Pan-Africanism and the State of Politico-Economic Integration in Southern Africa

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The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour-line - the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea –
W.E.B. Du Bois, 1900.[1]

Abstract
Socio-politico-cultural, economic and strategic realities of the southern African sub-region of Africa brought about the need for the coming together of its member states, though amorphous in the formation, to address their common overarching economic problem in South Africa. The geographic, economic and colonial factors in the sub-region prior to the 20th century, formed a series of politico-economic and security implications. The same cemented the first generation of the sub-region political elite together to wage liberation war against first Portuguese colonial domination of Angola and Mozambique, second Rhodesia (Zimbabwean) and third, South Africa. The offshoot of this anti-colonial and the anti-apartheid systems are linked with the zeal at which

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the DuBoisian prophecy affected Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah in fighting against colonialism and racism in Africa. The liberation of southern African Lusophone states and Zimbabwe (the perceived economic giant in the sub-region) brought about the formation of a politico-economic group: the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The germaneness of forming a united front against white racism and an urge to foster economic development amongst the member states against economic dependence on the Pretoria government during the apartheid regime loomed large in its formation. The end of the apartheid system and eventual coming to power of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa elicited another hegemonic rivalry in the newly created Southern African Development Community (SADC) to accommodate South Africa. Political rivalry between Harare and Pretoria led to the incorporation of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a member of the politico-economic organization. The political, economic and strategic implications of the African Renaissance, another fashion of Pan-Africanism that is tacitly rejected by some SADC states as South Africa's grand-design to economically and socio-politically dominate them, is an issue that students of southern African politics still contend with.

Introduction

Political developments in the southern African sub-region during the colonial era could have been the main factor that contributed to the longevity of minority regimes in the area. Geographically and historically, the area through the East and Central African regions is the main theater of colonial and apartheid dominations. In terms of climatic factors, the areas with Mediterranean like climates are conducive for the Europeans who came to Africa for various reasons, but

primarily for economic exploitation. There is a lot of literature that traces the coming of the white to the shores of Africa, mostly from the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Britain. Because of the climatic conditions of southern Africa, the small impact of the winds of change that blew across the continent against foreign domination were felt in the political arrangement of the sub-region. The colonial struggle in the Lusophone states, Namibia and Zimbabwe prolonged liberation wars that were supported by the two ideological and incompatible blocs of the East and the West. The need to fight against color discrimination and political liberation of blacks at the global level brought about the formation of the Pan-African movement.

The Pan-African movement was formed toward the end of the 19th century with the aim of fighting against the color bar against blacks in America. Pan-Africanism, according to Immanuel Wallestein (1961: 103), is a loose term and covers several different movements. It came about to address three major issues: first, as an avenue for the black Americans and West Indies to fight against racial discrimination and to trace their roots back to Africa; Second, it was used to support the political agitation of African nationalists immediately after the World War II; and third, it was used as a weapon to fight against racial subjugation in the southern African states and to establish a supranational states.[2] The last point is the main departure of our concern.

Between 1919 and 1945, five Pan-Africanist conferences were organized by W.E.B. Du Bois, who is now regarded as "the father of pan-Africanism". The 1945 conference could be said to be the most provoking one because some of the latter nationalists from Africa participated in the conference and the same continued to influence their attitudes towards colonialism in Africa. Some of the participants from Africa,

such as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyata, Obafemi Awolowo and H.O. Davies (Davies 1989: 123), went back to their respective countries to fight against colonial domination. They later received political independence for their states. In a bid to forge political and economic cooperation among African states, Kwame Nkrumah sponsored, with the help of George Padmore, a Trinidadian, All-African People's Organisation (AAPO) and the Conference of Independent of African States (CIAS) in 1958 to further agitate for the political liberation of Africa.

This had a direct impact upon South African politics. South Africa was invited to the conference of Independent African states, but it refused to attend because colonial powers in Africa were excluded. Not attending the conference was an attempt to continue its political and economic grip in South West Africa (Namibia). No other region in Africa (except perhaps, North Africa –Algeria) became involved in intensive liberation wars against the European in Africa other than southern Africa.

The use of force against colonialists can be traced to the fifth Pan-Africanism Congress (1945) which called for the use of armed conflict to decolonize Africa if the European states refused to grant political freedom to the colonial states. Moreover, the genesis of Pan-Africanism can be traced to events in 1887 in Philadelphia and Boston that transformed into the Free African Society and the Free African Lodge. These moves were solidified through the London conference of July 1900 which called for the independence of the African and West Indies colonies. The conference specifically addressed a protest letter to the Queen of England, Victoria, about the treatment of African blacks in South Africa and Rhodesia (Ajala 1998: 63).

The South Africa sub-region did not experience a smooth transition to political independence. This is because of the complex interdependent nature of the region and, in particular, the influence of South Africa. Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa entered into wars of liberation against their colonial metropolis. This was against the relatively smooth transitions in Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland (who formed core members of the frontline states against South Africa) and the DRC. Because guerilla warfare was occurring in these states, issues of Pan-Africanism acquired a firm root as a result of the solidarity support they received from other members of the Frontline States. In particular, Pan-Africanism issues benefited from the influence of Zambia and Tanzania. South Africa's war of terror against the frontline states brought about the formation of the SADCC to monitor economic and political developments among the member states. However, this association could not achieve much in the area of economic development because of Pretoria's anti-liberation posture that resulted from the economic sabotage of member states. The post-Cold War period brought about the independence of Namibia and the eventual democratization of South Africa. The implication of this was the re-admission of South Africa to the comity of nations against its pariah status. This admission had both positive and negative impacts on the sub-region. It provided military as well as relative political and economic stability to the area. Pretoria's intention to remain as the only credible hegemonic power in the sub-region continues to affect the economic development of the region. Suspicion by the other members of the organization in terms of the holistic concept of security is germane in their uneasy relationship. This will last for some time to come because of the complex interdependent

relationship in southern Africa in which South Africa and perhaps Zimbabwe have enormous roles to play.

