education has come to be regarded as a very profitable investment for individuals and society, and studies have shown that the higher the level of education investment the greater the private benefits to individuals and society (Blaug, 1980; Psacharopoulos...
and Woodhall, 1997; UNESCO, 2003, 2005, 2007). Despite this seemingly glaring evidences of the relevance of investments in education, serious controversies abound as to who should pay for it; just as countries continually cut public budgets for higher education (Tilak, 2006). However, in countries like Sweden and Finland higher education is seen as a social- merit or public good, which makes it a right of all citizens; making it statutorily mandatory for governments to fund it, irrespective of the cost as tuition fees are not allowed in higher educational institutions as provided for by the constitution.

According to Teferra and Altbach (2003) the bulk of funding for virtually all public African higher education is generated from state resources, such that they consistently provide more than 90 to 95 percent of the total operating budgets of the institutions. The public role in funding of higher education is discharged in different forms and ways, in different countries. In Tanzania, the model of African Socialism, the new trend according to Court, 1999; Teferra and Altbach, 2003 is that government is confining itself to funding the direct costs of education and leaving the incidental costs such as costs of residence fees, food, transportation, and the like to be met by students, parents and family members. This is also the case in Ghana and many African countries.

The high-income countries of the Northern Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries adopt two relatively successful financing models, which are affordability, and accessibility. The Anglo Saxon model is successful through its combination of a medium to high education cost and a highly extensive student assistance system, in particular with high availability of student loans; while the second successful model is the Northern European model, which provides the most accessible and affordable education to all students. They have large student bodies, high attainment rates, and the student bodies are reasonably similar to the country’s socio-economic composition. This comes from tuition free or almost tuition free tertiary education combined with extensive student assistance programmes. However, to
sustain these models, the governments have to rely on a large public investment into tertiary education financed by very high tax contribution of its citizens (Murakami and Blom, 2008). This model of using increased tax revenue to fund higher education largely helps to expand access and encourage equity in resource distribution.

The recent innovative mechanisms that some governments in the United States of America have adopted are the creation of a ‘demand-side’ voucher system, and the “supply side” vouchers. As the name implies, the demand-side voucher system is one in which institutional operating costs are determined and distributed by government to all undergraduates through voucher or voucher-like incentives. On the other hand, the supply side voucher system is that where education costs are paid by governments directly to institutions to offset part of students’ cost of higher education, based on student characteristics. To do this, there are two general types of allocation mechanisms that are used. These are the direct and indirect funding mechanisms. The direct funding mechanism adopted by governments all over the world include: financing of capital projects, cost of instructions, university-based research and research facilities and equipment. In most cases, these payments typically apply only to public institutions, although in a few countries such as New Zealand and Chile some private institutions are also eligible for public forms of institutional support. Such funding provisions are often determined through actual costs per student, average cost per student, normative costs per student (i.e., the use of the optimal staff/student ratios and other standardized efficiency measures to calculate what costs per student ought to be. This normative approach in costing education is being used in most developed countries, particularly England, and in Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic as requested by the World Bank.

The indirect funding mechanisms on the other hand include, the Demand Side’s vouchers, used to encourage competition among private providers of higher educational institutions and to encourage
and ensure increased access, affordability and quality assurance. Examples include the State of Colorado in 2004, Republic of Georgia, the Universities for All Program (ProUni) in Brazil, where tax incentives are used to “buy” places in private universities for deserving, academically qualified low income students; the Iskolar Scheme in the Philippines, where a student from each poor family is targeted for a two –four year scholarship of about $200 annually. (Pachuashvili, 2005) Other important mechanisms include scholarships, loans, tuition offsets in the US and Ireland, tuition tax- cash- back- credit in the province of New Brunswick in Canada, etc.

The private sector involvement in the funding of education is very crucial and significant. Nevertheless, the degree of private involvement varies widely across countries and levels of education. On the whole, countries tend to rely less on private funding for primary/basic to secondary education than at the higher level. Indeed, the share of private funding rises sharply at the higher level. For example, in Chile, 85% of higher education funding is private, and the share exceeds 75% in the Republic of Moldova and the Republic of Korea. In 11 out of 41 countries reporting data, 50% or more of higher education funding is from the private sector. In Italy and the United States, the proportion of private spending on tertiary education is almost five and six times higher, respectively, than at the primary to postsecondary levels of education combined. In the case of India, the share of private expenditure is relatively low at the tertiary level (14% of the total), where education typically benefits better-off families, while household contributions to primary and secondary education are twice as high as 28% (Colclough and Lewin, 1993; Colclough, and AlSamarrai, 2000; UNESCO-UIS/OECD/WEI, 2003; UNESCO/OECD/ Eurostat (2007; UNESCO-UIS/WEI (2007). However, in most parts of Southern Nigeria where most families withdraw their children from public to private schools, the household contribution to primary/basic and secondary education funding can be very significant to an upward of 95% or more.
The private sector involvement includes the role of the parents and students, philanthropic groups and non-governmental groups, proprietors of higher educational institutions, religious groups, etc. On the part of parents and students varied forms of fees, such as tuition, admissions, boarding, feeding, books, transportation, libraries, and development levies are paid. Of these forms of fees payable by students in higher education, tuition would appear to be one of the most viable and reliable source in places where used. In fact, Woodhall (2004, 2007) quoting the World Bank, opined that increasing cost-recovery strategies and charging of tuition fees in universities in the developing countries is fundamental in solving the problems of university education in the area. This recommendation is purely from an economic and rationality point of view, since the private benefits of higher education is often and always far greater than the social benefits. Indeed, the social benefits of education increases the lower the level of education. Hence more of public or social funds should be allocated to the lower levels of education for equity, and social justice; instead of using the people’s scarce resources to fund higher education that benefits most, the individual educate and their families.

As shown in Figure 2, the average annual tuition fees charged in 40 randomly sampled private secondary schools across the country (#23,734) and their average total fees charged (#67,065) can be equated to the total fees charged in under graduate (#28,862.5; #25,685) and post graduate programmes (#65,125 and # 54,500) in state and federal universities respectively. A comparison of fees charged in private and public educational institutions indicate a great disparity. For example, while the average tuition fees in the 14 sampled private universities stood at #237,883.3 and total fees #419,864.3, the total fees charged in postgraduate programmes are merely #65,125 for state universities or 27.4% of tuition or 15.5% of total undergraduate fees in private universities. The extremely large disparity in private and public university fees explains why there is low demand and under-capacity utilization in private universities as against over utilization in public institutions. The government, in addition to permitting increased fees
in public institutions, may need to also regulate the fees charged in the private institutions. For example, a situation where private institutions in Nigeria have to charge fees in foreign currencies is most unpatriotic and should be stopped.
In most countries where fees are charged, alternative measures are adopted to cushion the effects on parents, such as loans that are obtained, and after initial payments have been made by students and parents. These loan systems are obtainable in South Africa, Sweden, New Zealand, Germany, Hungary, Scotland, the US, etc. In some cases the fees are initially paid by governments, while students obtain loans or contingency funds from higher education contributory schemes to gradually offset them.

Recommendations
Available literature posits that there is nowhere in the world where higher education is entirely free, not even in the former communist countries, the socialist countries, or the highly democratic, developed and welfare states of the world. Indeed, indications are that budgetary allocations are dwindling, and experts are recognizing that throughout the world the financing of education is in serious crisis (Woodhall, 2007); hence alternative sources of funding are being sort. This calls for a comprehensive planning approach in the funding of higher education. A close analysis of the actual and incidental costs of higher education need to be undertaken and concrete financing policies should be taken holistically, bearing in mind the need for increased access, quality assurance, and affordability. Also many studies repeatedly stressed the importance of ensuring sufficient and stable sources of funding education (Colclough and Lewin, 1993; Mehrotra, 1998; Bruns, Mingat and Rakitomala, 2003) and that the level of public funding alone does not indicate good outcomes; in fact “mixed financing is better than either exclusively public or exclusively private financing” (Woodhall, 2007). This thinking informs successful governments finding a balance between private and public costs as they improve efficiency and prioritise education expenditure. From the experiences across the globe, it is only worthwhile recommending the introduction of enhanced fees in the higher educational institutions in Nigeria. There may be need to share the actual cost of tertiary education in such a way that governments provide funds for salaries and major
capital development projects in her institutions, while the institutions, from internally generated revenues fund staff development and research activities in collaboration with the private sector. In spite of the volatile and political nature of fee payment, its re-introduction can be achieved through a gradual and systematic consultations with the students body, parents and the entire stakeholders, just as was done at the Lagos State University some years ago, which is yielding massive results. Such a consultative forum would provide opportunity for all stakeholders to collectively decide how much is feasible and affordable by all. Also, it is required that fees are disguisedly and gradually introduced with new entrants through such items as development fee, caution fee, acceptance fee, library fee, science laboratory fee, sports fee, examination and field trip fees etc to forestall agitations from the student body.

In event of the government not able to muster the political will and courage to allow the introduction of tuition fees or some sort of substantial development fund of any guise, which has been the blight over the years, the alternative then should be to resort to either the Demand side or Supply side voucher system, by giving to the students or the institutions the normative unit cost equivalent. In particular, the use of the demand side voucher system that is targeted at the poor, and the re-introduction of the education loan system would help for equity; and the filling of the underutilized capacity in private universities while also enabling the public universities to improve on their carrying capacity and quality.

The introduction of some form of user fees must however, be preceded with alternative sources of remedying the cost implications through different and varied support incentive programmes like scholarships, bursaries, loans, and grants that are targeted at supporting the poor to pay costs. The managers of the institutions also need to introduce series of entrepreneurial schemes through which students can enlist for skill acquisition, while at the same time be engaged in part time work to earn income to argument school expenses.
There is a strong case in favour of the use of scholarships for both excellence and indigence and the setting up of a guaranteed student loan system that is strictly managed by the insurance and financial institutions, taking into cognisance, the Nigerian circumstances, and the critical considerations of the factors that crumbled the first attempt at student loan so as to make it feasible. Such loans should however be of income-related repayment type which provides room for mutual insurance and collateral that is guaranteed by the student’s university management. In addition, the degree certificates of the beneficiaries must be lodged with the financial institutions granting the loans until full repayment.

*Mandatory Statutory Provision:* Another major way of repositioning the higher educational institutions in the country for development is for the national and state assemblies to legislate and statutorily fix at least 26% of the nation and state’s annual budgets to education as recommended by UNESCO; and 50% of the education budget allocated to higher education. For example, in several Latin American countries, such as Nicaragua, Honduras, Bolivia, and Ecuador, the national constitution entitles public universities to a fixed percentage of the annual budget ([www.worldbank.org/education/tertiary](http://www.worldbank.org/education/tertiary)).

*Need for a legal provision for the establishment of an Education Expenditure Tracking Bureau:* There is an urgent need to constitute an education expenditure tracking bureau, made up of non-governmental officials, pressmen and pious men with integrity, empowered by law to regularly survey, campaign, publish and track down the various leakages of non-wage funds of educational institutions that never get to the institutions. This is being practiced in Cambodia, Ghana, Peru, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, with tremendous success stories (IIEP-UNESCO, 2005). There is indeed, a strong need for accountability and transparency in the allocation, utilization and management of the scarce resources available to education. With accountability and probity well entrenched in the management of education and all facets of our public lives, the need for a mandatory contributory fund for the development
of higher education at the State level becomes very relevant. Statutorily, every adult working Nigerian should be able to contribute at least 2% of their annual earnings to this fund, just like the education tax on companies, but this should be collected and utilized by the individual states. In the same vein, business organizations operating in the country should be encouraged by government to re-direct their provisions for corporate social responsibilities towards tangible human capital development endeavours, rather than on beauty contests, variety shows or sports only.

There is also the need for an institutional mechanism that demands accountability and transparency in the distribution and utilization of internally generated revenues (IGR), which hitherto are not subjected to external auditing and are therefore pruned to misappropriation and misuse. To ensure accountability and transparency that guarantee the attainment of the needs and aspirations of all stakeholders in the system, an all-inclusive participatory management approach, where all stakeholders—parents’ body, students’ body, academic and non-academic staff unions—contribute to the management of the institutions to create mutual trust among all. In this regard, the various unions in the institutions of higher education, beginning from the departmental students’ associations to the students’ union and the various staff unions must rise up to seek for self accountability and in turn demand accountability and transparency from management in the use of their collective resources. As a way of attaining further checks on management on the use of available funds, the internal audit department should be autonomous, separated from the office of the chief executive and empowered to collaborate with external auditors to audit the institutions and the various unions’ finances and publish their reports periodically. Through this process, the amount of funds generated internally and externally and how expended will be known by all.

The major source of internally generated revenue (IGR) for higher educational institutions in Nigeria is largely from tuition fees
charged in part-time and postgraduate programmes and perhaps some minor levies charged on full time undergraduate programmes. Thus, the Makerere University revolutionary policy option that encourages the introduction of demand-driven courses that bring about entrepreneurial ethos which parents, companies and individuals desire and are willing to pay for is recommended. This can be attained by encouraging the intensification of adult and continuing education programmes such as the weekend, sandwich or summer, and evening degree programmes. This implies the adoption of the eclecticism of course offerings and flexibility of timing as practiced in the United States of America and elsewhere (Court, 1999). To achieve this, mechanisms for monitoring and quality assurance must be put in place to ensure improved internal efficiency of the system. Also, to attain quality education the academic staff strength must be seriously enlarged to reduce staff – student ratio to about 10 and adequate incentive schemes offered to staff and units that generate the revenue.

A very crucial recommendation for improving the revenue base of the institutions is to adopt diverse cost reduction strategies. One major way to reduce cost and thus attain optimum fund utilization and efficiency is to gradually cut down on the number of non-academic staff of the institutions. To do this many of the administrative and senior technical staff with academic master degrees that qualify them for doctoral programmes should be converted to lecturers. This is a surer way of reducing the excess number of non-academic staff over time to attain the ideal NUC stipulated academic – non-academic staff ratio. In addition, there should be a deliberate policy of non employment of junior staff and the gradual facing out of junior staff, which are to be replaced with contract staff to perform their functions.

Every academic and non-academic staff of the institutions including the management staff must compulsorily be computer and ICT Compliant. The institutions must also be highly ICT compliant, such that meetings, minutes of meetings and results are convened and circulated electronically to reduce the volume of paper works that cost
so much without attaining efficiency. Being ICT compliant can also help the institutions to introduce on-line course delivery systems and the use of such education technologies as Smart Boards, slide machines, overhead projectors, power points, etc.

Conclusion
All over the world countries are desperately searching for innovative solutions to the substantial challenges in financing tertiary education, as the demand for this level of education is growing much faster than the ability and willingness of government alone to provide the resources that are adequate to meet this demand. For this reason and for the fact that the economic value of attaining a tertiary education in virtually all countries, as measured by rates of return or other indicators, is growing faster than the economic returns accruing to those who receive lower levels of education, introducing or raising tuition fees as a way of increasing cost sharing has become a fundamental option, even more in Nigeria. While introducing this and other funding mechanisms, the paper recognized the need to expand access and improve equity; attain better external efficiency such as enhanced quality and relevance, and increased internal efficiency through cost containment, prudent financial management, accountability and staff rationalization.

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Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP): Issues and Challenges

Sunny Ekakitie-Emonena

Key Terms: Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP), International Labour Organization (ILO), Trade Union Congress (TUC), Internal Labour Standards (ILS), Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC).

Abstract
This paper examines the emerging concept of the Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP), which is being orchestrated by ILO and the matrix of issues and challenges that confront the implementation of this programme. This paper presents perspectives on decent work from experiences in countries such as Nepal, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. Moreover, it tries to expose the socio-economic problems in those countries and how the DCWP agenda focuses on those situations and contributes to realizing the objectives of decent work as well as to enhancing productivity levels by observing the decent work objectives. The purposes and problems of trade unions are given lucid discussion and attempts are made to align them with the decent work principles and the ILO standards that are set to guide work universally. This paper recommends, given the experiences of Pakistan, Nepal and Zambia, that the NLC and TUC, in collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity in Nigeria and the Presidency, work together to synthesize a DWCP for the Nigerian state. Such programmes should be focused on liberating Nigerian workers from unwholesome trade and unfair labour practices.

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Introduction
The 21st century Chambers Dictionary (2006) defines work as physical or mental efforts made in order to achieve or make something; e.g. labour, study, research. Often, work is conceptualized as the exertion of physical, mental and psychological energy that is expended in meeting set targets. Moreover, the concept of employment easily approximates the platform on which work is done.

DWCP is about work, working people and how those people can work decently and be remunerated accordingly. Work is so important to man and his society that without it, socio-economic development cannot occur. There is dignity in labour: labour is not desired for its own sake, but is desired for what it can help create under any given economic conditions, including a recession, because it provides satisfaction through the consumption of goods and services which impact economic indicators such as GDP and NNP.

Because work’s importance to society, it has to be guided and driven by values. Thus societal beliefs, values and attitudes (Iyayi 2005) are relevant in shaping and developing the type of work programme that any nation desires in order to attain economic, social and industrial development.

Engels, Blackwell and Miniard (1986) identified three core work values of a nation which can provide space for business growth and economic development:

1. The core values that define how goods and services are made and used
2. The core values that provide positive and negative valence for brands and for communication in social programmes
3. That which defines acceptable marketing and industrial relationships
From the above, they posit that nations and economies that have strong work values almost always have high GDP. Russia is one country with strong work values. In the last quarter of 2009, Russia declared that it emerged out of its recession. Quite differently, Britain’s case is pathetic: reports from its third quarter (Q3) of 2009 showed that the nation had declined four percent deeper into recession. Moreover, the economies of France and Germany (both strong manufacturing economies) recorded 2% increases in Q2 and Q3 of 2009. (CNN, 2009 reports).

Work and decent productivity levels drive these indices. Therefore, work is viewed as more important than play, and work is indeed a serious adult business. People, societies and nations are judged by their work. When strangers meet, their first topic of conversation often relates to the kind of work each does. According to Engels et al (1986) “people are supposed to get ahead and make contributions to society through their work”.

Labour is the catalyst that transforms society. Marx and Engels (1966) identified the role of material and mental labour in the separation of the town and the country. For them, the antagonism between town and country begins with the transition from barbarism to civilization and progresses from tribe to state, and from locality to nation. Moreover, this transition runs throughout history up to the present day.

Across the world, ILO labour movements play a greater role in managing work and enhancing productivity. Empirical studies conducted by Manz and Sims (1986, 1987) identified “Leader behaviours” as an ingredient that necessarily impacts the success of work. Moreover, through their studies, Cohen and Ledford (1994) aver that leaders’ behaviours play a strong role in helping employees develop their skills and appropriating knowledge that will not only contribute to productivity, but that will also create satisfaction through decent work. Again, Crawford’s (1998) studies revealed that the leader’s “attitude” and his “leadership style” can have a positive impact on organizational and industrial success. Union and labour leaders have a
lot to learn from these studies in promoting industrial harmony and decent work.

**DWCP: A Conceptual Overview**

DWCP is an ILO initiative designed to propagate, nurture and promote a decent work culture and values. It is designed to achieve just advocacy by stimulating budgetary priorities in economic planning and implementing the priorities of nations under the ILO. Thus, DWCP is grounded in national priorities and is rooted in the national development agenda.

The concept of decent work is being promoted by the ILO as a philosophy that can cut across nations. Thus, it has a globalized agenda that is intended to create a set of uniform decent work practices and policies in priority areas. These areas must impact not only industrial harmony, but also economic growth and development. It intends to achieve the above goals through instrumental and strategic budgeting and planning.

The adoption of the decent work agenda is designed to provoke a series of actions including the adoption of fundamental work rights and principles. Mr. Ian Chambers is the director-general of ILO East Asia’s multidisciplinary team and Bangkok Area Office. While ILO’s director-general is Mr. Juan Somavia. At the (2009) summit, the director-general speaking at the Bangkok Area office challenged the members to stand firm by the committing to the objective made two years before the summit when the decent work agenda was launched. Mr. Ian Chambers’ account of progressed as follows, “since the last Asian meeting, the ILO has engaged in a profound rethinking and recasting of its role, mandate and approach”. The result, according to him, “has been the definition of the Decent Work Agenda”. In the 89th session of the international conference, titled *Reducing the Decent Work Deficit: A Global Work Agenda to the Circumstances and Realities of the Region*, he reminded members that the adoption of signified a
commitment to action both on the part of the constituent bodies of ILO and the ILO office in Geneva

At the 13th Asian Regional meeting of the ILO, held in Bangkok in August 2001, the tripartite delegate accepted the basic concept of decent work. It was designed to be the key concept that could integrate economic and social policies. Delegates at the meeting agreed that each country would prepare a National Plan of Action for Decent Work (DWNPA). Moreover, in DWCP, ILO was given the responsibility to provide assistance to its tripartite constituents in designing such plans.

Objectives of DWCP
When preparing a DWCP, the tripartite constituents and the ILO office review national policies and on-going activities and analyze deficits, gaps and challenges from a decent work point of view. Its agenda should be integrated into national policies and programmes and then implemented by the government and its social partners. The programmes consider four strategic objectives:

1. Fundamental principles and rights at work
2. International labour standards
3. Employment and income opportunities
4. Social protection, social security, dialogue and tripartism

These objectives constitute the framework for identifying decent work deficits and prioritizing the issues in the order in which they need to be addressed.

As gathered from the Pakistani DWCP, the way DWCP programmes operate are based on the following protocol.

1. The Pakistani DWCP is envisioned as a shared document that is prepared by consulting with ILO and its tripartite constituent. However, since the Pakistani government has prepared a similar document (PRSP) that specially mentions the
employment-poverty nexus, the DWCP intends to complement the PRSP framework.

(2) The DWCP is also envisioned as a dynamic document that can be subjected to revision and charge, when deemed necessary by the tripartite constituents. It covers a span of 3 – 5 years, which will be decided by the Decent Work Task Force (DWTF), and it represents a framework of co-operation for it is to be formulated jointly with the DWTF.

(3) The formulation of a DWCP is based on problem analysis. This allows priority areas of co-operation between ILO, its social partners and other international development departments within a country’s national developmental policy framework to be identified. Based on a review of the key issues that confront Pakistan’s work world, action has been taken to identify the major decent work challenges, gaps and deficits that persist under ILO’s four strategic objectives.

(4) Observing Decent Work (DW) challenges serves not only to consolidate the multiple work gaps and deficits under the umbrella of the decent work agenda and the DWCP, but it also provides reasoning for discerning the instruments that are key to implementing the DWCP.

(5) In Pakistan, the national contact for the DWCP is best understood from a multidimensional perspective. This perspective is based upon constitutional obligations, international commitments to uphold standards and the framework of socio-economic development policies, in conjunction with the prevailing scenario in the labour market.

(6) Furthermore, the ILO has informed people that August 2001 tripartite delegates who were at the 13th Asian Regional meeting agreed that each member country would develop a National Plan of Action (NPA) for decent work as a way to carry out the
ILO global decent work agenda. The objectives of the NPA are as follows:

- To strengthen the programming and monitoring of activities at the country level
- To affect focus and coherence of ILO action in the context of DW
- To adopt integrated, unified and holistic approaches for concrete results
- To harmonize ILO’s approach by development of national programming and the UN system

**Purpose of Trade Unions**

In 1962, in his policy paper titled: *A Programme for the Future*, Nigeria’s Prime Minister said the following regarding trade unions: “the fundamental and enduring concern of the honest trade union is the welfare of the worker and his family... the genuine trade union is above political or compromise betrayal of the worker’s interest; it is independent of the government and employers, and free of extraneous control. The genuine trade union workers (as the United Labour Congress of Nigeria promises to do) for social justice and national progress. It works for these great ideals on their most meaningful level – the greatest good of the greatest number. The concern of the genuine trade union is that the worker is adequately paid for his labour that his family has decent food and housing, that his lifetime of toil yield dignity for himself and a happier prospect for his children.”

According to Ananaba (1969) the paper lists the social objectives of the trade union movement as being to establish:

- Fair wages for every worker
- Good working conditions for every worker, equal pay and good conditions for work of equal value,
The right of every worker to choose his own job, his own union, and his own political party
- Full employment
- Universal free education
- Universal free health care
- Better housing for everyone
- A new and modern industry for Nigeria
- A modern system of agriculture
- Trade union freedom

The paper concluded that to be able to discharge these responsibilities, the trade union movement must reconstruct itself so it is focused on commanding respect, influence and resources (both human and material), without which these lofty aspirations would be daydreaming.

Problems
The problems Nigeria’s trade union movements face can be discerned from current challenges that are based principally on colonial issues and matters that arose from when trade union was restructured in 1976. Problems include:

1. *Factionalization* – Many union movements still have divisions such as NUT, NUBIFIE and NUHPSHW. These divisions are propelled by internal strife and weaknesses, in addition to external factors including politics and government intervention.

2. *Grievances* – These arise from job insecurity and unsatisfactory employment compensation and conditions. All of these problems bring about antagonism.

3. *Proliferation* - Proliferation of the trade union both before and after its 1976 restructuring.
4. Colonialism and colonial experiences and struggles to take a stand based on the ideological lines of “capitalism and communism”.

5. Struggles for power – Union leaders that lose elections want to pull down and cause divisions and functions in the unions.

6. A lack of internal democracy, and

7. The challenge of how to forge alliances between the trade union’s management and the mainstream NLC.

**Four Basic Applications of Decent Work**

At the 89th session of the International Labour Conference (ILO) the director general, Mr. Juan Somavia, proclaimed and defined four basic applications of decent work.

1. **It is a Goal:** In clear language, decent work presents a universal aspiration of people everywhere. It expresses their hope to obtain productive work with condition in which they have equity, security and human dignity. It is both a personal goal for individuals and a development goal for countries.

2. **It provides a framework for policy:** The four strategic objectives combine the ILO’s historic mandate in the field of rights at work, social dialogue and social protection with a growth and development agenda that is built around employment and enterprise. By integrating them into a single agenda, a framework for making policies is offered which presents the potential for a coherent approach to shared goals. This approach also provides the basis for a longer term joint commitment of the ILO’s tripartite constituents. This permits them to accommodate each other on immediate issues that could, if taken in isolation, divide them.
It is a method used to organize programmes and activities: Building the ILO’s program around the fair and strategic objectives of the decent work agenda has permitted the office to establish targets and performance indicators which, for the first time, enable it to measure progress and to be accountable to its constituents.

It is a platform for external dialogue and partnership: This is precisely because it is a far reaching and integrated agenda, which is readily understood. It provides a policy platform for external dialogue and partnership with other organizations of the multilateral system and civil society. It is an instrument for engaging with the world beyond the ILO’s walls.

ILO and the International Labour Standards
The ILO is the world body that epitomizes the labour movement and its activities. It has achieved this status through its various summits and conventions, which act as guides and guard the way civilized labour practices should be prosecuted across the world’s working nations.

The ILO has benchmark labour standards. The objective of international labour standards is to protect different workers from forms of exploitation and abuse by their employers, to reduce poverty amongst the mass of workers and to encourage employers to adopt enlightened practices in industrial relations matters across the world (Iyayi, 2005). The standards are made up of conventions and recommendations. The conventions have the force of the law, while the recommendations are simply guides for action. These standards hold that:

- Labour is not a commodity
- Freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained progress
Poverty everywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere

The war against want must be conducted with an unrelenting vigour in each nation. Moreover, it must proceed with continuous and concerted international efforts in which the workers’ representatives and employers who enjoy equal status with their governments join with the governments in a free discussion and then make democratic decisions geared towards promoting the common welfare.

All human beings, irrespective of their race and creed, have the right to pursue their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom, dignity, economic security and equal opportunity (Source: International Labour Office, 1998:9).

According to Iyayi (2005), the above standards cover the following broad areas: basic human rights, employment, labour administration, industrial relations, conditions of work, social security, employment of women, employment of children and young persons, older migrant workers, indigenous workers and people. Other special categories of workers include seafarers, fishermen, agricultural workers, dock workers and nursing personnel.

These conventions are bound upon any country that ratifies these standards. These codes and conventions have been well exposed to present a clear understanding of the concept of a decent work country programme and what it entails.

**DWCP in Zambia**

DWCP is one of ILO’s initiatives to propagate, nurture and promote a decent work culture and values for the purpose of achieving just advocacy. It can be practiced by stimulating budgetary priorities in economic planning and implementing the priorities of nations under
the ILO. Thus, DWCP is grounded in national priorities and rooted in the national development agenda.

A crucial purpose of the DWCP in Zambia is to have a programme that coordinates and aligns technical assistance, support and resources around an achievable set of priority outcomes. In Zambia, key issues were identified and prioritized through a planning process involving all of the constituents in the following agencies:

- The Zambian Ministry of Labour and Social Security on behalf of government;
- The Zambian Federation of Employers (ZFE) on behalf of employers;
- The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU); and
- The Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia (FFTUZ) on behalf of workers.

**DWCP in NEPAL (2008 – 2010)**

In 2005, the DWCP in Nepal began their ILO office; its first draft was produced in February 2006. However, the draft could not be finalized due to political instability. After peace was attained through a comprehensive peace pact in November 2006, adjustments to the draft were made. Nepal identified the below areas as priorities that the DWCP should address.

1. Recent political developments culminating in the formation of the “peoples movement” and communist party conflict which was launched in 1996.

2. Socio-economic context: Nepal is a heterogeneous country (like Nigeria). According to the Nepal Standard Survey of 2003 to 2004, people living below the poverty line fell from 42% to 31%. Although their Gini-Coefficient increased to 0.41 from 0.34, spatial and social disparities in the terms of region, caste, ethnicity and gender continued to dominate its socio-economic
landscape. Socially excluded groups such as women, landless agricultural labourers, child labourers, bonded labourers, and construction workers as well as people at risk of acquiring HIV/AIDS have a high poverty incidence.

(3) Labour Market Situation: According to the 2003-2004 census, 74% of the population that was older than 15 years old was employed, 2.9% of active citizens were unemployed and 22.8% remained inactive. Of the total active labour force, 70.6% were engaged in agriculture and 29.4% worked in the non-agricultural sector. The Male and female percentile was 3.1 and 2.7 respectively. In 10 years, unemployment rose from 32% to 42%. This increase in under employment rates indicates the local economy’s inability to provide productive employment opportunities for the growing labour force. The 7 million youth who are between the ages of 15 and 19 constitute a large fraction of this group. Moreover, the literacy rate is as low as 34% for women and 59% for men.

Nepal & the 3-Year Interim Plan
An interim plan for development was endorsed in December 2007 and was projected to cover the period from July 2007 to June 2000. In it, the government identified productive and decent employment growth as pressing issues and made the national socio-economic policy a priority. The blue-print for the plan avers that: “the government will play the lead role as well as a facilitator in creating opportunities for employment according to competence and skill of the new entrants to the labour market. While making the education system employment oriented, policy reforms will be done to provide a working environment suitable for humans, for workers and labourers in both the formal and informal sectors. Institutional arrangements will be made for providing skills and training in order to support, to increase the productivity of labour. In the informal sector, for enhancement of skills, training and
transfer of technology for laborers, matching their absorption capacity will be made.”

The plan targets growth in the agricultural sector at 3.6% p.a. and 6.5% in the non-agricultural sector. In addition to other growths, these increases should produce an economic growth of 5.5% p.a. The plan also focuses on 64,716 individuals to receive vocational training and skill development by 2010. Moreover, poverty and risk among workers and their families will be reduced through programmes related to occupational safety, health improvement and social security.

**Strategies to Achieve the Targets**

According to the plan, the following action strategies were projected.

1. Create a conducive environment to attract both private and foreign direct investments (FDI)

2. Ensure industrial peace through social dialogue

3. Revise policy and legal provisions to govern labour relations in the informal economy

4. Strengthen labour administration

5. Establish a social security fund

6. Run social insurance and micro-finance programmes jointly with trade unions in the informal sector

7. Whenever possible, use labour intensive technologies to create jobs

8. Provide employment guarantee programmes
9. Establish an employment information centre

The UN & Development Assistance
The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) aligns with Nepal’s above development plans in the following important areas.

a) To expand sustainable livelihood opportunities, especially for socially excluded groups in conflict affected areas
b) To improve policies, institutions and programmes for poverty reduction and employment generation
c) To provide special support to strengthen the state’s capacity for poverty and MDG monitor
d) To create economic opportunities for young people, excluded groups, people living with or at risk of contracting HIV, migrant workers, home-based workers and refugees

UNDAF further states that: “employment and income generating opportunities will directly contribute to peace building processes by improving social security. Youth unemployment in particular has the potential to function as a destabilizing influence.”

In all of these areas, it is important to point out the role the ILO plays in growth and development and in promoting industrial peace. The ILO has the comparative advantage over other agencies of leading labour market governance and employment generation. The ILO’s long-standing presence in Nepal (and other countries) provides the ILO with the opportunity to create strong and committed relationships with the government, UN agencies and other relevant organizations. Additionally, the ILO acts as a strong facilitator because the organization has a tripartite structure.
Country Programme Priority in Nepal

Tackling problems in a complex and developing country requires a priority driven, systematic approach. For the ILO, as well as the country, the problem involves generating productive employment, a promise of peace, dividends and, more substantively, an anchor to sustain peace. Thus, in light of this information, priority areas include:

1. Generation of productive employment for building sustained peace through:
   a) policy coherence for a national employment policy
   b) Labour market reform

2. Medium-term and short-term outcomes, indicators and a brief strategy through:
   a) a short-term strategy for immediate impact
   b) a strategy for the medium and long term that is based on sector policy and improved policy coherence
   c) A strategy for improving the articulation between a national policy and LED
   d) A strategy for facilitating and protecting the migration of Nepalese workers

Concluding Remarks

Having looked at the concept of decent work and salient issues and challenges inherent to the problem, evidently many countries, especially those in Africa, have not keyed into decent work’s lofty ideals. Decent work is not going away and should develop by integrating its objectives into all work systems and the emerging work culture of the ILO worldwide. All DWCP must have implementation plans and information concerning how their successes can be monitored and measured. Through the DWCP, ILO has a mission to liberate workers from work slavery and to produce humane work conditions that are capable of putting the aspects of world labour, not only on a
pedestal that will generate sustained peace and industrial harmony, but that will also help increase productivity levels.

It is hoped that the Nigeria’s leaders, at state and national levels along with industrial leaders, will utilize the DWCP of the ILO effectively to curtail incessant strikes as well as a situation where labourers use strikes as the ultimate weapon to force governments to reason with them. The above DWCPs used in Zambia, Pakistan and Nepal have provided a window of opportunity to learn about what is happening in other parts of the world, with a goal of mainstreaming the programmes with the socio-economic experiences of Nigeria. This paper strongly recommends that TUC and the NLC initiate and fast-track a DWCP for the Nigerian labour movement. This should be done in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour and Productivity as well as with the President to enhance the decent work ethos within the Nigerian workforce. The time to start is now.

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The Impact of Mass Media on the Posterity of African Cultures: A Mozambican Case Study

Munyaradzi Mawere

Key Terms: impact, mass media, posterity, Africa, Mozambique, culture.

Abstract
Culture is a central aspect of any human society. Once affected, positively or otherwise, the society’s way of living changes. Like other Southern African cultures, Mozambican culture is facing a new set of challenges, coupled with classic hindrances as it joins the global community. One of these challenges is the uncertain trajectory of mass media, particularly television, which has both positive and negative impacts on culture. This paper constitutes a philosophical examination of the impact of mass media on African cultures and adopts Mozambique as a case study. I was intrigued by this subject given the dramatic changes in the Mozambican culture as the tide of globalization in terms of mass media sweeps across the country. My philosophical argument is that for Mozambican culture to thrive these challenges must be discussed, addressed and mitigated against. Otherwise, the Mozambican culture will soon become history to its own people. The key conclusion from the paper is that the future of Mozambican culture, and by extension African cultures, will ultimately reside in its ability to address a number of theoretical, political and socio-cultural questions which confront the present and the next generation. To this end, a

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framework is presented for studying socio-cultural issues that impact on how knowledge, ideas and values should be transmitted and developed from one generation to another for the good and posterity of the African cultures.

Introduction
Africa has a heterogeneous society that offers many opportunities for cross-cultural research. Whilst authors on culture and mass media generally agree that people are identified by their cultures and that mass media affect culture in one way or another, there is patchy literature by Africans and Mozambican authors in particular, on the impact of mass media on African cultures. In the light of this observation, it is apparent that there is need for comprehensive research on Africa in this twilight zone especially in Mozambique where mass media is having a dramatic effect on culture.

Mozambican culture is communal rather than individualistic; traditionally, it is focused on relationships rather than being task oriented like the European culture. When asking for directions or upon meeting someone, it is polite to first greet the person and ask how they are doing and then go about business. Personal boundaries are practically non-existent. However due to mass media, acculturation is fast gaining ground. Culture in Mozambique thus is taking a new direction.

The impact of mass media on Mozambican culture however varies from province to province. Whilst culture and traditional ways of life are still well preserved from the central to the northern provinces of the country, the opposite is true in the southern provinces and in towns and cities. The Makonde people, from Cabo Delgado Province in the north-east, for example, are known for their traditional fearlessness and initiation rituals. They are also accomplished craftsmen, producing fine hardwood mainly mahogany, ebony or ironwood-and ivory carvings which often depict the stories of earlier generations. Music is also part
of the Mozambican culture and is very important to the Niassa people who live in the sparsely populated north-western region. The agility of the Nhau dancers of Tete Province is much admired. To the sound of resounding drum beats, they dance holding huge and frightening wooden masks. For the Chopi people of Inhambane Province (in the Central), the ‘timbila’ is both the name of a local xylophone and a wonderful dance. They also play ‘mbira’, made of strips of metal attached to a hollow box and plucked with the fingers. Besides, visual art is also important in the Mozambican culture. The Macua women, from Nampula Province are known for their art and craftsmanship. They paint their faces with ‘muciro’, a white, root extract. They also make straw baskets, mats and sculptures from ebony and clay. The traditional, spicy cooking of Zambezia is highly regarded. Zambezia chicken, grilled with palm oil, is a particular delicacy. All this is a testimony that the traditional culture of Mozambique as is still preserved in central and northern regions is rich and admirable.

Nevertheless, mass media and acculturation have resulted in most of the elements of the Mozambican culture and traditional ways of life fast disappearing. In towns and cities as with the southern provinces, the impact of mass media and cultural diffusion is more visible than in the countryside and other provinces. This paper examines the impact of mass media, particularly television, on the Mozambican culture. More importantly, the paper argues that though mass media has some positive impact on development, it has to be used with care and caution. This argument is borne from the observation that the impact of mass media in any culture is critical and will substantively affect the future in ways too numerous to mention. In this light, the paper philosophizes that in the face of mass media the future of Mozambican culture will only reside in its ability to address a number of theoretical, political and socio-cultural questions which confront the present and the next generation. Put differently, for Mozambican culture to thrive the issue of mass media must be discussed, addressed and mitigated against. Otherwise, Mozambican
culture is threatened and consequently facing a ‘slow death’. One day it might disappear the dinosaurs’ way if no immediate action is taken.

Understanding Culture and Mass Media
The terms culture and mass media do not always mean the same thing to everybody. For reasons of clarity and precision, the terms shall be discussed separately.