This paper is divided into eight parts. Part one is the general introduction. Part two focuses on the theoretical explanation of the problem at hand. Part three examines the political and economic development in the sub-region during the colonial era. Parts four and five discuss political and economic relations between 1960 and 1990. Parts six and seven look into SADC military, political and economic relations with the member states. Finally, part eight is the conclusion.

2. COMPLEX INTERDEPENEDENCE THEORY

Because international politics is a parasitic discipline that hinges on so many other subjects, in most cases, one theory is not adequate to analyze South African international relations (Garnett 1984:27-50). Because of this problem, this paper's intension is to employ the interdependence theory with an emphasis on the complex interdependence theory in analyzing the relationship between South Africa and the rest of the southern African states.

Main futures of complex interdependence:

1. There are multiple channels of interaction such as inter-states of realist school; trans-government relations, where the input of different government department and various parastatals play a vital role in communalizing states relations; and transnational non-state actors such as liberation movements, religious movements, trade unions, multinational corporations and the likes equally play vital roles.
2. There is an absence of a hierarchical system where issues of high and low politics are less relevant. This thesis is of the belief that the military, politics,

economics, society and cultural play prominent roles at different times, depending on issue at hand.

3. There is what one could term as unity and inclusion. That is, all member states in a system are sensitive to actions and inactions of any member states either on domestic or foreign policy issue.
4. The degree of vulnerability to member policies depends on the import of goods and services contributed by the said state to the system. It has little to do with the level of political, economic and social developments of the other members in question.
5. It erodes the notion of total autonomy and sovereignty of different units to the whole system. More emphasis is placed on sharing of sovereignty on three levels: international legal, Westphalian/Vatellian and domestic (Krasner 2004:88, 1999:9-25).
6. Military power can be employed only as a last resort when the *leitmotif* of a state is in danger. It is also relevant when supranational organizations, such as SADCC and SADC use it to preserve stability in a designated area or to fight against non-members of a system.

In social sciences, a theory may not be adequate to analyze states relations and behaviors. For the purposes of this paper, futures of integration theory like the absence of force and coercion and the use of collective action to promote mutual interests are equally prominent with complex interdependence theory (Evans & Newnham 1998:254).

Interdependence means that changes or events in any single part of a system will (sensitive effect) produce some reaction from or have some significant consequence on other actors of the system *whether they like it or not* (Russet & Starr

1992:439). Keohane and Nye (1987:364) believe that the need for interdependence could be couched from the need to achieve all what could not be realized in isolation. It emphasizes the links or interconnectedness among the units of a system. Such links may affect both the opportunities of states and the willingness of decision makers to act. These links can be likened to economic, political or social incremental integration. As much as this can generate stability, predictability, regularity, unity, growth and development, it can also breed frustration, anger, instability, competition and conflict. It may be asymmetrical where one of the units (usually the centre) in a system tends to benefit more than the others (periphery states). However, when it is symmetric (an ideal type that hardly met), it connotes that members mutually benefit and consequently, less of conflict arises among the members (Keohane & Nye 1987:365).

Due to the high degree of interdependence in all facet of international relations, there are some elements of sensitivity among states in the whole system where action or inaction of a member state affect others, at least in the short term. Therefore, all state in a designated system are sensitive to changes in the rules of transaction; regardless of if they are policy, social or economic changes. On the other hand and in the long term, vulnerability may be the type of relationship. This is a scenario whereby there is unequal exchange (asymmetrical relationship) in a system under consideration. In some cases when a state is vulnerable to other's policies (the inability of state A to absolve the cost B imposed on it due to its internal or foreign policy) the vulnerability could lead to conflict and the use of military power. The most vulnerable states are not necessarily the most sensitive ones (Keohane & Nye 1987: 368).

Increases in the interconnectedness of states not only bring the concept of sovereignty into question, but it also questions the existence of international relations and causes transnational relations to be viewed more as relations amongst states that have gone beyond state-centric decision making. The movement of goods, ideas and information across borders "without significant, direct participation or control by high-level governmental actors" of which states have no control over (Russett & Starr 1992:443) signifies a need to revisit the relevance of international relations. The permeability of state brings into prominence the import of Non-governmental Organizations (NGO's). Even at the government level, sub-national actors (part of bureaucracy) do relate with their counterparts from other state without the knowledge of national government (mostly on highly sensitive security matters).

Unlike the realist's school of thought, where military security and the use of force are important, the *autonomy dilemma* scenario makes states consider the input of non-state actors (liberation movements) in policy-making, making them to be vulnerable to each other. Worth nothing is that the issues that are central to the interdependence thesis are not static; therefore, strict hierarchical system of high and low politics believed by the realist school is not attainable in the complex interdependence school. Military capability of a state is not fungible in achieving socio-cultural, political and psychological interdependence (Russett & Starr 1992:445). Domestic politics or economics can influence international economics and politics and vice versa, the degree of sensitivity and vulnerability are the only things that differ.

As mentioned above, the use of military means to achieve state objectives has changed from state-to-state activities and has come to impact non-state actors such as

terrorist movements, guerrilla fighters, supranational organizations, international organizations and transnational institutions. Although the West perceives the activities of terrorist movements as horrendous, states continue to recognize their importance in international relations and therefore, have links with them through negotiation. For instance, South Africa engaged ANC in secret talk before Mandela was released from prison (Mandela 1994: 452-3).

Externality in the complex interdependence theory, unlike the private goods where the law of supply and demand determines its availability, addresses people's choices and the way those choices harm and benefit others (Russett & Starr 1992:451-2). This brings this study into what are termed as collective goods. This describes when member states equally benefit either positively or negatively on supplied goods, that is, the unity and inclusiveness of the supply (Russett & Starr 1992:453). There is another type of interdependence termed vulnerability or *forced–rider* where the cost of collective goods supplied by a member state is forced on all members in a system. Although there are some pockets of conflicts among the states, there is still a need for them to come together for collective goods. Another problem associated with interdependence is what is called *the tragedy of the common which brings ruin to all*.[3] It also makes states ignore their responsibilities as the member states will always seek to maximize their share of the common goods, even when their supply is limited. Having examined the theory of complex interdependence, the next section shall address the suitability of the theory in assessing the political economy of the southern African states in the apartheid and the post apartheid relationship.