Culture
Culture derives from the Latin word *cultura* stemming from *colere* meaning ‘to cultivate’ (Bastian, 2009). However, the concept and definition of culture have been well documented in the literature, and scholars have provided a number of interpretations to the term. The complexity of coming up with a universally agreed definition of culture is predicted by the fact that social problems differ from society to society and this tend to define the role that culture has to play in society as well as the expectations of society on how and to what extent culture should help solving economic and socio-political problems. Yet the absence of a specific and widely agreed definition makes culture vulnerable to conflict interpretation by scholars. This has led Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn (1952) to compile a list of 164 definitions of culture. Since then, several authors have formulated a broad definition for culture describing it with different terms such as basic assumptions, feelings, values, behavior, and so forth (Benedict, 1959; Sapir, 1991; Hall, 1992; Schein, 1992; Trampenaars, 1994). Benedict (1959), for instance, defines culture as the canons of choice. Kluckhohn and Strodbeck (1961) introduce the concept of value orientations to explain the phenomenon of culture. Sapir (1977) suggests that culture is a silent language because different cultures present dissimilar perceptions about time, space, ownership, friendship and agreements. And, for Schein(1992:97), culture is a pattern of shared assumptions that a group of people learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems. Trompenaars (1994) proposes that culture directs people’s actions. He observes that culture is man-made, confirmed by others, conventionalized and passed on for younger people or new comers to learn (ibid). This connotes that for Trompenaars culture provides people with a meaningful context in which to meet, to think about themselves and to face the outer world. Van der Walt holds almost a similar understanding of culture. For him (1997:8), ‘culture is not only something alive’. It is rich and complex as it includes habits, customs and social organization, technology, language, norms, values, beliefs and much more. However, though the concept of culture has been interpreted differently throughout history, as has been shown in this study, what cuts across a number of definitions that scholars have provided on the concept is the general belief that the concept is most commonly used in three basic senses:

1) An integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief and behavior that depends upon the capacity for symbolic thought and social learning.

2) The shared attitudes, values, goals and practices that characterizes an institution, organization or group.

3) Excellence of taste in the fine arts and humanities, also known as high culture.

The precise definition of culture is elusive. The three basic senses seem to be captured in different definitions of culture discussed in the preceding paragraphs. In view of the three senses and for purposes of this work, culture shall be understood as an integrated pattern of human knowledge, beliefs, behavior, values, attitudes, goals and practices that characterizes an institution, organization or group of people. The fundamental idea of culture thus is that it reflects both the
social imperatives and the social consequences of human behavior (in a given society) in their conduct with others.

Mass Media
Until recently, mass media was clearly defined as ‘any medium used to transmit mass communication comprising of the eight mass media industries; books, newspapers, magazines, recordings, radio, movies, television and the Internet’ (Lane, 2007). It has been understood as the transmission and reception of ‘messages’ on a very large scale. However, the term mass media is no longer easy to define due to constant creation of new digital communication technology that is now abundant. Historically, the term mass media was coined in the 1920s with the advent of nationwide radio networks, mass-circulation newspapers and magazines (Bastian, 2009). It should be noted however that some forms of mass media such as drama, books and manuscripts had already been in use centuries before. The term denotes ‘a section of the media specifically designed to reach a very large audience such as the population of a nation state’ (ibid). This now includes mobile phones and the eight media industries mentioned above.

The term public media has a similar meaning: ‘it is the sum of the public mass distributors of news and entertainment across media such as newspapers, television, radio and broadcasting’ (ibid). The purposes of mass media include advocacy (advertising, marketing, propaganda, public relation and political communication), entertainment (music, acting, sports, reading, video, computer games) and public service announcements. There are rich theoretical discussions on the subject of mass media, and I will not engage this voluminous literature; instead, I will illuminate the benefits and challenges posed by television media vis-à-vis the current and future of Mozambican culture. Thus for purposes of this work, the term mass media shall be used to refer to television mass media industry. This is because the impact of television on Mozambican culture is greater than any other mass media industry existing in the country so far.
Background to the Mozambican Culture

Mozambican culture is one of the oldest cultures in Africa yet it is so diverse as to be impossible to pin down and define. This is because the South, Central and the Northern regions have their own distinct cultures and every ethnic group have carved its own cultural niche. However, there are some cultural elements that were traditionally respected and valued across all dialectical groups in the country. These elements together with the shared history of colonization and the following struggle for independence from the Portuguese are a common thread that bound Mozambicans as a people with a common identity. Even today, culture and its preservation matters a great deal to Mozambicans, at least in rhetoric. The government of Mozambique with the initiative of UNESCO has even formulated a ‘Cultural Policy’ which lays as its objectives protection and preservation of cultural heritage of the country, inculcating Mozambican art consciousness amongst Mozambicans and promoting high standards in creative and performing arts.

Unfortunately, the advent of mass media has made the cultural policy largely redundant as traditional forms of arts seem to have virtually disappeared or rather on the slow death. Traditionally, Mozambican culture is not only limited to material manifestations such as monuments and objects that were preserved over time. It also includes living expressions and the traditions; intangible heritage that Mozambican communities have inherited from their ancestors and transmit to their descendants, in most cases orally.

In terms of tangible heritage, clothing is one important aspect of the Mozambican culture. Traditionally the Mozambican women are decently dressed in long clothes that hide knees inside. Married women normally cover their hair and wore wrapping clothes on top of the long dress. Likewise, men are dressed in long trousers and shirts which cover almost all body parts. Visual art is another key aspect of the Mozambican culture. The Macua women, from the north-eastern Nampula Province are known for their art and craftsmanship in straw
baskets, mats and sculptures from ebony and clay. The traditional, spicy cooking of Zambezia is highly regarded. Zambezia chicken, grilled with palm oil, is a particular delicacy. The Island of Mozambique and Mozambique museum are other significant tangible cultural features of the country.

Mozambique also traditionally regards its intangible heritage as a matter of active concern. The Chopi’s Timbila, a traditional musical expression, for example, was declared a masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of humanity in Mozambique in 2005 (UNESCO Report, 2005). The Makonde, from Cabo Delgado Province in the north-east, for example, are known for their fearlessness and initiation rituals. The Makonde are also accomplished craftsmen, producing fine hardwood mainly mahogany, ebony or ironwood-and ivory carvings which often depict the stories of earlier generations. Music is also part of the Mozambican culture and is very important to the Niassa people who live in the sparsely populated north-western region. The agility of the Nhau dancers of Tete Province is much admired. To the sound of resounding drum beats, they dance holding huge and frightening wooden masks.

The other important aspect of Mozambican culture is language. As given by the German romanticists of the 19th century such as Herder, Wondt and Humboldt, language is not just acting as one cultural trait among many but rather as the direct expression of a people’s national character and as such as culture in a kind of condensed form. Herder (1744-1803), for example, suggests, ‘since every people is a People, it has its own national culture expressed through its own language’. In the same line of thought, Franz Boas (1920) argues ‘the fact that intellectual culture of a people is largely constructed, shared and maintained through the use of language means it is unimaginable to study the culture of a foreign people without also becoming acquainted with their language’. In Mozambique, the official language is Portuguese but each ethnic group has its own vernacular language that defines it as a group. Another important part of the Mozambican culture is its focus on
relationships rather than being task oriented like the European culture. When asking for directions or upon meeting someone, it is polite to first greet the person and ask how they are doing and then go about business. Personal boundaries are practically non-existent. In fact, the traditional life of Mozambicans is communal rather than individualistic.

Mass Media and How It Has Impacted the Mozambican Culture
It is beyond question that media plays many different and possibly incompatible roles. For the audiences, it is a source of entertainment and information while for media workers media is an industry that offers jobs and therefore income, prestige and professional identity. For the owners, media is not only a source of profit but a source of power. For society at large, the media can be a way to transmit information and values. Thus depending on whose perspective and which role we focus on we might see a different picture of mass media. Likewise, the impact of mass media depends on whose perspective and on the role we focus. And for this reason, mass media in many societies has invited and incited serious debates as it can be viewed from both positive and negative perspectives. As such, mass media has impacted the Mozambican culture in ways too numerous to mention. On one hand, it has brought many positive changes in the Mozambican culture. And on the other hand, a number of negative impacts can be pointed out especially from African traditionalist and moralistic view points.

The advent of mass media has effected a number of changes in Mozambican traditions, customs and values. Although it is a well known fact that culture is dynamic and never static, the impact of mass media on Mozambican culture is so tremendous that it becomes imperative for the issue to be discussed, addressed and mitigated against before it is too late. It is worth noting however that the impact of mass media on Mozambican culture varies from one area to another. In the southern provinces of the country, cities and towns, for example, mass media has had more impact – both positive and negative - than in
The Positive Impact of Mass Media on the Mozambican culture

The advent of mass media in Mozambique like in any other society has brought about a number of positive changes. As means of communication, mass media is playing an important role in Mozambique. Unlike in the old days when messages took months to reach their destined audiences, through mass media such as TVs they are now fast reaching the designated recipients/masses in all corners of the country. In the war against HIV/AIDS, for example, mass media is helping a great deal in sending the message to the public to change the risky sexual behavior and promote awareness of the pandemic in youth and the public in general. Agha (2003) confirms that the exposure to mass media messages concerning HIV/AIDS reduces personal risks and promotes condom use as an attractive lifestyle choice thereby contributing to development of perceptions that are conducive to the adoption of condom use and HIV/AIDS prevention.

With Mozambique’s low literacy rate, mass media has also become a powerful socializing agent (Graber, 1980) and a facilitator in knowledge polination. School subjects such as English, Geography, and Mathematics are learnt on television. With the same objective, mass media generates interesting debates on socio-economic and political issues. The STV and Mira Mar channels, for example, sometimes discuss political issues to do with justice, human rights and democracy. This is positive as politicians and academics rely heavily on media to communicate their messages. In more or less the same way, the general members of the public are affected by mass media on how they learn about their world and interact with others inside and outside the world of politics. In Mozambique, media thus is helping in transmitting knowledge, sensitizing people of their rights and in reducing the illiteracy rate which is currently 43% (Ali, September 2009). Thus mass media has a significant role in disseminating knowledge and in promoting academic excellence.
Besides, it is now a reality that in Mozambique mass media otherwise seconded by soccer has become a leading entertainer for most families. During spare time, people can entertain themselves watching sports, films and other entertaining programs such as soap opera (Novela) like Poderes Paralelos (Parallel powers), show de talento (Talent show), among others that are often shown on Mozambican channels. However, not all that mass media brings to the Mozambicans is beneficial when considering its culture. In fact, it seems more harm than good is being done to the Mozambican culture through mass media. The next section of this paper therefore examines the negative impact of mass media on the Mozambican culture.

Mass Media and Culture: A Closer Look at the Negative Impact of Mass Media on Mozambican Culture
There is a visible negative impact of mass media on the personality development of adolescents (Puri, 2006) in most if not all cultures. Concern from parents, professionals and the populace at large about the impact of mass media on children and adolescents has grown steadily over recent years. It is therefore imperative to examine and understand the role of media exposure on children and adolescents in Mozambique in order to diagnose and treat behavioral problems as well as to prevent further tragedies and disorders on culture and in the personality of the adolescents.

For some Mozambicans, mass media has resulted in enculturation. According to Random House Unabridged Dictionary (1997), enculturation is a process where individuals learn their group cultures by experience, observation and instruction. Mass media thus does assimilation, and though advancing into new technology may seem very exciting and futuristic, this may not necessarily be a good thing. This is chiefly because with mass communication devices people are sending the ‘wrong message’ to different cultures and especially the youth. In Mozambique, music, drama and literature have all changed
with time due to the advent of mass media communication system. In
towns, cities and generally the southern provinces, the impact is even
on the rise due to the increase of foreign channels owners who are
capitalizing on the channel. Mozambique being one of the poorest
countries in the world, its economy is controlled by the rich western
countries. So are some of its television channels. The channels are
dominated by the Portuguese (R.T.P Africa) and the Brazilian (Mira
Mar) television channels. The Brazilian Universal church sponsored
television channel, Mira Mar has too much sex and talk shows which
stretch too far if we are to consider the Mozambican culture where the
channel exists. In fact, it presents a plethora of programs with sexual
overtones. Vai dar namoro literally mean (Go and make love), Gugu and
Tudo é possivel (Everything is possible) are cases in point. So is the STV
program called ‘Music box’. These programs present naked (both men
and women with only painted bodies) and semi-naked people (with
bras and pants only) especially women dancing and sometimes making
love- fondling each other or sleeping together- in the public. This is a
taboo in the Mozambican culture and by extension the African
traditional culture.

It is even surprising to hear that the channel is sponsored by a
church – the Brazilian Universal Church of God - given its contents.
From an African traditional view, such programs are irritating
especially when watching with one’s in-laws, daughters or mothers,
among other family members. The dangers are not just in the content,
but more importantly, in volume. If one sees something once, s/he can
dismiss it as aberrant; if sees it continuously, however, at some point,
one is left with a sense of being out of step with mainstream beliefs and
values (Frick, 2008). The sexual overtones that the channel frequently
presents have resulted in many interpreting it as a promoter of
prostitution and cultural decadence amongst the Mozambican youths.
Many young people are no longer dressing in a ‘decent African way’
imitating the way actors in these channels dress. It is now a common
thing to see young girls walking around the city with just small tight
skirts (mini-skirts) or with tight shorts. Young people can now make
In addition, other traditional social structures, customs and values are fast disappearing from the scene. Communication which often took a wonderful musical tone especially in the communication of literature, political and socio-economic works is dying away. The religious and epistemological roles of the traditional folktales have been down-played while their didactic and moral aspects have been, however, overtaken by mass media. Folktales were passed down generations verbally by a storyteller who usually was an old man or an old woman past child bearing age. Mozambican traditional culture upholds these octogerians as custodians of wisdom and knowledge. The advent of television however has made this rather obsolete. The traditions of village theatre and dance, folklore and story telling thus are now history in the Mozambican culture. These were used as forms of entertainment and education (to impact good moral values that would prepare them for adult ritualistic society) in the youth. These traditions also offered a curriculum that prepared the children for their
present and adult life, a curriculum that so far has been seconded and imitated by none. Thus due to mass media, folklore and story telling have lost their following and thereby changing the traditional social structures of the Mozambican people. Instead of the youth gathering around a story teller who was an accredited and experienced old person in the community, they now gather around televisions watching films and other programs. And since ‘no child is born with a culture’ (Barker, 1994: 4), but learn that in which they are born in, young people are picking up the negative aspects presented by the above stated cultures to the next generation.

Mozambique has a socially oriented culture (Bower, 2007). It is focused on relationships rather than being task oriented like the American culture (ibid). When asking for directions or upon meeting someone, for example, it is polite to first greet the person and ask how they are doing and then go about business. Life is communal rather than individualistic. If a child were to steal from a neighbor, it would be the neighbor’s responsibility to spank the child rather than the parent. Likewise, if one were to yell, ‘thief!’ in a market, the crowd would gang up and beat the thief. All this is because justice is carried out communally in the traditional Mozambican culture. However, since the advent of mass media all these social and communal values of the Mozambican culture are fast loosing favor to the individualistic western values. The Brazilian Mira Mar channel has many programs such as operas (poderes paralelos) which emphasize that one’s life is a private business and no one should bother another person’s life. Today, if one yells, ‘thief!’ in Chipamanine market in Maputo, no one would even turn eyes to the thief. If a child steals from a neighbor and the neighbor disciplines the child, beware! The next day the neighbor would receive a summon from police.

Also, it is now a common thing in Mozambique that people enter into business without formally greeting one another first,-which is alien to the African culture. In fact, entering into business before formal
greetings is considered inhumane and morally wrong in the African traditional culture.

It can also be noted that the content of music by Mozambican musicians has changed significantly due to mass media with most of the musicians concentrating much on beat/rhythm and not on message. Some of the songs famous in the music fraternity today are full of sexual overtones and innuendos. Manuel Mazoi’s (whose trade name is Oliver Style) *Tira ropa* (put off your clothes) and Mr Roger and Ziqo’s Dog Style are good examples. The former song whose genre is known as *Marabenta* is sung as:

- **Vocal:** *Tira ropa* (x4) (Put off your clothes)
- **Chorus:** *Tira* (x4) (Put off)
- **Vocal:** *Timila xifambo* (Put off your shoes)
- **Chorus:** *Timila* (Put off)
- **Vocal:** *Timila buluku* (Put off your trouser/short)
- **Chorus:** *Timila* (Put off)
- **Vocal:** *Tsalingeni kei?* (x4) (What about the underwear?)
- **Chorus:** *Timila* (x4) (Put off).

The content of this song has been argued by moralists and traditionalists to be promoting prostitution, immorality and social disorder in the traditional Mozambican culture. In many occasions, it has been reported that in some public drinking occasions like beer parties people dance this song putting off their clothes one by one as the song commands until they are naked. The content of this song is greatly influenced by loss of direction on the cultural values by the artists. Because of what they normally see happening on television, it is no longer a taboo for them to talk about putting off clothes in the public. With similar sexual innuendos is DJ Aridilas’ *Ainda por cima você jinca* (even in bed on top of me you still complain). As is the case of Oliver Style’s *Tira ropa*, one can read the immoral tone of Aridilas’ song right from its title.
Some controversial programs offered by the *Mira Mar* television channel are the *Show internacional blue man* and *Jogos com as Circo Pindorama os menores artistas do Brazil*. In these two programs, one person is asked to stand still in front of a data board with legs apart. Another person stands on the opposite side with five extremely sharp knives. He will then start throwing the knives fiercely one by one, one just on top of the head of the person in front. The other two are thrown on sides at waist height. The forth one is thrown exactly between the legs and the last one on either side of the leg but at knee height. The person in front should be courageous enough not to move an inch. Otherwise, s/he will be finished. The game is not only frightening but life risking. It shows images of violence and aggression. If one of the knives is misdirected and get into the flesh of that in front s/he is dead. In the Mozambican traditional culture, such games are considered devilish and unacceptable. Besides, children may imitate such games. Given the natural experimenting habit of children and that the game requires a high degree of expertise, these games can be argued to promote social delinquencies that may result in lose of lives or fatal injuries among children.

Another critical issue that mass media is seriously aggravating is that of names. I understand a name as ‘a label for a noun, normally used to distinguish one from another’ (Wikipedia, 2007). Names can identify a class or category of things, or a single thing, either uniquely, or within a given context. A personal name identifies a specific unique and identifiable individual person, but in ‘a given context’. As such, Mozambican names identify Mozambicans in their context from people of other contexts. However, this is appearing otherwise in Mozambique as traditional names been shunned since colonial period. Surprisingly, this seems to worsen even years after independence. Part of the reason for this is that the content in mass media is largely Western and names of participants (presenters, actors/artists) in these media channels are foreign, mainly Portuguese. Presented with such a scenario time and again in *novellas*-operas and other TV programs, most children and even adults in Mozambique tend to do what Shakespeare portrays in his
What’s in a name? That we call a rose, where ‘Romeo out of passion for Juliet, rejects his family name and vows, as Juliet asks, to ‘deny (his) father’ and instead be ‘new baptized’ as Juliet’s lover’ (eNotes-Shakespeare, 2010). Most Mozambicans thus have shunned their traditional names in favor of the Portuguese ones. As of now, one can hardly encounter a single Mozambican of the contemporary generation with a traditional name. Actually, if a child/person identifies himelf/herself with a traditional name at school or anywhere else in the country s/he will be laughed at or rather mocked. This hatred of one’s own culture is grievous and shameful that it can not go unchallenged especially in the African context where traditional names are literal and carry meaning to one’s own life, family or society.

The same is true even in the Western tradition. Blake (2009) confirms that ‘names can reveal much about your family history’ since sources from which names are derived include nicknames, physical attributes, place of origin, trades, heraldic charges, and almost every object known to mankind that is related to the person in a way. Blake’s conception identifies with Stallman who rightly notes that ‘names convey meanings; our choice of names determines the meaning of what we say. An inappropriate name gives people the wrong idea’ (Stallman, 2009). For him and indeed so, a rose by any other name would smell as sweet—but if you call it a pen, people will be rather disappointed when they try to write with it. And if you call pens ‘roses’, people may not realize what they are good for. This serves to mean that ‘names really matter for our communities because people who forget history are often condemned to repeat them’ (ibid). In fact the situations and problems that led Mozambicans develop traditional names are not completely eradicated, and they threaten to come back. It therefore remains paramount for Mozambicans to maintain their traditional names as they are ‘custodians’ and ‘sources’ of history to themselves and future generations. But to gain this revolutionary future, a better future different from the deplorable present, this must be a quick move-before foreign culture in Mozambique regains its composure and eliminates dissent and efforts as those demonstrated in this present work.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that whilst it is acceptable that the Mozambican culture should progress together with the ‘global village’, Mozambicans should take a critical look at the role and impact of mass media in their society. The following questions should be seriously considered before Mozambique ‘grabs’ on everything that foreign cultures bring through mass media:

1. Who owns the media?
2. Why are some images and ideas so prevalent in the mass media while others especially the local ones are marginalized?
3. Whose voices are represented and whose are not heard?
4. What impact do mass media have on culture? and
5. How people use and interpret the mass media?

It is through critical analysis through these questions that Mozambique could realise how important it is to respect and preserve its own ‘customs and traditional values’ and ensure that these are carried on into the next generation. This analysis is critical because the mass media in Mozambique like elsewhere in Africa has, until today, systematically failed to act as the critical ‘fourth state’ that they pretended to be. Instead, mass media have consistently represented the interests of, and functioned as an integral component of the elites controlling society and determining policy and events. Yet it is the traditional values and customs shun by most television channels in the country that distinguish Mozambicans from people of other countries.

It is apparent that more harm than good is being done to the Mozambican culture. Besides dress, many other Mozambican cultural aspects have been sacrificed in favor of Western values brought to the Mozambican society mainly through mass media. The tradition of story
telling has taken a back seat in the Mozambican culture due to cassette playbacks of discourses. So is folk music. It has given way to cassettes and CDs. Drama and theatre have suffered the same consequences. They have diminished in importance under the stiff competition brought forth by mass media.

More importantly, it has been argued that due to mass media many traditional values in Mozambique and by extension Africa are now considered as ‘outdated’ and ‘out of fashion’. Person to person interaction between strangers, for example, has nearly disappeared in towns and cities as information is now relayed through media channels: televisions, mobile phones, radios, books, newspapers and magazines. African identity thus is being given away to mass media yet in Africa a person is identified not only by ‘rationality’, but by culture. As such, Mozambique should preserve and safeguard its culture from decadence so as to ensure that its customs and values are passed on to the next generation undiluted. Programs that mass media bring to Mozambican masses should therefore culturally censored before they are presented for public consumption. This would at least ensure that the youth are not ‘mentally corrupted’ and made to unconsciously forget or despise their customs and values.

It should be understood that although some programs might be educative to audiences of high intellectual levels- the educated elites-the same programs may yield opposite results when presented to uneducated masses and to people of a different culture. This is the case with the Brazilian Soap operas called Novela-Poderes Paralelos (parallel powers), Tudo é possível (everything is possible) that are presented on STV and Mira Mar channels that are widely watched across the country. In most cases, the message is understood and interpreted literally as it is presented due to the low literate level in Mozambique. And today, a lot of young women can afford walking around the city semi-naked or in very tight mini-skirts as they normally see in the operas. They are forgetting that in traditional Mozambique and by extension African traditional culture, thighs are offensive.
In the light of all these observations, the paper concludes that the issue of mass media is urgent and calls for immediate action by the government and the public in general. Otherwise, Mozambican culture would continually experience a ‘slow death’ and one day disappears the ‘dinosaurs’ way’.

Recommendations
Media often acts as the bridge between our personal/private lives and the public world. We see ourselves and our place through mass media. Given this nexus, there is need to pay special attention to mass media lest we are manipulated by it. As argued by Reuss and Hiebert (1985) and indeed so, while mass media can be manipulated by the public, it is the former that normally manipulates the latter. In view of the dramatic effects of mass media in Mozambique, it is apparent that if nothing urgent is done to most of the programs presented in the Mozambican channels, substantive cultural decadence would continue taking its toll.

I suggest that the Mozambican government should set a separate ministry called ‘Ministry of Culture and Communication’. This ministry would culturally sensor all programs that have to do with culture before they are presented on television for public consumption. If a program is likely to cause discord on Mozambican culture then it would be replaced by that which deserves. The proposed ministry would also send its agents around the country gathering all information and promoting the Mozambican culture by presenting programs with more local cultural content. It would be also imperative that the Ministry works hand in gloves with the Ministry of Education and Culture so that even in schools, emphasis on culture is more pronounced. Competitions on traditional dances, music, theater and drama can be promoted right from school to national levels. This would catch the Mozambicans when they are still ‘young’ that they grow up conscious of their own culture. This would be a firm step to bring back the daunting Mozambican culture back on track. But to gain this revolutionary future, a better future different from the deplorable
present, this must be a quick move. Otherwise, Mozambican culture will soon be a history to its own people.

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Representation of Religion and Religious Issues in Zimbabwean Mass Media

Tendai Chari

Key Terms: ethnocentrism, cultural diversity, media representation, religious issues, religious tolerance, stereotyping, Zimbabwe.

Abstract
The fact that the mass media has power in constructing and shaping reality is hardly disputable. Through its representation of issues and people, the mass media can influence what people think about and how people think about other people and issues. The media is a medium for raising awareness and understanding about various social issues including religion. However, in Zimbabwe, like many other parts of the world, the media’s depiction of religion and religious issues has been controversial. While some people believe the media promotes an understanding of diverse religious groups, concerns have been raised that the media subtly promotes certain religious ideologies while shunting others to the sidelines. By doing so, the media has been accused of sowing oats of suspicion and misunderstanding between different social groups. Employing textual analysis and informed by the framing theory, this paper analyses the representation of religion and religious issues in the Zimbabwean media. There are many key questions addressed in this paper: How does Zimbabwe’s media represent the country’s various religions and religious groups? What effect does such representation have on public opinions and perceptions? This paper argues that through several commissions and

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omissions, the media in Zimbabwe represents the country’s different religions and religious groups in a manner that negates Zimbabwe’s religious and cultural diversity.

**Introduction**

Zimbabwe is a secular nation that has had diverse religious faiths since it attained its independence from Britain in 1980. Section 19 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of worship when it states that: ‘Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, that is to say freedom to change his religion or belief through worship, teaching practice and observance’ (Government of Zimbabwe, p:14). This freedom has ensured the existence of religious pluralism in the country. The clearest manifestation of this pluralism has been the increasing plethora of diverse religious groups and denominations which coexist alongside one another. However, the fullness and richness of this diversity is not reflected in the country’s print or electronic media. Because the media, including the sole broadcaster (the state –owned) Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), lacks a coherent policy on religious matters, Christianity has eclipsed all other religions in the media while a ‘token invitation’ has been extended to the rest (TP, 2004). This paper discusses the representation of religion and religious issues in Zimbabwe in order to assess the mass media’s potential to promote religious harmony and tolerance in the country. This paper also seeks to initiate debate on the mass media’s role in representing religion and religious issues in a multicultural context. Reference is also made to both the press and the electronic media.

**The Media Situation in Zimbabwe**

Zimbabwe’s media essentially consists of the government owned print media, a coterie of privately owned newspapers and one state owned broadcaster, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC). State owned Zimbabwe newspapers (Zimpapers Pvt Ltd 1980) dominate the press market. They also run the only two daily newspapers in the
country: *The Herald*, published in the capital of Harare, and *The Chronicle*, based in the country’s second largest city Bulawayo. ZBC also owns a number of weekly newspapers and magazines including *Kwayedza* and *Umthunywa*, both of which are published in the country’s dominate vernacular languages of Shona and Ndebele, respectively. Zimpapers’s flagship, *The Herald* is distributed nationally while *The Chronicle* is distributed primarily in the regions of Matabeleland and Midlands (Chari, 2006). The government also runs eleven provincial newspapers which are produced by the Community Newspapers Publishing Company, a company owned by the state of New Ziana.

On the other hand, the privately owned press has been shrinking since the closure of *The Daily News* and its sister publications: *The Daily News on Sunday* (closed in 2003), *The Tribune* (closed in 2005), *The Weekly Times* (closed in 2005), *The Sunday Mirror* and *The Daily Mirror* (folded in 2007). The only notable privately owned newspapers are weekly publications. These include *The Zimbabwe Independent*, *The Standard* (both of which were owned by the Zimbabwean media mogul Trevor Ncube, who also owns *The Mail and Guardian* (SA), *The Financial Gazette*) and a few provincial weekly newspapers and magazines. After these newspapers ceased publication, Zimbabwe’s media space has been shrinking and consequently, an over-reliance on state owned media for news, opinions and information has arose. Over the years, radio and television’s geographical coverage has shrunk tremendously, resulting in remote parts of the country, such as Beit-Bridge, Victoria Falls, Plumtree, not receiving signals due to antiquated transmission equipment.

**Mass Media and the Public Sphere**

The mass media is regarded as a public sphere or a market place of ideas; a platform where different views are freely exchanged. In his book *The Transformation of The Public Sphere*, Herbamas argues that the mass media plays an important role in extending the forum for public debate from small circles in coffee houses and salons, to the greater
masses and other interest groups and hence, in broadening public opinion (Herbamas, 1989). In public democratic societies, it use to be assumed that before public action was taken, there would be a rational discussion between citizens. The mass media was viewed as having a facilitative role in this process. It was viewed as the connective tissue that brings together governors and citizens. This conception of the public sphere implies that everyone has access to the media and that no one is left out. As noted by McQuail, “all points of view or sectors are regarded as in principle of the same value...every voice has the same chance of being expressed whatever the size of the group or the number of followers” (McQuail, 1987, p 27). If the media conformed to McQuail’s view, it would follow that all religions and cultures in society would have fair and equal access to the radio, television and print media. However, as illustrated in the following accounts, this does not appear to be the case.

Beside its role in the public sphere, the mass media has a role as a mediator. This role implies that “the media lie between us receivers or consumers and that part of potential experience which is outside our direct perception or contact; that they stand between ourselves and other institutions with which we have dealings” (McQuail, 1987; p 52). Therefore, the media plays a crucial role in mediating issues because our perception of people and issues is usually derived from the media. McQuail adds that “our perception of groups to which we do not belong or cannot observe is partly shaped by the mass media” (Ibid; p 52). The mediations religious affairs is dramatised by Hoover when he notes that:

In the media age, religion can no longer control its own symbols. In times past, clerical authority could more or less dictate where, when, and how religious ideas, symbols, and claims would surface. Today, the pope can’t control the way Madonna or Sinead O’Connor use or abuse religious symbols. Muslim clerics can’t stop popular culture from portraying Islam in ways they don’t approve of. No one can control what the news media will cover and how they will cover it. What once was a bright line drawn around religion, shielding it from
secular scrutiny, has long since been dissolved by universal, instantaneous, and increasingly visual experience (Hoover, 2003, p 1).

Thus, religions can no longer control their stories, their idioms and the way they are viewed as they fall increasingly further under the media’s subjective interpretations. The many metaphors the media dramatizes the extent to which mediated reality is dependent on the media’s whimsical interpretations. The media is regarded as many things including “a window on experience”, “an interpreter”, “a platform”, “a signpost”, “a mirror” and “a filter” (MacQuail, 1994). These images connote that what we call reality is something constructed or manufactured. The media also plays the role of the agenda-setter.

Agenda-Setting and Framing
Agenda setting is a process in which the media carefully selects which issues to focus on to influence public opinion. Cohen demonstrates the centrality of agenda-setting when he states, “The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Dearing and Rogers, 1996. Cohen (1963 cited by Dearing and Rogers, Ibid p.1). A second level of agenda-setting is framing: it shows that the media can influence the way audiences interpret certain messages. Entman asserts that: “To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993:52).

This paper argues that the media plays a pivotal role in influencing what people think about different religious faiths and those who subscribe to them. This paper also borrows from the social construction theory of the media which argues that reality is a social construct. Thus, the media circulates knowledge and shapes opinions about people and issues. Moreover, this paper concurs with Tuchman’s
view that “the mass media necessarily legitimate the status quo’’ and Enzensberger (1974) who characterizes the media as the “conscious industry’’ (cited in Tuchman, 1989; 156). Therefore, the mass media plays an important role in shaping people’s opinions about other people’s religious faiths, beliefs and practices. This paper further argues that the mass media limits “frames within which public issues are debated and so narrow the available political alternatives’’ (Tuchman Ibid: 156). Furthermore, the media influences opinion about other people’s religions by carefully selecting issues and events that fit into their frames and leaving out those that do not.

Media Policy and Religious Issues
Zimbabwean media coverage of religious issues does not fully reflect Zimbabwe’s diverse religious faiths. Christianity is given the most media coverage, while other religious are marginalized. Some neglected religions include the African Traditional Religion (ATR), Islam, Judaism, Bhudaism, and Bahai. Christian programmes and music dominate national television programming. Seven days a week, national television begins with a Christian sermon. Sunday’s religious programming is also dominated by Christian broadcasts. Additionally, there are numerous advertisements on ZBC-TV, especially during the main news at eight in the evening. The number of Christian broadcasts on Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Television (ZBC-TV) increases daily without a corresponding increase in broadcasts from other faiths. Therefore, the impression produced by this situation is that the country is a Christian nation; however, this is not the case. All of the other faiths appear to have been symbolically annihilated from the media. This annihilation has caused non-Christians to feel like religious orphans. This view is enforced by a letter which appeared in the editorial pages of a 2004 private weekly newspaper which stated:

ZBH has remained pro-Christian to the extent that Christianity has become the official religion of our national broadcaster. Its broadcasting stations have equated religion to Christianity; religious
music has become synonymous with Christian music; talk shows are all Bible based unless a token invitation is extended to other religions: moderators of infotainment programmes, cultural and religious talk are biased towards Christianity, or they are hostile towards, or offensive to other religions, or religious convictions. There is no other religious programme on any of the radio and TV stations that are single-faith based as one would with programmes such as Psalmody, Gospel Hour, Prime Gospel Show and many Talk Shows on all radio stations except Power FM (TP, Financial Gazette, 16.12.04).

The state broadcaster’s tendency to be biased towards one faith persists because there are not policies on religious matters. Thus, without religious policies, the state broadcaster, Disc Jockeys (DJs), presenters, producers and other personnel have equated religion with Christianity. A former minister of the Ministry of Information and Publicity (the parent ministry of the state broadcaster) acknowledges this policy vacuum and the need to have a broadcasting policy on religious programming. He states that:

We in the ministry firmly believe that God’s house is broad and with many denominations. We believe religion is wider than Christianity. We believe life is nourished by the word but fed by other pursuits and interests, including secular ones. The national screen must reflect this diversity. It creates room for everyone, including yourselves (Mangwana, 2007, p2).

The absence of a guiding framework on religious issues in the media, particularly in broadcasting, means that journalists at the state broadcaster are permitted to make their own decisions on religious programming. Experience has shown that without policy, individual journalists, most of whom are Christians or sympathetic to Christianity, will fill the airwaves with Christian programmes while ignoring other faiths.

A key informant reported that sometimes, in advance, a single Christian organisation or denomination buys a period of broadcasting time for up to a year. Thus, when other religious organisations
approach the state broadcaster to buy airtime for their programmes, they are told that the airtime allocated for religious programmes has been exhausted. The crowding out of other faiths by dominant religions does not augur well for a society that yearns for religious co-existence, tolerance and diversity because those who subscribe to the marginalised religions are left feeling like religious orphans.

A similar observation has been made by Viney (2001). He found that on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Christianity dominated the airwaves at the expense of other religions. Moreover, members of religions other than Christianity “do not feel that they too have a stake in religious broadcasting in the UK” because they are marginalized. Thus, Viney concludes that on the BBC, religious broadcasting is viewed as principally a Christian affair where other “groups are invited as occasional guests” (Viney, 2001, p 55). This scenario not only makes the term religious broadcasting sound like nonsense, but it also turns the notion of public broadcasting and the concept of the public sphere on their head.

Religious Programming on Zimbabwe Television
Here, Table 1 shows the distribution of religious programmes on ZBC-TV.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Programme Name</th>
<th>Time Slot</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Egea Ministries</td>
<td>0630-0700</td>
<td>30 min</td>
<td>sermon</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Bible Speaks</td>
<td>10:00-11:00</td>
<td>1 hr</td>
<td>sermon</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Celebrate Life</td>
<td>11:30-12:00</td>
<td>30min</td>
<td>sermon</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winning Ways</td>
<td>12:00-12:30</td>
<td>30min</td>
<td>sermon</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Gospel Show</td>
<td>21:30-22:30</td>
<td>1 hr</td>
<td>musical</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gospel Sermons-BBN Believers</td>
<td>0455-0555</td>
<td>1 hr</td>
<td>sermon</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td>Programme Name</td>
<td>Time Slot</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Format</td>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>Gospel Sermon</td>
<td>0455-0555</td>
<td>1hr</td>
<td>sermon</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>Gospel Sermon</td>
<td>0455-0555</td>
<td>1hr</td>
<td>sermon</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>Gospel sermon</td>
<td>04555-0555</td>
<td>1hr</td>
<td>sermon</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>Gospel sermon</td>
<td>0455-0555</td>
<td>1hr</td>
<td>sermon</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>Ithambo</td>
<td>22:30-23.00</td>
<td>30min</td>
<td>magazine</td>
<td>African Traditional Religion,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christianity, Islam, Baha‘i,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Judaism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>Christianity and Tradition</td>
<td>06:30-07:00</td>
<td>30min</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>African Traditional Religion, Christianity, Islam, Baha‘i, Judaism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:[ ]

**Representation of Religious Issues**

In the Zimbabwean press and electronic media, religious issues are often regarded as soft news. Consequently, they are often lumped together with subjects that lack immediacy such as sports, entertainment, misadventures, movie releases, music reviews and other human interest stories. The defining feature of soft news is that other than a reporter’s curiosity, there is no precipitating event that triggers the story. Religious stories rarely make it to the front pages of Zimbabwean newspapers. Generally, religious news can only become a cover story if there is a bizarre element to it as was the case with stories that have bedeviled the local Anglican Church since 2004 including those that tell of a pastor being accused of rape, church funds being embezzled or squabbles occurring over church leadership. The focus of religious issues is extremely important for it determines whether a story
will make be printed or aired. Thus, one finds that religious issues are usually pushed to the backburner unless they involve controversy or a big name.

**Sensationalism and Religious Issues**

A key element to religious reports in the Zimbabwean press and electronic media is sensationalism. Millbank notes that the mass media contributes to the “fostering of a climate of conformity by containing dissent...[and by accentuating]...news, which falls outside the consensus or...by treating dissenting views as irrelevant eccentricities which serious people, may discuss as a consequence” (1969 cited by Tuchman, 1989:156). Whenever religious issues or personalities appear in the media, they are highly sensationalised. Sensationalism, also known as sunshine journalism or yellow journalism, is media coverage that seeks to excite the audience’s vulgar tastes by preying upon their curiosity. It thrives on gossip, rumours, hearsay, hype and misleading information. Reporting that uses sensationalism is extremely controversial and loud. Moreover, the purpose of it is to grab the attention of the audience. In extreme cases, the media completely disregards facts when utilizes sensationalism. Major concerns about the use of sensationalism include that it:

- removes focus from more important issues;
- may promote misperceptions for the audience or the involved parties; or
- may exacerbate existing problems by making them appear as if they are out of control, as one was to say, “the world is on fire”

In some situations, sensationalism encourages certain social behaviors. In the Zimbabwean media, religious issues and undesirable personalities are preyed upon to boost copy sales, television ratings and advertising revenue. Newspapers and magazines use religious personalities as bait to grab a readers’ attention in a manner that obfuscates issues. Examples of this can be found in the following news headlines from the Zimbabwean press:
Clergyman accused of sexual abuse (The Sunday Mail, 10.12.06)
The tale of a woman who rose from the dead (Parade Magazine 2000,)
Guruve—home of the bizarre....Now woman ‘turns’ into man (The Sunday Mail, 04.06.06)
Church members clash over grave shrine (The Herald, 01.07.06)
Defrocked pastor loses alimony (The Sunday Mail, 23.07.01)
Self-styled prophet jailed (The Sunday Mail, 02.07.06)

A common denominator in the above headlines is that they all have the potential to grab one’s attention because they revolve around a particular personality and they all contain a bizarre element. Selection subjects and headlines for stories are motivated by the media’s desire to tickle the audience, rather than a desire to inform them.