Colonial Era and Politico-Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa

It is the belief of some scholars of African politics that the *leitmotif* of pan-Africanism was the need to establish economic cooperation among the member states. In East Africa, the nationalists rejected federation of states imposed on them by the colonialists because of the likely domination of the settlers in the political arrangement of the post-colonial states. Instead of this, they opted for the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA). Julius Nyerere prefers to delay the political independence of Tangayika (Tanzania) until the two other East African states (Uganda and Kenya) receive their independence from Britain. This move can be viewed as an aspect of pan-Africanism. As much as this thesis holds water for economic integration in Africa in general, other nationalists, such as Kwame Knrumah, did not understand it in the same way. He instead called for *political independence first before other things will be given*. In southern Africa, the scenario is an admixture of economic and political integration. The three High Commission Territories of Basutholand (Lesotho), Bechanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland governed from the United Kingdom Colonial office refused incorporation into the Union of South Africa. As early as 1903, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) became members of the Southern African Custom Union (SACU). The economic implications of that were that member states shared a common currency and monetary policy. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was their central banker. Proceeds from exports of member states were in the hands of South Africa, and they imported almost all their goods for survival from the apartheid government (Blumenfeld, 1992:109-118). Any negative perceptions of the BLS countries by South Africa implied starvation and political instability. Politically, South Africa found it easy to install a trusted friend as a leader in any of the three states. This contributed to the neutrality of

Botswana in the power politics of and the anti-apartheid struggle in the region (Amusan 2006: 117-8). This was a result of the geographical peculiarity of the sub-region. For instance, Lesotho is a landlocked state like the other two states but, most importantly, it only shares territory only South Africa. The same thing affected political development in the colonial Franco-central African states where DRC, a member of the SADC belongs geographically.

France was conscious of the African nationalists movement towards amalgamation of colonial states. Paris made it a policy to disintegrate these states for its economic exploitation. This could have caused political instability immediately after the DRC received its independence from Belgium. Belgium had ruled DRC as a unitary state with some administrative decentralization. The intension of the Belgian government was to continue its economic exploitation of the territory with the aim that the federal system of the state, with its attendant on economic disarticulation, would plunge Kinshasa into political instability (Ake 1981: 43-4). While planning another fashion of Pan-African system by the Belgian government, France was of the view that disintegration of the states would further its economic motive therefore, Joseph Kasavubu was encouraged to form Bakongo separatist movement (Wallerstein 1961: 113). As much as the colonialists differ in the unity of Africa, they did not encourage a federation that would cut across colonial language and demarcation spheres.

One of the lapses of the 1945 Manchester Pan-Africanists movement was its concentration on political freedom without linking the same with economic development in the African states. This, ironically, was corrected in the case of the southern African states because of the South African apartheid system, which gave little room for

independent coterminous states to develop economically outside the tutelage of Pretoria.

The impact of liberation movements that were tied to the apron string of the OAU Liberation Committee was another means of cooperation among various movements. After the 1958 conferences in Ghana and the eventual formation of the OAU, with a united focus on decolonization and anti-apartheid struggle by the organization, a special fund was created by the continental political organization to disburse funds and overlook political, social and military developments amongst various movements in their respective sanctuaries. Expectedly, there tends to be a conflict of interests among the unwieldy movements. It was the duty of the OAU Committee on Liberation to maintain unity through the use of good offices among member states. With this, some of these movements not only received military training in various African states, but they also received training from the former Soviet Union, China and North Korea. The implication of this was that the friendships they established during their war of liberation helped them establish common economic and political institutions to further their general development.

Another plus in the formation of economic groupings in the sub-region is their common cultural heritage that straddles language and commerce. The Nguni language, which cut across many states in southern Africa made the coming together of the member states comparatively smooth. The Ndebele, SeSwathi, MoSotho, SeTwana and SeZulu are common languages in South Africa that are widely spoken and highly interrelated. Because Swahili is spoken in the states of Tanzania and Zambia, many of the guerilla fighters who spent a portion of their military training in either of the two states were well versed in Swahili. Liberation movements turned political parties after independence, expectedly form a

united front in fighting against apartheid system. Therefore, the coming together of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the Zimbabwe African National Organization Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the Liberation Front of Mocambique (FRELIMO) against South Africa was total.

Politico-Economic Relations from 1960s

Despite the volume of economic relations between South Africa and its neighbors, the issue of politics continues to be a scar in their relationship. The impact of Pan-Africanism on the leaders of the southern African states of Rhodesia and South Africa played more of a role in determining their economic and political interactions. Though it is well established that the degree of interdependence between the two camps cannot be ignored, the ideological dependence of the camps leads them to enact harsh and irrational policies towards each other. This is in contrast to the amount of financial, trade and labor that flows to and from the two camps. A lack of concrete institutional framework to regulate Pretoria and its neighbors' relationships causes instability. The involvement of extra South Africa in the internal affairs of Pretoria's system led to massive retaliation and to an export of conflict to the whole region. South Africa's coterminous states political objective was to promote liberation movements interest against minority regimes in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. This led to a sense of responsibility as brother's keeper according to the tenet of Pan-Africanism. This was in the form of political, financial and military support in waging war against South Africa and its puppets in Zimbabwe (Ian Smith), Namibia (Uniao National para a Independencia Total de Angola, UNITA and Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola,

FNLA), Mozambique (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana, RENAMO) and Angola. The support that the neighboring states received from the Eastern bloc allowed South Africa to retaliate through *total strategy* and introduced securocratic[4] government as a response to total onslaught on the rest of southern Africa. This takes many forms such as *blitzkrieg*, sponsoring opposition movements against *status quo* governments and *importation* of the capitalist states to support anti-communist intrusion in the sub-region.

South Africa's employment of alternative movements against her neighboring states paid off as the same movements were used to cause internal instability and a high degree of dependence on the South African goods and services. The activities of the Pretoria government through its protégés, UNITA and RENAMO, led to the closure of Lobito, Beira, Benguela and Nacala routes, which in turn caused Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to experience certain political and economic disadvantages. The implication of this was that South Africa would have more revenue from unfriendly states because the perceived littoral states of Tanzania, Mozambique and Swaziland were denied access to their ports. It also brought about political understandings because of the way economic and transport diplomacy was craftily employed by South Africa. The only option, according to the above theory of interdependence, was to rely on the good will of South Africa for the importation and exportation of goods and services (Green & Thompson 1986: 245-80). The need to find a catholicon to this development was the formation of the SADCC by the frontline states in the form of what this paper regards as micro Pan-Africanism with the aim of furthering the objectives of the AAPO and CIAS founded by Kwame Nkrumah.

Economic and Political Roles of SADCC

South Africa's desire to create a constellation of states in southern Africa was dashed immediately when Zimbabwe received its political independence through liberation war. It was the opinion of Zimbabwe that it should regain its lost glory as a result of the Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965. With the formation of SADCC and mostly with the involvement of the perceived liberal southern African states of Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho in the anti-South Africa these moves were considered to be unfriendly acts which needed to be met with military might. Among the intensions of the SADCC was the need to further the aims and objectives of the Pan-African leaders, that is, to fight against minority rule and to abhor racial discrimination in Namibia and South Africa.

With the need for gradual political and economic integration of Africa pronounced, one of the cardinal objectives of the Frontline states became to abide by the UN Economic Commission for Africa's call for sub-regional economic cooperation with subsequent Africa Union in future. If this was the aim of the SADCC during its formative years, the issue of politics, which some scholars would term as inconsistent with economic ideas should not come to fore. To what extent this could be argued for is a matter of academic conjecture. This paper holds that an iota of economic move has some political undertone. This is the main departure of this section where we are to argue that admixture of politics and economics are involved in the formation of SADCC. Despite the organization's political power in attracting international solidarity and developing financial assistance against South Africa's incessant incursion to the member state's territory, it was not well equipped to serve as a hob in actualizing the

member states' foreign policy against Pretoria. This is because of the geography of the sub-region. Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland (BLS) instead advocated for a reduction in their degree of dependence on the apartheid state. Economic détente between BLS and South Africa is understandable because of their geographical reality. The Lesotho Highlands Water project with South Africa, Botswana and South Africa Multinational Corporation (MNC) and De Beers, in exploration of the state's diamond and juicy incentives to attract investment from South Africa by Swaziland are central to the very survival of these states. Zimbabwe and Zambia are two states that perceived their economic relationship as *negative interdependence* in favor of South Africa. They opted for Pan-African anti-apartheid stance.

Dissociation costs on Frontline states were so vast that they could not survive without Pretoria government. For many of these states, the degree of their dependency on South Africa, in form of both visible and invisible trade, in investment and other financial flows, in labor services and in infrastructures and institutions, was too precious to ignore (Blumenfeld 1992: 114). These variables put the member states in a corner where a comprehensive sanction[5] as advocated by the organization black civil society in South Africa, Scandinavian countries and the communist states would want them to be. Malawi as a member of SADCC, for instance was contradictory. Its diplomatic relations with South Africa signified the extent to which the member states could not put their foot down on subjecting the apartheid enclave to a pariah status. Comparatively, the cost of their dissociation with Pretoria was higher than South Africa's. For instance, South Africa embarked on transport diplomacy against recalcitrant states such as Zimbabwe and Zambia. With Pretoria sponsoring insurgencey within Mozambique and Angola

railway systems, the major means of transportation and the link to the international environment was disrupted. Thus, because of sabotage (bombing) and wars in Angola and Mozambique, the SADCC states could not make use of these routes. This forced them to come to term with South Africa, since it became a matter of life-or-death.

The collapse of ideological war in the international system had a direct impact on the political arrangement of the sub-region. This took the form of dissolution of the apartheid system, as Mandela and his co-jailer were released unconditionally. The liberation movements turned political parties in South Africa were unbanned. Before this, another political milestone was registered as Namibia received her formal independence from South Africa. These developments brought about a Tsunami of political changes, specifically in southern Africa By 1992, SADCC started to revisit their stance on its future relationship with South Africa. In August of the same year, members of the SADCC met in Windhoek, the Namibian capital, and signed a Treaty and Declaration of SADC. Most important in this political and economic calculation was the need to integrate South Africa to the SADCC for economic development of the sub-region. In August 1994, South Africa's accession to SADC brought about a need to focus more on the economic development of southern Africa.

SADC as a Step away from the Pan-African Concept

The formation of SADC was not as smooth as the establishment of SADCC for various reasons. Personality problems between Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe dictate to some extent, the degree of tardiness in actualizing the establishment of the regional integration. Reasons for these are not too difficult to fathom. Mugabe held that the new

southern Africa economic and political arrangement would be tailor-made to suit his personal hegemonic ambition in the sub-region. At the same time, he wanted to regain the lost glory of Rhodesia that resulted from the *illegal* Ian Smith UDI government. On the other hand was South Africa's to remain the only credible power in southern Africa based upon international relations attributes of power. This development was not only against the initial ambition of Pan-Africanists of the unity of Africa, but it also reflected the conservative ideas of the ilk of Nigeria (Tafawa Balewa), francophone African states, save Guinea Bissau (Sekou Toure), Liberia and DRC (Mobutu Sese Seko) conception of Africa. Division of power in the sub-region, with more emphasis on security matters, also formed the crux of the disagreement between Pretoria and Harare. All these are going to receive some justification in the analysis of the post-apartheid southern African politics.

Two major schools of thought were developed from the integration procedure in southern Africa. One championed by the moderates was that the issue of economic and political relationships between member states should be on the stage of *the ladder of integration* on which participants progress from a preferential trade area to a free trade area before proceeding to a custom union. Participants then shift from a common market to economic union, before finally achieving political union (Bertelsmann 1998: 178). On the other hand was the radical school that advocates for political union to be addressed before other issues. The Pan-Africanists who were ready to forgo their state's sovereignty for a political union maintain the second position. This position is not applicable in southern Africa because of the way these states received their political independence from various colonialists. Perhaps the Lusophone states of Angola and Mozambique could venture into this idea but South Africa and Zimbabwe, which are the

main players in the SADC, are not ready for any arrangement that would change the existing *status quo*. The politics involved in the formation of the SADC confirm the mutual suspicion that exists between the two giants and credible states in maintaining balance of power and terror at the sub-regional level.