In the news, business names make news and as Brooks et al (1988; 5) observe, “the bizarre makes news, too”. While focusing on news stories that tickle the audience appears perfectly acceptable, doing so may befuddle important issues especially if doing so becomes an obsession. Important issues may elude the audience because preoccupied by mundane and trivial news. When too much attention is given to personalities and events, important tenets of a person’s religion may be glossed over or belittled. This is especially true when the negative deeds of the personality in question are considered to be representative of an entire group. Obsession with the negative aspects of a religious faith instills cognitive dissonance among followers and potential followers of the religion.

Societal harmony can be jeopardized because of the way the media handles conflicts within religious denominations and between different religious faiths. There are many cases in which religious issues have been blown out of proportion. For example, the arrest and trial of religious personalities, including the former president, Reverend Canaan Banana, Prophet Boniface Muponda, Prophet Lawrence Katsiru, Pastor Lawrence Haisa and others, have attracted phenomenal
media attention. Moreover, news reports on religious personalities have sometimes bordered on entertainment rather than informational. An example of this was the coverage of the trial of Godfrey Nzira, a leader of the Johane Masowe Apostolic Faith group who had been convicted of nine counts of rape.vii

On 18 March 2003, *The Daily News* published a story whose headline read “Nzira supporters run amok”. The paper reported that about 2000 female “supporters of the Nzira went haywire” beating up court officials, policemen on duty and smashed doors “after their leader had been convicted”. The magistrate who presided over the rape case was reported to have “escaped death by a whisker”. One magistrate was reported to have lost her shoe in the melee. Sanity was only restored after officers in the Zimbabwe Prison Service (ZPS) fired warning shots into the air. This story had all the ingredients of a short drama. It created the impression that members of this particular religious group are inherently violent, fanatical, and irrational. However, it should be noted that the story itself does not say much about the rape case or Katsiru. Consequently, readers were forced to view him through descriptions of his supporters.

This biased representation is similar to what another religious group called the *Mukaera or Mudzimu Unoera*, a sect based in Guruve, Mashonaland West province, was subjected to when most of the media portrayed it as a mythical sectviii. In *The Herald Online* (Port Elizabeth), Micheal Hartnack refers to the Mudzimu Unoera (Mukakera) religious group as “a classic example of how dangerous cults emerge in communities under cataclysmic stress” (*The Herald Online* 06.02.06).

*Parade* magazine, a popular monthly and privately owned magazine which specializes on human interest stories, reported that the Mukaera village where the religious group is based “is not just a village for anyone”. The magazine reported that “Devout followers of the Mukaera have vowed to follow the church’s teachings to the letter” to suggest that there are religious groups whose members do not intend to
follow teachings of their faith to the letter (Parade, April 1999, p 51). The Mudzimu Unoera church members are described by the magazine as living a life stranger than fiction. The magazine dwells more on what the group does not do rather that what it does do. For instance it states:

They don’t keep any domestic animals. They do not grow crops (‘not even one bed of tomatoes’). Their children do not go to school. They do not go to clinics. They do not eat pork, mice, nor do they smoke or drink (Parade ibid, p51).

The fact that this group’s members are described more in terms of what they do not do rather than what they do is a deliberate rhetorical strategy, designed to undermine their faith and religious practices. They are depicted as behaving in a way that is out of the ordinary or stranger than fiction. Thus, readers are unable to understand this religion better because the press tends to mystify, rather than furnish, information about the religion. Therefore, readers are unlikely to be educated about this religious faith. If anything, they are likely to be left wondering about and even becoming suspicious of the people who follow the religion.

Television’s coverage of religious groups is equally controversial. For instance, a broadcast made on 7 February 2007 of the ZTV current affairs programme, Behind the Camera, portrayed the Mudzimu Unoera religious group in a prejudicial manner. Throughout the programme, the religious group and its “Tritnoy” language were repeatedly referred to as very strange. Part of the programme’s script read:

This week we speak a different and strange language known as Tritnoy. We urge you to exercise religious tolerance for the next 20 or so minutes...Mashonaland Central is a province is well known for its good soils, rains and agricultural produce. People say if you get a farm in that province you are likely to become a successful farmer as long as you work very hard of course. Of late the province has been in the news for reasons which have nothing to with its good soils. Tucked
away in Guruve is a village called Chatiza. In this village is a church (denomination) or rather cult known as Mudzimu Unoera. The cult claims the Lord Jesus Christ kept his promise and came back in the form of a girl they call Baby Jesus who speaks a strange language called Tritnoy. She sang the national anthem for the Behind the camera team in the language...Strange isn’t it. Well not everyone thinks it is a strange language. There are people who speak that language in Guruve who are convinced it is what the mighty Lord gave them. Formed in 1932 under the leadership of Emmanuel Mudyiwa the cult initially used a different and equally strange language. Father to Baby Jesus, Mr Eniwas Nyanhete whose religious or is it cult name is Father or Baba Josefa from the Biblical Joseph whose wife gave birth to Jesus Christ, says the founder of his church was his father.

Although the presenter advised the audience to “exercise religious tolerance for the next 20 minutes or so,” his statements were ironic for he displayed a gross intolerance for the religious group in question. Whether this was deliberate is another matter. When confronted with presentations and portrayals such as the one mentioned above, audiences are less likely to be curious about the religious group in question and to want to learn about said group. Moreover, audiences are even less likely to sympathise or seek affiliation with a group when it is framed in a negative manner.

Makamure notes that “papers have to be forgiven because they have to make their news titillating and marketable” (1999;17). This comment suggests that the media’s desire to make a profit is another driving force behind sensationalism because it forces important details about other people’s religious beliefs to be lost.

The Apostolic church (Vapositori), which is one of the country’s several Independent African churches, has also been the focus of popular jokes, sarcasm and a soft target of negative representation. For instance, a Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) radio programme once reported that a member of the apostolic group, Majero, and his entire family fled their homestead and went into hiding.
during a countrywide immunisation programme. This incident was reported to have occurred when Ministry of Health and Child Welfare officials visited Karoi, in Mashonaland West province in 1999 (Cited in Parade Magazine, January 1999).

However, the media also quoted him refuting the report and dismissing it as a fabrication that was created by the media (Parade, January 1999, and p 10). When Parade Magazine later sought an interview with him, he agreed on the condition that his name not be mentioned “because reporters misinform” (Ibid. p.11). Although the magazine assured him that his name would not be revealed, they placed his name in an article that appeared the magazine’s January 1999 edition. In the article, Majero is described as “a Karoi enterprising farmer with a heavy load on his shoulders”, a “super daddy” enjoying “his macho status”. The use of sarcasm to belittle religious personalities not only creates contemptuous feelings towards those personalities, but it also creates the same negative feelings about the beliefs of the person in question. Such media representations do not bode well for religious tolerance in a country where the Constitution guarantees citizens the right to worship freely.

Religious Ethnocentrism and the Media
In addition to the general defacement of certain religions and religious groups, the Zimbabwean media is responsible for cultivating implicit and explicit religious ethnocentrism. Milligan (undated, p4) defines ethnocentrism as the tendency of people to “view their particular culture as being better, or even the only truly worthy of existence”. Gil-White (undated, p2) concurs with Milligan and describes ethnocentrism as the act of “passing negative moral judgment on how ethnic others organize their lives”. Moreover, Cunningham et al (2004 p1333) describe ethnocentrism as the tendency “to form and maintain negative evaluations and hostility toward multiple groups that are not one’s own”. Ethnocentrism is undesirable in society because it encourages people to be intolerant is a hindrance to cultural diversity
and multiculturalism. Hence, individuals will judge other groups in relation to their particular ethnic group or culture, especially in relation to language, behaviour, customs and religion.

In Zimbabwe, the media indulges in various levels of implicit and explicit religious ethnocentricity. It has a tendency to portray some religious faiths and groups as mysterious, inferior to Christianity or simply evil. For example, African Traditional Religion (ATR) is often equated with witchcraft. An example of this comparison is found in a story published in Parade Magazine in December 2000. In the story, traditional healers who gathered in Harare in 2000 to exhibit their wares were described by the magazine as witches and wizards. The headline for the story was “Big Indaba for witches” (Parade, December 2000, p 3).

This article is in stark contrast with the article the same edition of the magazine published on the Christian pastor, Larry Ekanem. The magazine describes Ekanem as “The Anointed Man of God” who performs miracles (Parade, December 200, p 7). In addition to describing the Christian pastor in a glorious manner, the magazine denigrates African Traditional Religion by insinuating that Zimbabwe faces daunting economic and political challenges because its people have embraced practices like totems and thus, have alienated themselves from God. The pastor is quoted as having said:

Zimbabwe is a blessed nation in Africa, look at the weather, its strategic position on the continent, its wealth and peace. You see, when tradition contradicts the divine plan of God people suffer, the totem system here in Zimbabwe for example, some people take certain animals as their totems and end up bowing to their symbols in praise to the extent of subjugating themselves to the totems. Some even go to the extent of adopting the characteristics of these animals; in short, they end up worshipping them, now where does that leave God? (Parade, Ibid; p7-11).

The fact that the reporter of the article gives his interviewee a long leash to disparage other people’s religion displays that the media is insensitive and intolerant of cultural differences. Moreover, it does
not bode well for religious co-existence and cultural diversity. This paper argues that religious ethnocentricity, or the tendency of some people to view their religion as the only legitimate religion, does not only apply to different faiths, but it is even found within specific religions. One such religion is Christianity where some denominations are regarded as more legitimate than others.

This attitude manifests itself in situations where the media subtly or blatantly treats certain religious groups within the Christian faith as inferior to others or as spiritually questionable. For instance, the media tends to depict African Independent Churches as suspicious and their spiritual leaders are often described as self-styled prophets or bogus prophets. On the other hand, spiritual leaders of other Christian denominations are described as acclaimed or renowned prophets. These labels are given without justification. Moreover, the labels are assigned with the intention of legitimizing some Christian denominations, while de-legitimizing others and thereby creating negative perceptions about those who are portrayed poorly.

A poignant case of religious chauvinism was demonstrated in the July/August 1997 (Number 33) issue of the Catholic News Magazine which disparaged the Universal Church of the Kingdom God (UCKG), a Brazilian Pentecostal church with branches in 90 countries including the United States of America, Europe and Asia, whose operations have surrounded with controversy in some African countries (BBC, 2005, Reuters, 2005). The Catholic magazine published a satirical piece, a cartoon and a commentary insinuating that members of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God were money mongers, bent on ripping off unsuspecting members of the public (Catholic News Magazine, 1997).

The Catholic news magazine described the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God as a “money club” or a “business” driven by the desire to make money, rather than spiritual salvation. This commentary chastises those who patronise the church for behaving like “cry babies” and lacking foresight. The Magazine reported:
God has given us brains to think and hands to work with. If we don’t use them don’t come crying. Rather learn your lesson.

The cartoon is even more telling for it depicts an immaculately dressed pastor laying his hand on a female member of the church saying, “Give me a tenth of your money in your pockets and God will stop all your suffering”. Beside the pastor is a basket full of people’s sorrows including unemployment, stress, demons, epilepsy, and impotence. In the second picture the pastor is at home praying with his wife, with his Bible in hand, and there is a brand new car parked at the house. The pastor tells his wife “They are still gullible. I bought another car” and his wife says, “I am proud of you, my husband. Let’s read the Bible and praise the Lord” (Catholic Magazine, 1997).

The Catholic magazine makes unjustified judgments about another Christian church organization with a tone that borders on defamation. Moreover, the article raises serious ethical questions. What exacerbates the ethical culpability of the Catholic magazine is that there is a Christian Church casting aspersions on another Christian denomination by passing moral judgments on it. Additionally, it is a publication of another Christian organisation. It could be argued that such writings hardly promote tolerance among different religious groups and are bound to provoke religious conflicts.

Stereotypical Representation of Religious Groups
A stereotype is an exaggerated belief, image or distorted truth about a person or group; a generalization that allows groups little to no differences or social variations (Greater Rochester Diversity Council, 2005). Stereotypes are often used in a negative and prejudicial sense to justify certain discriminatory behaviours. The production of stereotypes is usually based on simplifications, exaggerations, distortions, generalizations, and the presentation of cultural attributes as “natural”. Lester notes that “a stereotype imposes a grid mold on the
subject and encourages respected mechanical usage” (1996; p9). Prejudices differ from stereotypes in the sense that they are abstracts or general misconception or attitudes towards individuals or groups of people or culture. Lester notes that “prejudice, discrimination and stereotype make a lethal combination” (Lester, Ibid p10).

Stereotypes make people see things through a narrow, self-serving prism rather than liberating them from their prejudices. In the Zimbabwean media and popular culture, religious stereotypes operate at both the inter-faith and intra-faith level. Although inter-faith sentiments are not overtly expressed, the media sometimes exhibits subtle religious prejudices. The pervasive ignorance of religious traditions such as the African tradition, Islam, Judaism, Islam, Baha’i faith causes them to be stereotypically represented in the media. For example, African Traditional Religion is usually portrayed as shrouded in mystery, backward, barbaric, satanic and belonging to the backwaters of history. Such characterizations mystify religions and may discourage people from openly associating with members of such religious groups.

The African traditional healer, also known as the N’anga (African Doctor), is a major object of parody and a prime source of humour in radio and television dramas. Usually male, he is portrayed as a pathological liar and a cheat who is determined to manipulate unsuspecting clients into giving him their hard-earned money. Thus, he is portrayed as dirty, a conman, and a trickster. The African doctor is usually represented as a poor person who speaks half-truths and who does not properly measure his prescriptions. In the media and in dramas, the African doctor is placed in the same category as the false prophet who speaks in tongues but hardly communicates anything to his subjects because his language is from the underworld. When the prophet speaks, he does so to confuse rather than to help. Thus, the apostolic prophets of the Johanne Masowe or Johanne Marange groups are lumped into the same category as African doctor.
Moreover, the media tends to represent African Independent Churches and the African Traditional Religion as backwards and anti-modern. An example of such representations can be found in *The Standard*, a privately owned weekly, in its story headlined, “*Vapositori in Climb Down Over Immunisation*” (22.05.10). The story reported that the country’s various *Vapositori* sects agreed to take part in the ongoing government led child immunisation against measles programme after mounting stiff resistance.\(^\text{xi}\) The religious groups were represented as rigid, uncooperative and as derailing progress. The newspaper reported that “resistance had become deep rooted among members of the Johanne Marange sect in particular”. Even though such stereotyping may be unconscious, it could be argued that it promotes negative perceptions about these religious groups. In order to promote tolerance and harmony, the media should avoid dismissing other religious perspectives.

African Independent Churches, especially the apostolic sects, are often grouped together in the media. Although there are differences between the churches, the media implies that that they are all polygamists, adverse to western medicine, have shaved heads, wear white robes and do not send their children to school. Truthfully, the media has not bothered to conduct deeper research to try to understand the religious practices and differences of the groups. Instead, they have preferred to find solace in sweeping generalizations and hyperbole. An example of such a generalization is found in a story published by Parade Magazine (October 2001 edition) where led by E.P. Mwazha, an inaccurate photograph of the African Apostolic Church was used in a news article to wrongly attribute certain practices of the Jonanne Marange to the African Apostolic Church. This error prompted the leaders of the African Apostolic Church to write to the magazine a complaint stating that:

*It appears the writer did not do enough research concerning the article. Johane Marange sect is different from that of Johane Masowe. What the article portrays about African independent churches is a blanket cover*
which is unfortunate and unfair...Giving a blanket cover to all African Independent churches creates problems as some who do not practice why you portrayed get tarnished. The African Apostolic Church of Zimbabwe does not practice polygamy. Its members practise monogamous marriages. On the question of education the African Apostolic Church of Zimbabwe encourages its members to be highly educated (Parade, December 2001, p4).

The magazine went on to acknowledge its error and apologised for using the photo in its issue but, the damage had already been done and the stereotype were formed. Whatever the reason for the distortion was, the point remains that the media in Zimbabwe habitually indulges in contemptuous and gross generalizations of Independent African Churches. These generalizations do not bode well for religious tolerance and diversity. In spite of the fact that stereotypes are based on incorrect judgments, they play a crucial role in molding public opinion and make most people less inclined to reconsider their attitudes towards other religious faiths. It is possible that religious faiths ostracized by the media may find it difficult to attract new members or sympathizers for few people would have the courage to stand up and defend their positions. Chitando (2002:76) notes about how Independent African Churches and their members are subjected to negative reports in Zimbabwe’s mainstream media. He notes that:

Within the mainstream media, members of these churches have generally been the subject of scorn and derision. Due to the dominance of mainline churches and the aggressive nature of evangelical/pentecostal churches when it comes to media technologies, independent churches have not had equal access to the media in the country. On the whole, their followers are portrayed as uneducated, and their religious beliefs as an uncritical mixture of traditional spirituality and Christianity. In the early eighties the popular musician (who turned to gospel music in the late 1990s) Zacks Manatsa portrayed the Apostles as bearded, tea-loving, patriarchal figures in his song ‘Tea Hobvu’ (Strong Tea).
Conclusion
This paper has discussed the representation of religious issues in Zimbabwe’s mass media. Moreover, it has shown that the representation of religious issues in the Zimbabwean mass media is far from satisfactory. Both electronic and print media are culpable for this situation for they both have failed to provide equal and fair access to all the religious faiths of the country. This paper has also argued that the mass media promotes religious intolerance within and between the country’s different religious faiths practiced. Through outright or subtle biases, negative reporting, sensationism, stereotyping, ethnocentricity and various acts of omission and commission, the media in Zimbabwe has the potential to promote intolerance and misunderstandings within and between religious faiths. This paper has also considered that even within the same religious faith, the media can legitimize some church denominations while de-legitimizing others. At an inter-faith level, it has also been argued that because of the religious backgrounds of media owners, journalists tend to represent other religious beliefs and faiths, such as African Traditional Religion, in a condescending manner. The observations made in this paper may suggest that the whole notion of media independence and objectivity is a myth and needs to be rethought. Moreover, this paper confirms observations made by earlier scholars, such as Gaye Tuchman (1978), who note that media reality is a social construct and that news is always someone’s view of reality. This study does not wish to throw away the bay with the bath water, and sees opportunities for the media to improve societal differences in an increasingly multicultural and fast globalizing world.

The paper therefore canvases for appropriate training and education for media personnel so that they can better appreciate the essence of cultural diversity. As noted by the Commission on Human Rights (1991), most of the problems associated with ethnocentricism lie in education and training. It would helpful for journalists to be taught about the cultures of other people from a very early stage in their schooling. Journalism education should go beyond teaching prospective
journalists how to craft good introductions or how to meticulously handle a microphone. Trainees should be exposed to the diverse histories, cultures and religions of the world to break down cultural and religious walls that are often created by their own cultures. Adopting responsible and ethical reporting may also help people avoid the kind of reporting that has the potential to sow the seeds of suspicion about different religious faiths. Media houses should insist that there not only be sound ethical codes of conduct, but that there also be in-depth research conducted on how to keep the news fair and balanced. We are living at a period of history in which the Earth is a common homeland for a rapidly increasing, integrated human race. Thus, the media must acknowledge and accept cultural differences. Because acceptance of others must be promoted, media practitioners should be more sensitive to and accord time to all religious faiths and denominations. Behaving accordingly will allow people to recognize that diversity does not undermine democracy but rather, it deepens it.