Admission of DRC as a member of the sub-regional organization, despite its location in central Africa, could be explained by Zimbabwe's urge to check the perceived preponderant power of South Africa. This was despite Kinshasa's political history in southern Africa during the Cold War period against progressive liberation movements. South Africa intension in admitting DRC also could not be too far from the need to exploit the untapped natural resources of the state to further economic dominance of Pretoria in the sub-region. Therefore, DRC membership was interpreted by the two states as a means of furthering both political and economic objectives.

Development integration continues to be the preferred model of the members' relationships against the political intension of the SADCC states in dislodging apartheid system in South Africa and Namibia. Therefore, the focus on trade and development of infrastructural amenities that eluded the member states because of Pretoria *national strategy* against its coterminous states needed special focus. As much as Maseru Trade Protocol was drafted by the member states for liberalization of trade, there are some cogs to the achievement of this according to the Development Bank of Southern Africa (c.f. Bertelsmann 1998:181):

Its failure to provide for differential treatment for least developed countries;

Its emphasis on tariff barriers to trade when they are not the main obstacles to intra-regional trade;
The absence of provisions to address supply-side measures;
The call for the immediate national treatment of goods and services traded within the region;
Its attempt to create policy harmonization when it is not required from Free Trade Area (FTA);
The treatment of relationships of member states with other regional groupings;
Inadequate provisions to foster equitable industrial development in the region;
The absence of compensatory mechanisms; and
Its failure to address adequately prevailing trade imbalances in the region.

Because of the inadequacies of the principle of tariff problems to the development of the trade within the region, the Southern African Bank further proposed some solutions to the economic backwardness of the member states that usually create trade diversion for other members and trade creation for South Africa. The Bank therefore focuses on the need for equitable industrial development in the member states after addressing the following snags to industrialization:
Small size of domestic markets;
Poor ability to absorb new technologies;
Lack of technical skills;
Lack of product and market diversification;
Low investment;
Lack of harmonized tariff liberalization; and
Widespread poor infrastructural development in the region.

Despite the above-mentioned problems associated with the economic integration of some of the routes that were

sabotaged during the liberation wars and apartheid's desire to form a constellation of states.
The Beira Corridor, linking Harare with the port of Beira in Mozambique for the transportation of mineral resources and agricultural products;
The Benguela Corridor, linking Angola to the copper mines in the south of the DRC and Zambia;
The Malanje Corridor with intension of developing rail system in Angola;
The Nacala Corridor connecting Mozambique to Malawi and Zambia for the exploitation of mineral resources such as copper;
The Namibe Corridor to Menongue in Angola for the active transportation of Luanda natural minerals; and
The Tazare Corridor connecting Tanzania, Zambia, DRC and Angola

It should be pointed out that according to some political and economic analysts, the need to develop these areas could be linked to South Africa's desire to control the mineral resources of the SADC members. For instance, the development of the Maputo Corridor is being viewed as an attempt to make South Africa's manufactured goods available to its coterminous states to the east and north-east. The development of gigantic shopping malls along the route are not to satisfy the South African in the area, but as a means to create more jobs in the state as long as Swathis and Mozambicans would patronize these shopping complexes in Nelspruit and Malelane. The Corridor was constructed by private concession on Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) where it would not only benefit South African companies. Issues of security loom large in consolidating economic development. In achieving this, the

problem of security comes into prominence as discussed below.

Holistic Approach to the Concept of Security in SADC Region

The remaining security issues in the post-Cold War international system continue to reverberate in the mind of government officials, policy analysts, mass media and NGOs. In the post Soviet Union, the issue of security has transcended the military sphere where the size of the standing army and weapons of mass destruction are the *sine qua non* to power in international politics. Although, as this paper will latter address, military security remains one of the contemporary conflict problems in Africa for a variety of reasons.[6] The political mistrust between Zimbabwe and South Africa led to a misunderstanding at the SADC, where the two should instead acted as leaders for the other members to emulate. The initial political problems emanated from the issue of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (the Organ). Mugabe wanted the Organ to be independent of the SADC as a security organization. Ironically, he was the chairperson of the Organ at the time, while Mandela was the chairperson of the SADC at the same time (1996). Because of the security implication of the Organ to the stability of the southern African region, Mugabe wanted to hold onto the security, and left the political and economic spheres to South Africa. The insistence by Mandela that the Organ was an integral part of the whole SADC triggered a crisis and a lack of trust between the two states. In order for Mugabe to entrench his political influence in the region, he formed an *unholy alliance* with some SADC member states to strengthen the Laurent Kabila government in the DRC. Angola and Namibia joined Zimbabwe in the war against the anti- *status quo* in the DRC for various reasons, which are examined elsewhere (Amusan, 1999: 27-34). Despite

this, South Africa and Zimbabwe appreciated the need to cooperate for the general development of the sub-region, realizing that the negative effects of any unpopular policy would have a direct effect on their respective state's stability. To curb this, spheres of influence were carved out for themselves and probably to work towards the general development of the sub-region and by extension Africa in general. While South Africa was in charge of finance and investment, Zimbabwe was asked to coordinate food, agriculture and natural resources' sectors on behalf of the SADC (Van Wyk, 1999:79).

Conclusion

While Africa needs political and economic development, the personal ambition of some of their leaders continues to militate against it. This is exactly what is affecting the southern African sub-region. The zeal at which the liberation movements united would have moved the sub-region forward in the form of general development despite the fact that in some instances they failed to agree on issues because of ideological differences. The introduction of globalization imposed on SADC members by various international financial institutions gave them a little room to maneuver in terms of homegrown politico-economic development in line with the founding fathers of Pan-Africanism. The need to open the market for international exploitation not only killed the DuBoisian model of Pan-Africanism, but it also exposed the sub-region to what Amechi Okolo (1986) terms as "Dependency: the Highest Stage of Capitalist Domination". South Africa, a capitalist state from its inception, rejuvenates the concept of Africa Renaissance. However, the commitment to the rebirth of Africa is not in line with the state policy

towards the SADC. This explains why the rest of the member states continue to perceive Pretoria as an exploitative hegemonic power that only looks after the interest of its socio-politico-economic development at the disadvantage of the other states. Its intension of absorbing the BLS and Namibia economically during the apartheid era still looms large in the Mandela-Mbeki administrations.

Notes

1. C.f. Edmondson, Locksley. 1974. 'Africa and the African Diaspora: Interactions, Linkages, and Racial Challenges in the Future World Order', in Mazrui, Ali A. and Patel, Hasu H. *Africa*: *the next Thirty Years*. England: Davison Publishing Ltd.
2. For the sake of this paper, we look into the composition of the southern African states to have transcended the geographical location of some states in the sub-region.

Tanzania, Zambia and DRC suppose to belong to another region.

3. This is a term developed by Garrett Hardin (1968: 1243-8), it centre of argument is that any resources that is available to everybody without policy control tend to favour some and denied others access to it. It is zero-sum game where there is a need for either privatisation or social control as a regulatory system (Stiglitz 2006: 162-164, 322; Greene 1997: 321-3).
4. President Pik Botha elevated State Security Council to preside over intrusive bureaucratic system, known as the National Management System, with tentacles reaching into virtually every government department and into every corner of the country (De Klerk 1999: 115)
5. For a proper understanding of the futility of sanctions imposition on another state, see (Rienow 1961: 285-7, Russet and Starr 1992: 171-3).
6. The post Cold War international politics that is expected to bring unity, development and harmony through democratization instead elicited crises in Africa. Some of these crises are resulted from the need to control mineral resources either by a handful of political elite, warlords or MNCs. This claimed live of thousands of people in DRC, Cote d'Ivore, Angola, Sudan and to a smaller scale Nigeria. For more in-depth knowledge on this, see Reno. 1998 and Berdal and Malone. 2000.

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The Niger Delta of Nigeria: A World Class Oil Region in Africa, 2000-2006

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Keywords: Oil, Niger Delta, Nigeria, African World Class.

Abstract

Nigeria is the largest crude oil producing country in Africa, the sixth petroleum giant in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the eleventh in the world (Okodudu 2007:10). But it gained world class fame only in the year 2000 through oil production in its Niger Delta region. The scholarship of this essay is how the region attained this feat at the beginning of the twenty – first century. The work also documents the seventeen giant oil fields that made it possible and the aggressive drilling campaigns in the region. Other topics addressed include the oil and gas reserves in the Niger Delta, crude oil production from 2000 to 2006 and its export values in US dollars.

Introduction

The Niger Delta is the southernmost region of Nigeria. Although it occupies ninety percent of the Nigerian coastline, it is specifically between the Mahin river estuary in the west

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and the Cross River estuary in the east. The region has been producing oil since 1956. From this time to the end of the twentieth century, it was not a world class oil region. The major constraint was the inability of its giant fields to produce oil in great quantities. On attainment of this feat at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it became listed as a world class oil region.

Many have conducted researched on Nigerian petroleum in the Niger Delta. The literature that focuses on this topic is written in the early twenty-first century. Amongst them are the following: Ikoku C. U. *Petroleum: Mankind's Best Friend* (Port Harcourt, 2000) and Udo, E. J. "Impact of Oil Exploration in Akwa Ibom State" (Uyo, 2001). Others are the recent works of Okowa, W. J. *The Problems and Prospects of the Niger Delta* (Port Harcourt, 2007) and Jaja, J. M. *Underdevelopment and Conflict in the Niger Delta: The Tragedy of Oil Exploration* (Port Harcourt, 2007).

These works address the problems of community relations and the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta. The work of Okowa evaluated the prospects of the Niger Delta in Nigeria and how the latter marginalized her Delta region. None of these works examined how the region became world class in petroleum production which this paper addresses to fill in this gap in the petroleum history of Nigeria. First, the aggressive drilling campaigns of the early twenty-first century must be considered.

The Aggressive Drilling Campaigns of the Early Twenty-First Century

One of the most significant events in the history of the Nigerian petroleum industry in the Niger Delta is the aggressive drilling campaigns that took place between 2000 and 2006. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the petroleum industry progressed beyond a doubt and the Niger Delta became a world class petroleum region, especially in Africa. The Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC) and the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) had a joint venture agreement in the year 2000. This led to the first open competition for crude oil blocks as well as the discovery, building, and production of Okono offshore field in 2001. Four years later, the first marginal oil field awards to indigenous firms were created and the second open competition for oil blocks started in 2005 (Obiozor 2005).

Anyway, between 2000 and 2003, more than fifty onshore and deepwater oil blocks were discovered in the Niger Delta. These were located in the shallow and continental shelf, deep and ultra-deep offshore and onshore. In the year 2000 alone, thirty new oil blocks were offered for bidding with Shell having 30% stake in the Nigerian energy sector. The petroleum history of Ibah (2000:17-18) documented some of these blocks found in 2000 as Oil Prospecting Lease (OPL) 135, 236, 304 and 452 in the Niger Delta onshore. Six blocks discovered in the continental shelf are OPL's 229, 233, 239, 240, 277 and 467. The eleven blocks in the deep and ultra-deep offshore of the Niger Delta include OPL's 214, 242, 243, 249, 250, 318, 320, 322, 324 and 326. Among the deep water oil blocks discovered in 2003 are OPL's 220, 221, 222, 246, 247,

217, 218, 219, 245, 244, 216, 215, 243, 212, 213, 248, 211, 250, 210, 209, 315 and 316 (Lawal 2004: 12).

In the case of OPL 222 explored by Chevron Texaco, two reservoirs of oil were found. The first oil found on the block and drilled was from Ukot I exploration well. But the second that came from Usan I well produced 5000 barrels of crude oil daily from a water depth of 750 meters. This reservoir contributed immensely to the company's growth (Pryor 2002:19).