End Notes

i ZBC has five radio channels and two television channels.

ii Kwayedza (Shona) and Umthunywa (Ndebele) are vernacular terms which mean dawn.

iii Formerly ZIANA, the company was restructured following the appointment of Jonathan Moyo as Minister of Information and Publicity.

iv The Daily News and its sister paper The Daily News on Sunday were closed after failing to comply with the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) in September 2003.

v There are also a number of publications which are published outside the country and are circulated in major towns and cities in and around the country. These include The Zimbabwean (UK) The Sunday Times, The Mail and Guardian, The Star (SA) and a host of other publications.
vi It is worth noting that television programmes particularly news and current affairs do not appear on the programme schedule and as a result cannot be captured since they are impromptu or transient. Be that as it may we feel that the table should give a general idea on the skewed nature of religious programming on ZBC. There is therefore scope for a more systematic and comprehensive longitudinal studies on religious on the state broadcaster.

vii Johane Masowe is an African Independent Church that has been subject to negative musical and press reportage. In the 1980s Zex a prominent popular musician caused uproar in the country after lampooning the religious group through his song ‘Tea Hobvu’ (White Tea). The song was interpreted as portraying male members of the religious group as gluttonous and self-fish patriarchies who do not care much about their families.

viii The group has received widespread and negative publicity in newspapers, magazines, radio and television. Also, see below.

ix Tritony is the language spoken by members of the Mudzimu.Unoera group and was portrayed as funny on the ZTV programme.

x For example, in 2005 the church was banned by the Zambian government for allegedly engaging in ‘satanic activities. For more details see, BBC and Reuters stories on http://wwrn.org/articles/19707?&place=southern-african&section=other-groups and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4485222.stm

xi Some Vapositori groups do not believe in western medicine as a result they refuse to send their children to hospital or participate in government immunization programmes.

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Pan-Africanism and the Challenges of Development in the 21st Century

Dr. Akpomuvie Orhioghene Benedict

Key Terms: Africa, Pan-Africanism, development, poverty, industrialization, globalization, population growth.

Abstract
Some people maintain that Africa cannot unite because it lacks the ingredients necessary for unity including a common race, culture and language. Yet, the forces that unite Africa greatly outweigh the forces that divide it. In practical terms, this deep rooted unity has been demonstrated in the development of Pan-Africanism and, more recently, in the projection of what has been called the African personality in world affairs. This paper generally focuses upon discerning the best way to promote unity and development in Africa, as well as on the correct path for achieving economic development in the continent. Perhaps no condition better depicts the state of Africa’s current development than the commonality of poverty in Africa. Despite these bleak circumstances, Africans welcomed the new millennium with enthusiasm and a new found determination to tackle the continent’s long standing developmental burden. This paper recommends that Africans be mindful that in a world that is rapidly globalizing, enormous challenges face the continent’s development and that power, might, wealth and technology determine ‘who gets what, and when and how’ in the world. For Africa to get out of its low-level economic trap and lay the foundation for significant progress in economic decolonization, new economic strategies need to be formulated and rigorously pursued at all levels.

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Introduction
For many years, African politicians throughout the continent have called for African freedom and unity. Nyerere (1969) however, contended that politicians have presented the political and economic arguments for freedom and unity without focusing on details. Nyerere stated that significant thought and detailed negotiations must replace slogans if the politicians’ objectives are to be attained. To ask what is meant by African unity is the same as asking what Africans want and expect to achieve. In broad terms, the answer is simple: Africans wish to determine their destinies and overcome the poverty that has plagued the continent for decades.

Africa has a population of about 78 million people which constitutes about 10 percent of the world population. Moreover, Africa’s land covers an area of 30.1 million square kilometers. Most of the continent’s economies are dominated by agriculture. (South Africa and Mauritius are the only major exceptions to this generalization.) The influence of African agriculture is evident in that about two-thirds of Africa’s total labour force is employed in agricultural jobs and about a third of the GDP and one half of its exports are agricultural (ADB, 2001:19, 235). Furthermore, over 70 percent of the continent’s exports are unprocessed commodities and most commodity prices have declined consistently over the years. Current global trade rules create barriers to processing. One such barrier is that the region requires that its capacity be increased to import essential intermediate and capital goods that are important for economic growth.

After registering an average of 2.6 percent annual growth between 1965 and 1974, per capital GDP stagnated in most African Countries. Moreover, mainly because of an increasing decline in trade, Africa’s economy continued to deteriorate during the first half of the 1980s for the decline in trade significantly reduced Africa’s access to international finance. This decline in turn resulted in over two thirds of Africa’s population to have lower incomes in 1985 than they did in the
mid-1970s (World Bank, 1994: 17-19). Africa’s poor economic performance appears even more unfavorable when compared to the economic performance of other developing countries throughout the world.

Most African economies continued to be poor throughout the second half of the 1980s and 1990s. According to UN statistics (see Todaro 200: 708 – 9), in the 1980s, Africa’s poverty rate rose to about 40 percent. Moreover, real wages declined by over 30 percent and even dropped by more than 50 percent in some countries. Additionally, in 1996, debt service amounted to 14 percent of total export earnings. The poor state of African economics is made further evident by the fact that while underemployment became severe during the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, open unemployment increased at an annual rate of 10 percent. This data supports that from a global perspective, Africa has fallen steadily behind the rest of the world. During the 1980s and early 1990s, many African countries adopted the World Bank/IMF inspired Structural Adjustment Programmes to correct structural imbalances and enhance macroeconomic stability in their countries.

Perhaps the best way to appreciate the imperatives of African unity in this era is to place them in context of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) that were adopted in 2000. According to the United Nations (UN), the development goals set by the Millennium Declaration expressed the resolve of the “world’s political leaders to free their fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to make the right to development a reality for everyone and to free the entire human race from want” (UN), 2000:8).

Africa has been struggling to take control of her destiny since the beginning of the last century. In 1900, the first Pan-African Congress was held in London. Other congresses followed but, according to the renowned African anthropologist, historian and scholar Ali Mazrui, the
first four Pan-African Congresses did not help Africa move towards political self-determination. However, in 1945, the fifth congress marked a turning point for Africa. The congress helped English speaking Pan-Africanist Nationalists become aware that the colonial problem required action in Africa to be solved, not manoeuvring in European capitals (Mazrui and Tidy, 1984). According to Nkuhlu (2003), this marked the beginning of a new consciousness: a realization that Africans needed to take ownership and leadership of their struggle against all forms of colonialism. To Nkuhlu, this was the beginning of the African Renaissance.

Great Pan-Africanists like W.E.B. Du Bois, George Padmore, Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Leopold Senghor shared a vision of a free Africa in which it would be in a position to make its own contribution to human culture, science and civilization. As rightly noted by Nkuhlu (2003), from the start, the struggle against colonialism was not only about achieving political independence. It was also about creating conditions for the continent to be regenerated.

Unfortunately, the rebirth of the continent remains an unfinished task: Africa is yet to take control of her destiny. During the Cold War years, African countries had no choice but to remain, not only allied to, but also dependent on the superpowers. Consequently, African resources continued to be exploited, unabated, by super powers and their allies as if colonialism had not ended. Moreover, African countries continued to supply minerals and raw materials at prices determined by the interests of the developed countries. Unlike in other countries and continents, the existence of abundant natural resources did not lead to increased investments in processing industries and the transfer of technology to Africa; but rather, it led to the impoverishment of the continent. Africa’s lack of control over both its political and economic destiny has retarded the rejuvenation of the continent.
Africa’s leaders and thinkers, including academic theoreticians, pragmatic activists and especially Africa’s premier regional intergovernmental organization, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), continue to focus upon the study of the unpleasant developmental experiences of independent Africa that have occurred since the 1950s. The analysis asserted by Asante (1991) generally focuses on the broad issue of discerning how best to promote development in Africa and to determine the “correct” path towards economic development. Enduring interest in this subject has been considerably heightened by what is now generally termed, the ‘continental African development crisis.’ This crisis has been intensifying over the last decade which in turn has profound implications for people’s satisfaction as well as political stability in Africa.

Development as Freedom and a Search for an Alternative African Development Strategy
The debate over the meaning of development and its direction and constituents has persisted for decades. As it has continued, the debate has brought about postulations from contending theoretical perspectives.

Obi and Chukwuemeka (2006) contended that perhaps what fueled the conflict on the real meaning of development was that despite many years of implementing policies fashioned by western ‘development’ agencies and scholars, the third world, including African nations, remains neck deep in poverty and some nations are getting poorer. These scholars argued that if all the ‘theories’, programmes and policies that have been forced upon the third world under the belief that they are vital to development have not worked after many decades, one or bother of the following are true: the conceptualization of development is faulty or the approaches towards realizing it are wrong. This realization has made a new approach to development necessary.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, much theorizing about the causes of Africa’s underdevelopment and alternative strategies for development were propounded. Yet, while various developmental theories and concepts provided some initial direction for research, by the mid 1970s, both the theories and concepts were shown to be inadequate for explaining Africa’s continued under-development. Asante (1991) noted because they were grounded in western political and developmental tradition, the various theories often distorted more than they explained. Not surprisingly, the policies, programmes and projects that were formulated on the basis of these theories have had notable failings.

In many respects, as far as development is concerned, African countries, and the continent as a whole, stand at a crossroads. Past strategies appear to demand a thorough re-examination in order for the potential opportunities for higher and more stable rates of growth to be exploited. Hence, in recent years, there has been a desperate search for new approaches and methods for development. These approaches should not be focused on poorly imitating the strategies and life styles of societies with different historical, cultural, economic, and political backgrounds. This article contributes to the search for new methods and is written by informed writer who advocates for indigenous African strategies.

Development can be seen as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. As Sen (2001) correctly stressed, focusing on human freedoms differs from narrower views of development such as identifying development with the growth of the gross national product, the rise of personal incomes, industrialization, technological advancement and social modernization. Of course, growth of the GNP or of individual incomes can be very important in order to expand the freedoms of members of society. But freedoms also depend on other determinants such as social and economic arrangements (i.e., facilities
for education and health care), as well as political and civil rights (i.e.,
the liberty to participate in public discussion and scrutiny).

Similarly, industrialization, technological progress and social
modernization can contribute substantially to expanding human
freedom. Freedom depends on other influences as well. If freedom is
what development advances, then a significant argument for
concentrating on the over-arching objective rather than on some
particular means or specially chosen list of instruments exists. Viewing
development in terms of expanding substantive freedoms causes
attention to be directed to making development important, rather than
merely focusing on a means that plays a prominent part in the process.

Sen (2001) further averred that development requires major
sources of oppression be removed including: poverty, tyranny, poor
economic opportunities, systematic social deprivation, neglect of public
facilities, and intolerance. Despite unprecedented increases in overall
opulence, the contemporary world denies elementary freedoms to vast
numbers of people; perhaps even to the majority of people. Sometimes
the lack of substantive freedoms relates directly to the economic
poverty that robs people of the freedom to satisfy hunger, to achieve
sufficient nutrition, to obtain remedies for treatable illnesses, to be
adequately clothed or sheltered, and to enjoy clean water and sanitary
facilities. Sen (1989) also viewed development as capability expansion.

From the foregoing information, one comes to understand
development as essentially a broad, multidimensional process that
encapsulates the political, economic and social spheres of people’s lives.
In an attempt to capture the developmental aspirations of Africa,
references must be made to past attempts to create continent-wide
development programmes. For example, between the 1980s and the
early 1990s, African leaders adopted a number of initiatives that were
developed in Africa such as The New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD), which was aimed at addressing all dimensions
of the multifaceted developmental challenges that confronted the continent. Other initiatives included:

- The African Charter for Popular Participation for Development, 1990 and

If NEPAD is not truly the first comprehensive initiative that emanated from Africa that was designed to tackle the continent’s problems, the claim that it is the first truly African-owned framework for redressing the socio-economic and political difficulties of African countries must also be addressed.

NEPAD has been hailed as perhaps the boldest new initiative that focuses on the appropriate path that Africa should take to achieve long-term development. NEPAD appears to offer a new basis of hope that Africa may still rediscover the path to sustainable development as has been created in the midst of the fairly obvious failure of nearly twenty years of IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment and the donor regime of conditionality and cross-conditionality that was integral to promoting the neo-liberal agenda in Africa. According to Adebayo Olukoshi in his “Governing the African Developmental Process: The Challenges of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),” it is all the more so that NEPAD offers hope for development since the programme is presented not only as an African-driven project in content and direction, but also apparently departs from the experiences of the adjustment years. Therefore, for the very
reason of its alleged African “ownership”, the programme is expected to strengthen the prospects for achieving the goals of the initiative.

Although NEPAD has been extensively criticized for having an essentially neo-liberatist character, the programme represents the most recent in a series of development cooperation agreements that has been formulated to help elevate Africa from its morass of underdevelopment (Ogwu, 2002). The remote origins of the process leading to the formulation and adoption of NEPAD can be traced to the arrival of the post-Apartheid era in Africa politics, as well as to the widespread belief that with continental liberation from foreign and minority rule complete, the next challenge that Africans must tackle is promoting economic development.

The establishment of the African Union (AU) represents an attempt by African states to gain even more than the Organization of African Unity (OAU) did in the past. While OAU has five objectives, the constitutive Act of the African Union spells out fourteen objectives. Objectives included in the act are to increase unity and solidarity between the countries and people of Africa and to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent.

These broad developmental goals have been adopted by African leaders and by implication, given the claim that NEPAD represents a policy initiative of the AU, represent challenges to the AU. To credibly assess the developmental challenges that face the AU, an overview of some of the salient issues that impact Africa’s development efforts in contemporary times must be made.

The Challenges of African Development in the 21st Century
Some years ago, the world ushered in the twenty first century and the new millennium with widespread fanfare and celebration. Africa also welcomed the new millennium with feelings of enthusiasm, vigour and
a new found disposition to address the developmental burdens that have long burdened the continent. According to Ogwu (2002), one manifestation of this renewed vigour was the establishment of (AU). Although the AU was buffeted at its inception as representing little more than “old wine in new skin” based on the assumption that there was very little difference between it and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU has been constituted and is at its incipient state of institutional development.

Africans cannot be unaware of the enormity of the challenges posed to the continent’s development in a rapidly changing world. Attention must also be paid to the fact that people exist in a world in which power, might, wealth and technology continue to determine ‘who gets what, when and how’ and a world, according to Ogwu (2002), that offers no charity to the weak.

Perhaps no condition better depicts the current circumstances of Africa’s development than the pervasiveness of poverty on the continent. Poverty in Africa has become so severe that even in comparison with other less developed countries in other continents, poverty is evidently rising on the continent. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Developments, “Least-Developed Countries 2002 Report,” the proportion of people in 29 African countries living below $2 per day increased from 82 percent in the late 1960s to 87.5 percent in the late 1990s. For those living in extreme poverty (those making less than $1 per day), the increase was from 55.8 to 64.9 percent. In absolute figures, the number of Africans living in extreme poverty rose from 89.6 million to 233.5 million over the same period of time. Furthermore, the United Nations classified 49 countries, worldwide, as less developed countries. They were assessed on the basis of GDP, human resources and economic diversification. Out of this number, 33 of the countries are located in sub-Saharan Africa.
Poverty is aggravated in Africa by additional burdens that saddle the continent. The crisis created by the debt alone ensures that Africa maintains a marginal position in the global arena. At the moment, there are about 41 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) in Africa. Out of these countries, 32 of them are Severely Indebted Low-Income Countries (SILICs), while 25 of them are in SSA. The total debt of the SILICS, which was $58.1 billion in 1980, stood at $211.2 billion in 1997 (Ajayi and Iyoha 1998). The extent of the debt problem is further demonstrated by the present value of the debt which exceeded 220 percent of exports in 1993 in 27 of 37 countries in SSA. Moreover, debt service due exceeded 25 percent of exports in 22 countries. Additionally, 12 countries had debt service that equated to more than 50 percent of their exports. Debt rescheduling was arranged for over 28 countries and some countries have gone through such arrangements up to 16 times since 1980 (World Bank, 1995).

Apart from the presidential campaigns that have been targeted at attaining debt reprieve, current efforts to reduce debt have hinged largely upon the HIPC’s initiatives that were launched by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1996. Under this scheme, about 22 African countries qualified for some reduction in their total debt burden. However, the scheme has been criticized for having a very limited scope and being very slow in delivering the expected debt relief.

To the leaders of African nations, these challenges are eye-openers to the fact that attaining political independence does not guarantee political and economic stability. New models must be founded for political and economic stability to be ensured. Realizing that Rome was not built in a day, social, political and economic structures that will suit new African nations have to be sought.

Two major issues, the impact of conflicts on Africa’s development and the issue of leadership (a major source of conflict), must be critically examined. Conflicts have undoubtedly undermined
the ability of African countries to harness all the resources that are available to them for development. Otubanjo (1994) observed that while people are busy destroying the few things that they have, they also seem to think, or believe, that they need the West, which disparages from time to time, to sometimes help us acquire weapons and rebuild after the wars. One can imagine the kind of devastation that has taken places such as Liberia, Sudan, Burundi, Nigeria, Congo Democratic Republic, Rwanda, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Otubanjo further noted that one problem Africans must contend with relates to the political arrangements that allow leaders who are not very sensitive to their people’s needs to be in power. Leadership is a problem that currently plagues African nations: nations’ ability to properly determine their leaders without undue interference is the source of the problem.

The rapid spread and effects of HIV and AIDS constitute one of the most critical challenges to human development in Africa. Although only 10 percent of the world’s population is in Africa, over 70 percent (or 25.3 million of the estimated 36.1 million people living with HIV/AIDS worldwide by the end of 2000) were living in the continent. Moreover, three quarters of the over 20 million people worldwide who have died of the epidemic since its emergence lived in Africa (ADB, 2001:3). Of the estimated 13.2 million AIDS orphans, more than 90 percent of them are in Africa. The AIDS pandemic is a serious threat to human development in Africa. It affects the major human development indices such as life expectancy, knowledge, education, income and economic growth.

According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2000:2), “human development is essential for realizing human rights and human rights are vital for full human development”. Just as human rights contribute to human development, human development also helps to augment the reach of the human rights approach. People, therefore, demand human rights as a way of enhancing their capacities and areas of choice. They demand access to education, employment,
health care, and housing, as well as greater transparency and accountability in governance, justice and gender equality.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 acknowledges human rights as a global responsibility. At the regional level, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and the African Human Rights Commission were put in place and ratified by African Countries. These declarations inspired many constitutions to be formed in independent African states including constitutions that are acting as political transitions to move countries from being under military rule to being democracies. Law alone cannot guarantee human rights: relevant institutions and an enabling environment are required. While many African countries have made progress in meeting the people’s demand for human rights, the majority of countries still abuse human rights. These abuses must be addressed in the interest of the people.

In Africa, corruption has had several negative implications for development and governance (ADB, 2001:123-5). It has hindered proper resource management, undermined efforts to enhance growth and poverty alleviation and has obstructed sound and sustainable growth in the private sector. In many African countries, corruption has had a crippling impact on development for it has undermined laws and weakened the foundation of national institutions, which constitutes the pillars of economic development. Widespread corruption has reinforced existing economic and social inequalities and has undermined the credibility of government and public institutions. Unless corruption is effectively combated in Africa, the vicious circle of rising poverty, poor governance and corruption will continue unabated.

Another major threat to development in Africa is rapid population growth. In 1974, the World Bank based the importance of population on the concept of human development when it observed that “the effect of population growth on the quality of development – as
measured by the social indicators as the number of people who are adequately fed, become literate, share equitably in income growth and are productively employed – is more important than its effect on income growth “(see Ojo 1987: 80). The trend of population growth has social implications for human development issues such as education, health and nutrition, employment and housing. It is generally held that underutilizing labour (unemployment and underemployment), which is a major cause of poverty and inequality, can in itself be primarily attributed to excessive population growth (Ojo, 1981). Excessive population growth has been prominent in most African countries, being 3 percent or over in some countries in 1999; e.g. CDR and Mali (3 percent each). Population growth in other countries exists as follows: 3.1 percent in Niger, 3.3 percent in Somalia and 3.4 percent in Liberia (ADB 2000: 251). The average annual population growth for Sub-Saharan Africa is 2.8 percent (1.6 percent for the whole world) higher than the percentage of growth for any other region in the world.