However, the Federal Government of Nigeria allocated these blocks to 57 multinational and indigenous petroleum firms for exploration. Some of them are Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), Exxon Mobil, Agip Energy and National Resources (AENR), Chevron Texaco, Petrobras, Esso Exploration, Nexen Petroleum Nigeria and Petroleum Production Company as well as the Nigerian government owned National Petroleum Development Company (NPDC) established in the 1980s for petroleum exploration.

SPDC did not only use this aggressive drilling period to upgrade her oil fields and flow stations in the Niger Delta. They also achieved a million barrels of oil daily. Shell principal officers, like Mr. Salim Al Alawi, Mr. Oghale Ibi, Dondo Ahire, Hans Flikkema and Don Boham (2003:25) clarified how the one million barrels per day mark was reached. According to these authorities, who were the heads of field engineering, production geology, well operations swamp east, corporate well engineering and external relations, respectively, their budget for 2003 was to drill an additional 62 oil wells. But they could only accomplish 51 that added 136,000 barrels per day to their corporate holdings. As a result, in two days time 5–6

October, 2003, Shell's total production increased from 1.007 million barrels per day to 1.012 million.

Other petroleum players in the Niger Delta ,like Agip Energy and Natural Resources (AENR), also developed their old and new oil fields in 2003. Ekundayo (2003:25) gave an instance of Okono and Okpoho Fields where Agip spent more than US$400 million to increase the capacities as well as commissioning a new Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) Vessel called *Mystras*. Because of their discovery of more fields in the Niger Delta region, they were able to increase their total crude oil production from 90 million to 250million barrels in 2003. In the agreement they signed in 2000 with the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC), Agip provided the funding and managed the new fields jointly with NPDC.

In 2004, the Federal Government of Nigeria granted equity shares in five offshore blocks to NPDC. According to NPDC's chairman, Abba Dabo (2004:3), the blocks OPL's 214, 242, 256, 244 and 318 that are in the oil-rich Niger Delta will enable the NPDC to earn revenue for Nigerian Government through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).

With the advantage Exxon Mobil had in the Eastern Obolo (Andoni) part of the eastern Niger Delta offshore, they were able to develop the East Area Additional Oil Recovery Project (EAAORP) in a joint venture with the NNPC. Ugwuanyi (2004:18) stated that the result will increase Exxon Mobil's production from 750,000 barrels per day in 2000 to 500 million in the future.

As for Total, then TotalFinaElf, their Amenam-Kpono Project was exploring over one billion barrels of oil reserve in

Eastern Obolo (Andoni). The findings of Ekundayo (2004:23) brought into focus the US$2 billion Amenam-Kpono Field. This is in addition to building and monetizing Amenam Kpono Oil and Gas Export Project (AKOGEP) Phases I and II in the Eastern Obolo offshore. Also within this period of 2003, they were developing their Akpo and Usan deep offshore projects as well as the second phase of Ofon Field also in the Eastern Obolo (Andoni) offshore area of the Niger Delta.

Going through the frequency of these aggressive exploration and exploitation of the petroleum industry, the Nigerian Government came up with more Oil Prospecting Leases (OPL). Thus in February 2003, thirty one indigenous oil firms were awarded the OPL to explore 24 marginal petroleum fields in the Niger Delta. Adindu (2004:12) mentioned the total oil reserves in the marginal fields then as 1.36 billion barrels per day. Being handled by indigenous firms, it is a giant step towards the development of the Niger Delta region in particular and Nigeria in general.

However, the revelations of Isiwu (2004:13) put Nigeria's overall crude oil reserve at about 33.4 billion barrels in 2003. Not less than 95% of it was in the Niger Delta region. Before then the estimate of recoverable oil was 22.5 billion barrels. In spite of the fact that they are processed through seven terminals and floating production vessels, the oil came from the 3000 kilometers of pipelines that cross the Niger Delta. These pipelines link 275 flow stations to the existing seven petroleum terminals that process it for export.

Until the end of 2006, Nigeria's petroleum deposits were concentrated in the Niger Delta's onshore and offshore swamps and continental shelf. Experts, like Ikoku (2000:47), have proved that it will continue to flow for the next forty

years. Because it is light sweet crude with low sulfur content, it will continue to be the most preferred worldwide since it can be more easily obtained and refined than heavy crude (Onyige 1989:176).

A close study of it depicts the position that the Niger Delta oil has promoted Nigeria in the comity of world petroleum producing countries. In 2003, Nigeria was the eleventh largest oil producer in the world. The ranking were as follows: Saudi Arabia, USA, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, Kuwait, Iraq, United Arab Emirate, Mexico, China, Nigeria, Libya, Canada, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Algeria, Norway, and Britain. As a result, the Niger Delta is a world class petroleum region within and outside Africa (Ibah 2004:8).

The Niger Delta as World Class Petroleum Region in Africa

The strategic position of the Niger Delta as a world class petroleum region was well spelt out when it was listed in the *USA Geological Survey World Petroleum Assessment* (2000). Thus, a world class giant oil field produces between 500 million and five billion barrels. In the case of the Niger Delta of our study, the seventeen giant petroleum reservoirs that are world class oil fields meet the criteria as shown on Table 4 below.

Table 1: Niger Delta World Class Oil Fields

S/N	Operator	Oil Fields	Date Discovered	Reserves (Mmbbls)
1.	Shell	Bonga	1993	600
2.		BongaSouth West	NA	600
3.		Bomu	1958	875
4.		Cawthorne Channel	1963	750
5.		Forcados –	1968	1,23

		Yokri		5
6.		Imo River	1959	875
7.		Jones Creek	1967	900
8.		Nembe Creek	1973	950
9.	Exxon Mobil	Edop	1981	733
10.		Erha	1991	1,200
11.		Ubit	NA	945
12.	Chevron Texaco	Agbami	1998	1,000
13.		Meren	1965	1,100
14.		Apoi-North-Funiwa	NA	500
15.	Total (Total Fina Elf)	Okan	1965	800
16.		Amenam-Kpono	1990	500
17.		Obagi	1964	670

*NA: Not Available.