In virtually all African countries, population pressure has led to a “bulge” in the demand for education at all levels. However, a lack of adequate facilities has caused many citizens to be denied the right to education while enrollment growth rates have been recorded at the expense of quality education. The population explosion in Africa has also meant that the labour force has been growing at about 2.5 to 3 percent per annum: this has not been matched by the employment generating capacities of the national economies.

Current organizational structures in Africa are based on foreign ideologies and are very imitative. Bolarinwa (1994) stressed that they do not rely on their strength and resources and therefore, cannot define their vision of the future. Its antecedent is clear: culture is a cumulative experience and culture develops symbiotically with the people. Moreover, people and culture are never separated in time. The impositions of foreign models have tended to separate people from
Their cultures and consequently, modern Africans tend to be a confused, aping ideas from everyone but themselves.

Among Africans, the most popular foreign models are Western ones which are based on extreme individualism. Within these models, collectivity was redefined as an institutional organization and an illusion of isolation was created for the individual. Within this illusion, friendly, communal interchanges were gradually replaced by indifferent institutional umpires that belong to isolated professional unions such as the police and social workers (Bolarinwa, 1994:96). According to Bolarinwa, intra personal interfaces have all been removed. Neighbours and co-tenants do not interact on any level. Even family ties have been broken and replaced by institutional agencies like orphanages and convalescent homes. The greatest form of impoverishment is the destruction of the community; man’s greatest need, after food and shelter, is affection. Man is a communal animal and always craves his kind. When other people are removed, man is left with the present heterogeneous social and public structures and laden with the burden of maintaining extensive bureaucracy. Consequently, a person’s community becomes separated and, a multilateral agency for every form of living is institutionalized as government.

Globalization, as it is used today, refers to growing interactions in world trade, national and foreign investment, and capital markets, as well as the ascribed role of the government in national economies. According to Aluko (2004), the hallmark of globalization is thus promoting the free market, individual initiative, private enterprise, ruthless competition and capitalism into a credo. He asserted that the logic of “survival of the fittest” becomes, as it was in countries in the 17th, 18th and early 19th centuries, one of the physiocrats, Adam Smith’ssonian and their governments and the utilitarian economists. The weak people, the poor countries and their governments are blamed for their lack of competitiveness. The inexorable mix between competition and co-operation and between the public and the private sectors in
economic countries is displayed. As defined in current operation, globalization has universal consequences; they are not restricted to Africa. However, globalization has certainly brought with it some progress as well as new opportunities, technologies, improved communication networks, new product and new opportunities.

Conclusion
This article examined the nature, scope and effects that globalization has on the world economy in order to show that globalization has violated, and it continues to violate, the principles of free and fair world trade as well as the principles of just distribution of the world income. As Aluko (2004) correctly noted, globalization has failed, and continues to fail, to reconcile the interests of the economically rich and strong nations and people with the interests of the economically poor and weak nations and people throughout the world. In fact, because other less economically developed countries are finding it increasingly difficult to fully integrate into the global economy, globalization is diminishing the economic competitiveness of an increasing number of peoples and countries outside the Triad. On the other hand, many weaker countries are being, once again, economically and politically re-colonized. Africa is obviously the continent that has been hit the hardest by globalization as well as by the activities of financial and economic institutions that promote and sustain the globalization paradigm.

Africa has suffered and is still suffering from the problems of delayed development. The continent and its people have been the victims of exploitation, whether in the form of slavery, colonization, neo-colonization, structural adjustment, international money-lending and money-changing or the ongoing globalization or triadization. Globalization continues to increase the competence gap and reduce Africans tendency to perform and be innovate on a daily basis (Aluko, 2004; 47).

From the foregoing information, few will disagree that effectively managing the political question in Africa is a pre-requisites for
sustaining development in the continent. Indeed, numerous African scholars, including Claude Ake, Thandika Mkandawire, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, Mahmood Mamdani and Abdul Raufu Mustapha, have suggested that tackling the political question is an important precondition for resolving the governance and development crises of the continent. In connection with this conclusion, Ake has drawn attention to the fact that the way in which politics have been conducted tends to lead to Africa being underdeveloped. Additionally, Mamdani observed that the bifurcated nature of the state effectively disenfranchises the majority of the populace. Wamba dia Wamba has suggested that organizing politics based on the activities of professional politicians not only limits the prospects for the public to select from, but it also reinforces the authoritarianism inherent in the developmental process.

Beyond the link that scholars have made between politics and its role in influencing the development process, it can be argued that the essence of the anti-colonial and post-independence political contestations that have wracked the African continent, centre around the struggle, at all levels, for a more representative and accountable politico-constitutional order. This order can in turn serve as the basis for mobilizing the public to support a development agenda.

Although the current crisis in Africa has serious economic repercussions, it essentially has social and political origins. Consequently, there are no short cuts to resolving the problem and it will take a long time to resolve. The foundations of progress lie with the people and as such, power must be redistributed to society as a whole. Until the destiny of Africa is firmly in the hands of the African people, via the democratization of the African societies, and popular participation in the development process is mobilized, economic progress will continue to elude Africa. Therefore, a development process which puts the individual at the center of the development effort is vital.
The cultural milieu of a people is a major factor in the development process for that society. Moreover, the totality of values, norms, attributes and beliefs of a society shape that society’s social, political and economic organizations and inculcate a general feeling towards development and related issues amongst its people. This balance is attained over a long period and consequently, a proper understanding of this local knowledge base and values must be the starting point for development. This does not assume that all aspects of Africa’s cultural milieu are negative and problematic. There are many aspects that are positive and could be exploited more successfully for development.

As it exists today, Africa is not the design of its people. Its name, partitioning, popular religions, official national languages and most of its contemporary cultures are foreign impositions: none of them is fully an African derivative. The present design of Africa definitely does not have the interest of its people as a goal. Rather the economic sovereignty of the interlopers accounts for the perpetual oppression that is carried out against Africans. Therefore, most of the philosophies are contradictory. The designs were based on the divide and rule system whereby the interests of outsiders are promoted in order to dominate other groups and are sometimes shored up with foreign means. Given this history, a moot question arises: how can Africans achieve humanity?

I believe that Africa’s time has come. The time has come for Africa to take the next step in her evolution. The road has been long and arduous, from slavery to colonial subjugation, from colonial subjugation to neo-colonial dependence, and now from neo-colonial dependence to genuine independence and democracy. As President Mbeki states, “It is only under the conditions of the latter (genuine independence, unity and democracy) that Africa and the world will

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The Dynamics of Nigeria’s Population Policies

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Key Terms: Census, demography, development, governance, population.

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ABSTRACT
Since her attainment of political independence in 1960, Nigeria has experienced a number of demographic experiments. These experiments were designed to facilitate good governance, strengthen her economy, assist in poverty reduction and provide meaningful data for the uplifting of the lives of her populations. Also since the 1963 census, administrative changes in the number of states and local governments have informed the population dynamics by varying degrees. The physical and effective relocation of the federal capital to the centre, lack of uniform nature, direction and quantum of changes in population movements, differential in mortality and fertility rates, season of enumeration, differential in seasonal migration, and lately, the Niger Delta crisis have all influenced the country’s population. Based on published literature and other media sources, this paper examines the

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dynamics of Nigeria’s population policies. To achieve this, the paper was anchored on the concepts of demographic transition and population explosion. Efforts are made to historicize the country’s population policies, her demographic experiments, and their attendant controversies. Finally, the paper identifies the prospects for population policies.

INTRODUCTION
Nigeria is by far the most populated country in Africa, with approximately 150 million inhabitants and a land area of 923,768 square kilometers, lying on Africa’s west coast and bordering Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin. Reports say that the country is being devoured by unbelievably unjust poverty, alongside diseases that should no longer exist, such as malaria and yellow fever (Shields 2006:64). The country is a three-tiered federation comprising 36 states, the federal capital territory and 774 local governments. Since transition to civil rule in 1999, the government has initiated several reform programs, which were designed to affect the socio-economic and political lives of the population.

The spatial distribution of Nigeria’s population is uneven, with an increasing density in the coastal regions and rural areas but the country’s cities are expanding at a rapid rate. While a larger part of the country’s population is engaged in agriculture, the bulk of government’s revenues come from the nation’s crude oil. This accounts for the downside of the Nigerian economy, namely: the volatility in the international oil prices. Yet actual crude oil production has been lower than projected due to the conflict in the Niger Delta. Worried by this current trend, the Nigerian government seeks alternative sources of revenue to finance public goods. It has also decided to go tough on tax, because the situation on ground calls for more emphasis on increased revenue through tax (Kolapo 2008:64; Chiedozie 2008:17). The National Population Commission (2007:8-9) reports that the country’s annual
growth rate during the last decade of the 20th century has been relatively low, averaging 3 percent. The population has grown at approximately the same rate over this period and this indicates the insignificant improvement in the welfare of the average citizen.

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic segmented society. Onigu Otite (1990) identified 374 ethnic groups, which Abdul Raufa Mustapha (2007:3) have broadly divided into ethnic ‘majorities’ and ethnic ‘minorities’. According to Mustapha (2007:3), “the numerically – and politically – majority ethnic groups are the composite Hausa-Fulani of the north, the Yoruba of the southwest, and the Igbo of the southeast.” The census of 1963 reveal that the three majority ethnic groups constituted 57.8 percent of the national population, while eleven of the largest ethnic minorities put together constituted 27.9 percent (Afolayan 1983; Mustapha 2007). The issues of ethnicity and religion were diluted in the census of 2006 because of the numeric and hegemonic strength of the ethnic majorities and the array of alliances by the ethnic minorities around the ethnic majorities, particularly in the area of political and economic resources. Yet, Mustapha (2007:3) notes that, “each of the three hegemonic groups tries to build up sufficient alliances to ensure its preponderance in government, or to prevent its being marginalized by competing alliance.” The remaining parts of this paper examine the concepts of demographic transition and population explosion, Nigeria’s population policies and demographic experiments. In between these sub-themes, efforts are also made to identify the sources of population data and the controversies and misconceptions arising from census and its uses. Finally, the paper recognizes the prospects for population policies.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION AND POPULATION EXPLOSION
The concepts that underpin this study are demographic transition and population explosion. As early as 1795, Condorcet had the foresight to realize the danger of over-population. In his views, this could lead to what he calls a ‘diminution of happiness’, and possibly be mastered
through a rise in productivity, better management, the prevention of waste and the spread of education. In response to the threat which population could pose to the environment, Condorcet recommended ‘dematerialized’ growth. In his words, “the same level of production will be achievable with less destruction of raw produce, or alternatively will last longer.” Matsuura (2007:53) made reference to the foregoing in his identification of significant developments that will determine future population trends. First, according to Matsuura is that the population growth of the latter 20th century will come to be seen as one of the biggest events in history. Second, there is an abrupt slow down in the rate of growth, due to demographic transition. Third, virtually all the population growth between now and 2050 will take place in the developing countries. Fourth, if current trends continue, the whole of this population growth will be taking place in towns and cities. Fifth, world population is marked by radical inequality of various kinds. Sixth, the aging population – arising from low fertility and higher life expectancy – is another uneven but generally destabilizing trend which will impose an increasing burden.

Matsuura also averred that the challenges of international migration, food security, jobs, poverty reduction, public health, housing, infrastructure, the environment, and the promotion of sustainable development must be addressed. Population growth, he says, challenges development and hampers the fight against poverty. Thus he recommended the emergence of real ‘knowledge societies’ as the prospect of coping with population growth and aging. He believes in working “for equitable growth and development founded on intelligence, science, technology, and a change in our ways of living, producing and consuming,” (Matsuura 2007:53). As if in agreement with Matsuura, Foulkes (2008:3) emphasized the trend in the advanced industrial democracies that, higher incentives for human capital led to a demographic transition, which in lagging or developing countries was slower and, therefore more explosive. Foulkes noted that, “even before the industrial revolution, trade had an impact on the formation of
markets and democratic institutions in Europe.” In developing countries, he says, “lower incentives for human capital slowed institutional formation, which depends on a more equal income distribution generating a more democratic distribution of the de facto power.” To examine how trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), technological change, institutions and demographic transitions interact, attention must be given to the new theory of economic growth. That is free trade and FDI would lead to the equalization of growth rates and production levels across countries. As noted by Foulkes (2008:2) “enquiry into the long-term persistence of income inequality between and within countries underlined the importance of dynamics in population technology and institutions.”

Damianova, Tzvetkovska and Ivanov (2005:27) have also observed the serious effect of demographic factors on municipal economic development potential. In their words, “depopulation of certain regions, migration, and different levels of education and qualification among the labour force all come to bear on implementation of economic policy.” Thus it can be argued that the way families actively manage generational change and succession, and how they attempt to rebuild food security and maintain resilience in the face of adversity may be adjusted. In the 1950s and 1960s, latter-day Malthusians predicted that population growth would outstrip the world’s food supply. This led to the green revolution (Rothberg 2008:9), which spurred the agricultural sector into achievements in terms of radical improvements in production – based on initiative including research, extension, and infrastructure – that brought about increased yields in both developed and developing countries.

It is also important to note the comparison done by Cogwill (1963), of the conditions in the developing countries and the experiences of European countries on which the original version of demographic transition was built. Whereas it took Europe 150 to 200 years to reduce their death rates below 15, the developing countries’ experience is within 15 to 20 years. Fortunately enough, the developing countries
import the death control technology invented by European countries. Resting on this, Idele (1998:159) distinguishes between the revolutionary nature of ‘African type’ of demographic explosion and the evolutionary European demographic transition, alluding to dialectical materialism; that it is physically more challenging to control ‘evolutionary transition’ than ‘revolutionary explosion’. Idele compared the contemporary urbanization trend in Nigeria with that of Britain. By the 1850s, Britain already had a huge ‘urban population base’ upon which the industries depended immediately after the industrial revolution, whereas, in Nigeria the unprecedented metropolitan trend occurred at a time when scarcely more than 20 percent of the population lived in open townships. Also, the industrial revolution pulled rural folks to the townships to supply industrial labour in Britain, while the industrial concerns in Nigeria were too few to exert any significant ‘pull effects’ on the rural dwellers to migrate en masse into the cities. In a sense, rural migrants in Nigeria are respectively, being pushed by rural population pressure (such as land dispossession) and pulled by the (often illusory) promise of the existence of better economic opportunities in the cities (Idele 1998:166).

Idele (1998:158) opined that migration to the cities or Europe does have minimal effect on the population because Nigerians are uniquely endowed with the immense ‘reproductive capacity’ to ‘breed like the rabbits’ even if in the long run the human beings may have to ‘die like the rabbits’, hence the non-feasibility of improvement in agricultural production since food supply is fairly inelastic in the short run. The transition to civil rule in 1999 brought about changes in critical areas such as privatization of state-owned enterprises, public sector reforms, leading to large-scale redundancies, market liberalization and removal of fuel subsidies. These policy changes would certainly have implication for the country’s demography.
It will not be out of place to argue that since the attainment of political independence in 1960, Nigeria has had a number of population policies. These policies are designed to facilitate good governance, strengthen her economy, assist in poverty reduction and provide meaningful data for the uplifting of the lives of her populations. Also since the 1963 census, administrative changes in the number of states and local governments have informed the population dynamics by varying degrees. More fundamentally, the physical and effective relocation of the federal capital to the center, lack of uniform nature, direction and quantum of changes in population movements, differential in mortality and fertility rates, season of enumeration, differential in seasonal migration, and lately, the conflict in the Niger Delta have all contributed to the country’s population dynamics.

In June 1966, Nigeria had the first recorded reference to population policy in the form of guidelines for the second national development plan. The policy statement of the plan prepared by the Federal Ministry of Economic Development was that, “there is a need to evolve a population policy (including spatial distribution) as an integral part of the national development effort.” The statement paid lip service to the various demographic indicators such as over-all population growth rate, dependency ratio, tempo of urbanization and urban unemployment rate, and recommended that the nation’s population policy should be evolved essentially on ‘high resource base potential’. Idele (1998:161) notes that, the third national development plan only re-echoed the major provisions of the prototype population policy contained in the earlier plan.

At the Arusha Conference of 1984, the Nigerian government reported that the country’s population was growing at a faster rate than the rate of food production. This observation was re-echoed at the World Population Conference held in Mexico in 1984. This culminated in the federal government approval of the 1988 national policy on
population for development, unity, progress and self-reliance. The 1988 policy marked the first ever officially documented population policy instrument for Nigeria. Idele (1998:157) describes this 29-page document as ‘straightforward and scholarly written’, but seriously lacking in its technical format and pragmatic recommendations. He added that the 1988 policy was ‘bereft of any form of legal or physical authority’ to midwife the ‘one-spouse-four-children’ reproductive ceiling recommended for the country in any foreseeable future. It has turned out that most families are shrinking because the economy does not encourage the four children per spouse ceiling.

The national population census of 1991, the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994, and the HIV/AIDS Summit held in Abuja in 1999, alongside the poverty and food security and the population-environment-development nexus all made a revision of the 1988 population policy imperative. The revision led to the government approval of the 2004 national policy on population for sustainable development. Succinctly, the 2004 population policy is designed to improve the standard of living and quality of life of the people, promote material, child and reproductive health, and achieve a lower population growth rate through the reduction of birth rates by voluntary fertility regulation methods compatible with the national policy to achieve even distribution of population between urban and rural areas. The 2004 population policy also aims to prevent the causes and spread of HIV/AIDS pandemic and address the problems of international migration and spatial distribution, as expressed in the Dakar/Ngor Declarations 1992, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 1992 and International Conference on Population and Development Programs of Action 1994 (Obasanjo 2004). One major weakness of the 2004 policy is attributable to the fact that the social objectives as captured by the Nigerian Constitution are rather non-justiceable.
SOURCES OF POPULATION DATA

Good planning requires an accurate and up-to-date population database. However, like any other developing country, Nigeria faces the challenge of developing a timely and high-quality population database. To address this challenge the country relies on a number of sources for its population data, namely: census, survey, vital statistics and administrative records. Before the adoption of the national policy on population for sustainable development, major demographic surveys conducted include the Nigeria fertility survey (NFS) in 1981/82; the Nigeria demographic and health surveys (NDHS) in 1990 and 1999; the national sentinel surveys (NSS) in 1994 and 1999; the multiple indicator cluster surveys (MICS) and the general household surveys (GHS) (Nigeria 2004:4). Others sources include the core welfare indicators questionnaire (CWIQ) survey, education census, authenticated administrative data from ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs), national living standards survey, used for the national poverty assessment, surveys relating to consumption and health indicators, and stakeholders’ forum for gathering inputs and validating contents of reports (National Planning Commission 2007:8-9).

The childbirth registration is another source of data for population planning. The NPC is mandated to establish and maintain machinery for continuous and universal registration of births and deaths throughout the federation. This mandate is in addition to the overall duty of undertaking periodical enumeration of population through sample surveys, censuses or otherwise. It was reported that over 10 million children in the country are not registered. Hence the NPC has to recruit the services of religious leaders, traditional institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to assist in educating the public on the importance of childbirth registration (Ande, Nzeagwu and Olagoke 2007:95). On its part, the annual socio-economic survey, established by the Statistical Act 2007, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Act 2007, and the Communication Act 2003 is specifically designed to collect relevant statistics to facilitate the production of gross
domestic product (GDP), information and communication technology (ICT) indicators and monitor economic performance of the country. Suffice to note that non-compliance with the enumerators in the field to achieve the objectives of the survey is punishable under the laws establishing the survey.

Another major source of population data is based upon the internal research by development agencies. For example, arising from its internal research, the United Nations Population Fund Agency (UNFPA) reported that, about three million Nigerians, especially youths, move into the labour market yearly with little hope of getting jobs; and about 48 percent of young girls in the North West zone of the country get married before they turned 15. The research categorized the youths into: “unemployed; under-employed; temporarily out jobs; and fresh graduates from the Universities.” The report advised the productive engagement of a greater percentage of these people to reduce poverty and create wealth. It was also reported by the UNFPA that, “Nigeria has a population of over 140 million and one third of that number (4 million) are young people between the ages of 10 and 24 years. And “approximately three million people in Nigeria, mainly youths, work into the labour market annually with few getting jobs.” (Sam 2008:9).

It is possible to triangulate the UNFPA report with the 2006 census results. Based on the 2006 provisional census figures, Nigeria has a youth population of 80 million, which demographically represents 60 percent of the country’s total population of 140 million. With data sourced from the National Manpower Board and the Federal Bureau of Statistics, only 10 percent of the total number of graduates being produced by the country’s tertiary institutions had been getting paid employment. The implications for the country are enormous. As recently observed, “the rising and disturbing incidence of cultism, prostitution, kidnapping and hostage taking amply illustrates the
frustration of the most active segment of Nigeria’s population.” (Emenike 2009:14).

Of all the sources of data highlighted above, census stands out significantly in determining the country’s population dynamics and governance. Jacobson (2000) has well captured the significance of census. In his words, “the decennial census set the tone for the nation.” The data gathered (or generated) from the census report affect a range of issues such as redistricting, congressional reapportionment (or constituency delineation), federal funding for states and localities, and the way populations (or people) think about. Census is for guidance. Businesses use the census to determine population shifts and potential sites and ventures, while public safety officials, such as fire departments and police, use it to locate their precincts. Considering the foregoing factors, “the census becomes more than just an enumeration of the individuals in the nation; it is an indispensable tool for government and private enterprise alike.” More fundamentally, the “census provides an account of the country’s inhabitants, including their occupations, ethnicity, race and place of residence.” It thus “offers a means of comparing population shifts over the decades and the ensuing effect on politics.” (Jacobson 2000: 1).

DEMOGRAPHIC EXPERIMENTS IN NIGERIA

Pre-Independence Censuses
It is on record that, Lagos was the first Nigerian city to witness census. According to Idele (1998:168), in 1789, an American sailor, Captain D.
Adamson made a rough estimate of Lagos to the extent that it contained some 5,000 inhabitants. In 1815, the population of Lagos was estimated at 11,000; and in 1861, it was further estimated at 30,000. In line with the British census arrangement at home and in the colonies, between 1871 and 1931, the population of Lagos was estimated every decade as follows: 1871 (29,000); 1881 (37,000); 1891 (38,000); 1901 (42,000); and 1911 (100,000). The 1931 census of Lagos was 126,000. There was no census in 1941 due to the effects of the World War II. In 1950, the census of Lagos was 270,000. It should be noted that census only extended out of Lagos from 1901. Thus the Nigerian population was 18,720 in 1921; 19,928 in 1931; and 31,000,000 in 1952/53.

Post-Independence Censuses
The first nationwide census after independence was held in May 1962. Coordinated by an expatriate, Mr. J.J. Warren, the 1962 census was meant to help gerrymander the entire country into polling and electoral constituencies, and aid economic and development planning, particularly for the development plan of 1962-1968. Otoghagua (2007:53) notes that the expected benefits of the outcome of the census spurred the politicians to hijack the exercise with manipulative tendencies, and this generated a lot of controversies. As a result, a verification test was slated for November 1963 to check the validity of the 1962 census.

The November 1963 Census was also characterized by problems ranging from shortage of census materials through insufficient period of enumeration to politicization of the exercise by politicians. Specifically, the manipulated figures by politicians led to dispute among opposing political camps. Also many elites and rural dwellers developed apathy of sorts towards enumeration and the imported principles of enumeration by the expatriate were not amenable to African situation. The governments of Eastern and Midwestern regions rejected the results on the grounds of inflation, gross irregularities and unauthorized acts. The case for annulment instituted
at the Supreme Court by the Eastern region was dismissed for want of evidence. The young region, Midwest later accepted the result for fear of being denied federal aid. The reaction from the Western region government was a compromise because “Akintola could not afford to bite the finger that fed him,” to use the words of Aghemelo and Osumah (2009:59).

In spite of the controversies generated by the exercise the federal government published the provisional results in February 1964 (Ibeanu and Momoh 2008:23). Thus the provisional results became the reference point of analyzing the population dynamics and validating the planning process until 1991 when the Ibrahim Babangida-led regime conducted a nationwide census. From the evidence in the literature, it can be argued that the pockets of opposition that trailed the two exercises were informed by the lack of clear variation between the initial census and the verification test. Also another statutory body was not established to conduct the verification exercise. Even then, data ought to have been triangulated to measure overlapping but also different facets of the phenomenon. Possibly, this would have yielded an enriched understanding to ensure the validity of data (Wilson 2004:22). Were it so, the different stakeholders would have accepted the results even though there was no clear-cut variation between the two results.

The 2006 Census
After a period of 14 years, the administration of Olusegun Obasanjo conducted a nationwide census. The 2006 census report estimates Nigeria’s population to be 140 million. The report submitted to the Government of Nigeria by the national population commission (NPC) contained the population figures by sex at the national, state and local government levels. NPC noted the deviation between the final and provisional population totals at the three levels of government to be well within the acceptable demographic norms and absolute percentage population difference is not significant. (Makama 2008:36).
The 2006 census figure placed Kano State as the most populated in the country with more than 9 million people followed by Lagos. Bayelsa State was least populated with 1.7 million people. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo earlier presented the provisional report of the census to the National Assembly in early 2007. On Thursday, January 23, 2009, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua submitted the final figures of the 2006 census to the two chambers of the National Assembly, as stipulated by section 213, sub sections 3 and 4 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria:

Where the Council of State advises the President to accept the report, the President shall accept the same and shall then lay the report on the table of each House of the National Assembly. Where the President accepts such report and has laid it on the table of each House of the National Assembly, he shall publish it in the official Gazette of the Government of the Federation for public information. (Alechenu and Ameh 2009:8).

Commenting on the 2006 census, Makama (2008:36) notes that “the relative ranking of the states do not exhibit any change though some states have gained marginally while others show very small overall decline.” The commission expects this trend to “allay any misgivings or fear in any stakeholder of dramatic variation between the provisional and final population totals.” At the local government level, there were relatively greater population fluctuations for obvious reasons. First, “the local governments are of vastly differing population sizes.” Makama added that, “an accurate and reliable census usually implies that the coverage and content of the census are fairly satisfactory in the given context.” Also “no census anywhere in the world is perfect, in terms of coverage and content.” That of 2006 was a de facto census and only those seen and found during the visit(s) of the enumerators were enumerated. Large cities and towns and their administrative and commercial areas are usually prone to boastings and misinterpretations that high population density (number of persons per square kilometer)
necessarily translate into a very high population size. Whereas, due to commercial activities, markets or public activities (such as educational institutions, hospitals and public or private offices for example), the day time and weak day population could be significantly different than the usual resident population eligible for enumeration on a *de facto* basis.

Census, Controversies and Misconceptions
Once released, any individual, institution or state that has complaints about the census figures can take the case to the census tribunals. The NPC has commenced the dissemination of figures among all stakeholders, to enable them have an idea of what really transpired. NPC has also promised to prepare tables of the various ‘demographic variables’. In spite of these mechanisms some still allege that the census was fraught with irregularities in which some areas were not enumerated. A major pointer to the controversies is the parallel census held by the Government of Lagos State to ascertain the actual population figure in the state. The NPC had allocated 9,013,534 of the 140 million populations to Lagos after it released the provisional results of the population and housing census conducted between March 21 and 30, 2006.

However, Lagos State disputed the figures and awarded itself 17,553,924 populations, relying on the result of a parallel exercise it conducted. Armed with the figures, the Lagos State Government perfected plans to articulate its position before the Census Tribunal raised by the Chief Justice of the Federation. The NPC argued that it was illegal for any state to conduct a parallel census, because it is the only body statutorily empowered by the 1999 Constitution to conduct census. Pockets of opposition from states in the East and South-west parts of the country have also trailed the 2006 census figures but it is on record that only Lagos State has challenged the figures of the 2006 census final population totals, to argue that Kano State does not have population more than Lagos State (Otohghagua 2007:361; Alechenu and Ameh 2009:8; Nurudeen 2009:1,10).
The foregoing indicates that indeed, census has become a contentious issue within the Nigerian governance and politics. The reasons for the controversies and misconceptions are not hard to find. First, census is used for political calculation. For example, the use of census in political domination by some regions has encouraged other regions to capitalize on it to change the country’s political equation. Suffice to note that it is a criterion for assessing the viability of new states and local government areas and a determining factor in constituency delineation for election purposes. Second, the population figure is used for resource allocation, among the regions in particular and resource distribution in general. Section 162(2) of the 1999 Constitution provides that in determining the formula, the National Assembly shall take into account the allocation principles, especially those of population, equality of states, internal revenue generation, landmass, terrain, as well as population density. This section reinforces population figure as a determinant for revenue allocation, hence stakeholders try to manipulate the outcome of census in their domain.

Third, it is a basis for allocating quotas in recruitment into government establishments. Where there is an alleged breach of federal character principle in the recruitment of staff, the federal character commission (FCC) is empowered by paragraph (8)(1)(c) of section c, part 1, third schedule of the 1999 Constitution and its enabling Act, to “take such legal measures, including the prosecution of the head or staff of any ministry, department or agency (MDA), which fails to comply with any federal character principle or formulae prescribed or adopted by the commission. Thus alleged lopsided recruitment of staff by the management of any government establishment attracts the attention of the FCC. (The Punch 2008:2).

Fourth, a census report can be used to determine the declaration of highways. Increase in population of the country and the subsequent increase in the number of states could lead to a call for elevation of more roads to federal highways. With the creation of more
states in the country, roads now traverse between the states and once a road cuts across more than one state, it automatically qualifies as a federal road. The classification of more roads as federal highways would also aid the development and growth of the affected areas. This was the argument canvassed that led to the resolution on “Declaration of More Roads as Federal Highways” by the House of Representatives in March 2009 (Ossai and Oladimeji 2009:6).

Fifth, a census report can also be used for strategic housing and urban planning. In urban areas, strategic urban planning is impossible without reform of the land policy implementation, land tenure, land administration, land management, land tax, land redistribution, all of which are inextricably linked. It may be virtually impossible to embark on slum upgrading without an adequate land administration system, giving information about the location of state and private land and the location of existing slums. Also, without such information, it is difficult to service an area in terms of infrastructure and for cost recovery. Even land distribution to the urban poor is impossible without proper information and records (The Guardian 2008:62).

However, there are a lot of cultural beliefs and myths surrounding census. For example, the issue of birth and death, which is essential for planning and identification of health and other social needs of the people, has been misconstrued. Whereas, vital registrars are domiciled in the local governments with the mandate to register deaths, as well as births of children born from June 1988 to date, some cultural beliefs and myths are woven round the enumeration of offspring (Oyedele 2009:8). Thus there is misconception of census data, which is designed for sustainable development as against the belief that it is specifically for sharing the national cake. Also, there is hostile reception by the rural dwellers that are not in tune with the objective of the NPC. It is important to note the difficulties in getting to the interior and other poor terrain as part of the logistics problems confronting the population officials. As observed by some stakeholders, “no amount of automation
CONCLUSION

In understanding the dynamics of Nigeria’s population policies, the role of industrialization, the season of enumeration, mortality and fertility rates, differential level of over count, uncertainties of precise local government and state boundaries, and socio-political and ethno-religious conflicts are important. As noted by Makama (2008:36), these constitute the ground reality but “it is not easily accepted by diehards.” Onokerhoraye (1995:1) once argued that, “population growth should be encouraged as it is beneficial to the development process because of the advantages which are associated with the population growth.” Attempts are being made to link population to the current global financial meltdown. Yet others think that, not minding the global financial crisis, population can never be stagnant. There must be growth in population and the annual growth rate is 3.4 and many industries have been established and infrastructures have been made (Nurudeen 2009:10).

What aptly describe the competition for political and economic resources are the systematic and overlapping patterns of inequalities that are caused by a complex range of factors, which include history, geography, cultural orientation, religious affiliation, natural resource endowments, current government policies and past colonial policies. (Mustapha 2007:4). These help to explain the peoples’ political perceptions, with a tremendous impact on the electoral policies and the composition of government. As noted by Mustapha (2007:15), “since the 1950s, partisan political groups are wont to bandy around whatever data suits their political objectives. Passions within the general population were often inflamed by media publication of selective data on the ethnic composition of different branches of the bureaucracy.” (Mustapha 2007:15). This supports the argument by Makama (2008:36)
that many Nigerians are in the habit of making population estimates of a given area mostly to suit their own arguments, political or otherwise. In this case, there may be a wrong mix up of the phenomenon of high population density, which according to their mindset, should necessarily result and translate into, in every case, a very high population size. This places the lives of enumerating staff at risk. There are usually emotional and sentimental outbursts with wild population guesstimates sprinkled in between. Such outbursts negate the very essence of the channel of legitimate grievances. While the body responsible for census may apply required painstaking effort, labour and patience to validate the results for internal and external consistencies, it happens that the country is deprived of the benefits of population policies. (Makama 2008:36).

In the light of the foregoing, this paper recommends some steps to achieve prospects for population policies in Nigeria. First, during subsequent census, enumeration should be done at place of residency, for the purpose of planning. Reference can be made to a place of origin only for traditional, cultural and historical purposes. Second, to vote and be voted for should not be dependent on residency. There should be mobility of franchise to help state actors in dispassionate planning. Third, the officials involved should adequately be trained to attain a high level of proficiency and efficiency in the discharge of their duties. Fourth, Nigerian leaders should make a commitment to population stabilization and resource conservation. This is in tandem with the suggestion by Hinrichson and Robey (2000:5) that, “if every country made a commitment to population stabilization and resource conservation, the world would be better able to meet the challenges of sustainable development.” This requires intelligent public investment, effective natural resource management, clearer agricultural and industrial technologies, less population and slower population growth. Fifth, a framework should be designed by government to look beyond census figures as the basis of resource allocation and utilization. With the adoption of more than one source of data, as captured by the 2004
national population policy, misgivings or fear in stakeholder would be allayed, even in the light of deviation between the figures. Finally, resource and power should be shared meaningfully and intelligibly in the light of the behavioral patterns of the Nigerian population.

References


**Appendix I: 1962 Initial Census Figures and Verification Test**

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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<th>Verification Test</th>
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<td>29,758,875</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12,394,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>665,246</td>
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*Source: Osaghae (2002)*
### Appendix II: 1963 Census Figures

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<td>Western region</td>
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*Sources: Adigwe (1974); Ojiako (1981)*

### Appendix III: 1999 Census Figures

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<td><strong>Population Totals</strong></td>
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Note: Male Totals (44,544,5); Female Totals (43,969,970)

*Source: Otoghuaga (2007:197-198).*

### Appendix IV: 2006 Census Figures

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Source: Otoghagua (2007:362)
Book Review:
*Saturday is for Funerals*
Unity Dow and Matt Essex (Harvard University Press, 2010)

Jennifer Rosenbush

In Botswana, there is a saying that even the greatest calamities can induce laughter (24). Unity Dow and Matt Essex capture this dissonant spirit of tragedy and hope in their new book *Saturday is for Funerals*. The title of the book derives from the alarming regularity with which the people of Botswana attended funerals in the mid-1990s. The rampant rate of HIV/AIDS, combined with a lack of treatment options, resulted in such a high death rate that each and every Saturday was reserved for funeral-going. Dow, a High Court judge and writer, and Essex, a professor of health sciences at Harvard University, trace the spread, treatment, and socio-cultural consequences of HIV/AIDS in Botswana. The authors detail the ways in which the crisis has been drastically curtailed through the work of individuals, researchers, and policy.

This 218 page book is divided into a total of fifteen chapters, preceded by a preface and introduction and followed by a glossary, list

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Jennifer Rosenbush is a graduate student of anthropology at Boston University.
of further readings, and an index. Each of the fifteen chapters include a personal narratives followed by a medical analysis.

The personal narratives beginning each chapter, featuring people from Dow's personal and professional life, are intimate and emotional. Accordingly, a primary strength of this work is that it provides a humanized account of those infected with and affected by HIV/AIDS. Dow shares, for example, her mother's disquiet with the number of deaths in the extended family, including an aunt who passes away before medications are available. HIV affects people in all walks of life and the staff of the court are no exception. Dow and her staff learn to recognize the warning signs and encourage ill coworkers to seek testing and medical attention. Many follow the advice, but others, such as Dow's driver, are not ready to take the leap. Dow also profiles individuals facing drug resistance, blood transfusions, and the search for a vaccine. It is clear that the judge's concern for the well-being of the community is not restricted to the courtroom. At times, she seeks out these responsibilities, at other times they are foisted upon her, however, her actions are a reminder that one person can make a difference.

Essex's expert medical analysis chronicles the changing understanding of HIV/AIDS whilst complementing the personal narratives. In the 1990s, he writes, the long incubation period of the virus caused confusion and deaths were often attributed to opportunistic infections. As time went on, awareness of transmission and the course of the virus deepened. Essex applies this knowledge when profiling high risk populations, including discordant couples, where one partner is positive and the other is not, and young women in intergenerational relationships with older men. The babies of positive mothers were at risk for mother-to-child transmission of the virus during birth or breast feeding. The development of treatment is central to the book. The potent three-drug combination known as HAART (highly active antiretroviral therapy) was introduced to Botswana through the efforts of a Harvard University project with funding from
the Gates Foundation and the Merck Foundation. The HAART treatment plan is widely available and so effective that many people are able to live healthy, productive lives. Drugs preventing mother-to-child transmission are also currently accessible and effective. Other important factors such as opportunistic infections, particularly tuberculosis, are also analyzed, as are drug resistance, blood transfusions, and traditional male circumcision. Throughout the book, Essex deftly explains medical developments in a way that is detailed but accessible to a reader with a social science background.

The two-part chapters illustrate and analyze the drastic social and cultural changes in Botswana resulting from the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In the mid-1990s, greetings were abbreviated for fear of asking after the well-being of a family member of who might have suddenly succumbed to illness. People would refuse to sit downwind of a person living with HIV/AIDS. Since that time, increased knowledge about how the infection is transmitted, and the realization that everyone has a friend or family member infected with the virus, the stigma has greatly lessened. These factors also mean that orphaned children are usually taken in by the extended family. This contrasts with many other African countries where orphaned children have been ostracized. Dow and Essex acknowledge, however, that changing household composition introduces new stresses to families.

Advancement in the testing and treatment of HIV/AIDS has also changed the social landscape. Knowing about the efficacy of medications has increased people’s willingness to get tested. Those who go for testing often express palpable relief at knowing their status. Dow recounts a chronically-ill staff member coming to her office and announcing his positive status “so firmly and with such jubilation that [she] thought he meant the opposite” (53). The people of Botswana also blend new treatment options and technologies with traditional values and practices. Some HIV-positive people consult traditional healers or the ancestors before beginning treatment; others use cell phone
messaging to remind partners to take their medications. Male circumcision practices are another example of the blending of tradition and technology. The final chapter of the book brings many themes together in its discussion of the challenges and successes of government intervention in Botswana.

While much of the content in this book has cross-cultural resonance, *Saturday is for Funerals* is truly a story of Botswana and its people. Perhaps most importantly, this book depicts a success in the fight against HIV/AIDS. It presents more than glimmer of hope in an area of the world that is often depicted as hopeless. This valuable addition to the literature is accessible to lay people would be of great value to students in a range of disciplines. The book is not a substitute for ethnographic studies or medical surveys, but the interdisciplinary approach gauges the pulse of Botswana. The authors skillfully weave together their work in a way that makes the whole more valuable than the sum of its parts. Accordingly, the book both plays on the heart strings and engages the mind.