Source: Emmanuel O. Egbogha, "Fifty Years of Petroleum Exploitation in Nigeria: Public Lecture Presented at the First Emmanuel Egbogah Lecture Series on Petroleum Policy and Strategy at the University of Port Harcourt, March 27-29, 2006, pp.35-36.

According to Imomoh, (2006:7) the Niger Delta oil fields were the second largest oil fields in the world. Superseding them were the super-giant oil fields found in the Middle East, especially those of the Iranian or Persian Gulf. Simply put, it is the size of the oil wells, not the number of wells discovered, that matters. Like in Nigeria, the Niger Delta

did not only pioneer petroleum production, but it also has the largest fields in the country and in Africa in general. This includes the Bonga, Agbami and Okan Fields at the Escravos in the western Niger Delta as well as Amenam-Kpono in the Eastern Obolo (Andoni) part of the eastern Niger Delta offshore (Akintunde 2000:5).

Bonga for instance is Nigeria's first deep offshore field which was discovered by Shell in 1993 and holds the Oil Prospecting License (OPL) 212 of the same year. It is this pioneer Nigerian deep offshore field that is contributing immensely to the petroleum industry. Thus, it has since 29 December 2005 been increasing Nigeria's crude oil export by 200, 000 barrels daily. The field which was developed by Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCO) at the cost of US$3.6billion in a joint venture with First Oil, Esso, Agip and Elf covers 60 square kilometre area in the Niger Delta water depths of over 1000 meters (Wihbey 2006: 28, 30).

The Bonga field exposed the acumen of indigenous technology in Nigeria through their offshore loading buoy. The latter constructed by an indigenous company, Nigerdock, Lagos, became reputed as the world's 'first largest and most technologically advanced polyester deepwater bouy' (Egbogah 2006:28-30). This was made possible by the successes of petroleum businessmen in deep offshore development. Their exploration and development of the Niger Delta oil made Nigeria the African hub of petroleum (Ayiga 2003:11).

Another example comes from the Agbami Oil Field of Chevron-Texaco. This offshore deep water field, located 70 miles or 113kilometres offshore the central part of the Niger Delta on OPL Block 216, was discovered in 1998. According to Meze (2008), although it is in the water depth between 4,200

feet and 5,400 feet, the field covered 45,000 acres or 182 square kilometers and was given to Chevron-Texaco by the Federal Government of Nigeria as the Oil Mining Leases (OML) 127 and 128. Because of the huge petroleum deposits of not less than 900 million barrels, the appraisal work was completed in a record time of three years after the discovery and drilling commenced in 2004 (Salau, 2008).

Notwithstanding the fact that Chevron-Texaco is developing the field with Petroleo Brasileiro (Petrobras) SA and Total SA, Agbami is recorded as one of the biggest fields of Chevron. It is expected to produce about 100,000 barrels of oil daily which will boost Chevron's total output of 250,000 barrels per day. According to Ferreira, Petrobras Manager in Nigeria, Abami alone is estimated to endow Nigeria with not less than US$2 billion or N224 billion yearly whenever it is in full operation. In fact, Chevron's affiliate company, Star Deep Water Petroleum Limited, who is contracted to operate Agbami had brought a US$1.1billion Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel for the storage and processing of the oil from the Agbami Field. In fact the storage capacity of this vessel is said to be not less than 20,000, 000 barrels. Chevron-Texaco uses the field to pioneer the use of a new technology of Steel Catenary Risers (SCR) to produce oil from the deep sea wells (Makoju, 2008).

It is interesting that Nigeria, the country of exploration, has hand in the fabrication of the components of the project. The offloading buoy was done by Nigerdock Plc, Lagos; parts of the topsides by Daewoo Limited, Warri and both the suction piles and manifolds were the handiwork of Grinakers-LTA in Port Harcourt (Ferreira, 2008). Apart from the fact that these explorations brought about the world class

nature of these oil fields in the Niger Delta, there are other numerous wells owned by other oil conglomerates that increased the Nigerian oil reserves.

Nigerian Oil and Gas Reserves in the Niger Delta

Reserves are said to be estimated volumes of oil accumulation that are available for production in commercial quantity. Nigerian oil reserves in the Niger Delta started with 0.184 billion barrels in 1958 and rose to 16 billion barrels in 1986. In order to increase it, government policies in 1990 encouraged the exploitation of several deep offshore blocks in the Niger Delta with water depths of 3000 meters (Ugwuanyi 2004:10).

Nevertheless, the reserves came owing to the effectiveness of the petroleum firms. The drilling campaigns for the realization of effective exploration and exploitation were entrusted to many firms including Statoil, Amoco, Exxon (now ExxonMobil), Shell and Conoco. As a result, the reserve increased to 33.4 billion barrels in 2003 and continued to increase to 35.9 billion in 2005. By 2006, it was reading 36 billion barrels. For this reason, petroleum businessmen in the Niger Delta projected that by the year 2010, the production of Nigerian crude oil will reach the landmark of 40 billion barrels (Wihbey 2006:1).

Nigeria is also doing well in proven gas reserves in the Niger Delta. Egbogah (2006:12) demonstrates that gas reserves started with 2, 260 billion cubic feet in 1958. However, by 2006 the Niger Delta as world class oil region had increased to 187 trillion cubic feet.

Unlike it, the actual daily production of crude oil stood at 1.8 million barrels per day in 1990 and 2.6 million barrels

daily in 2005, which continued in 2006. Nigeria became the largest oil producer in Africa, sixth in the OPEC, fifth largest supplier to the United States of America and eleventh in the world. However, the NNPC and the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) made it possible for the Nigerian Government to know that about 116 out of 300 marginal fields in the Niger Delta are potentially productive. Interestingly, about 1.3 billion barrels are the oil reserves in these marginal areas of the Delta. Increases in oil reserves were regularly encouraged by the Federal Government of Nigeria. The Niger Delta became the source of this encouragement through the opening of its ultra-deep offshore for oil blocks. These blocks that were acquired by the Nigerian indigenous and international petroleum firms were rapidly developed to become a part of the Niger Delta oil fields (Indiamaowei 2004:15-18).

As soon as the Niger Delta offshore was opened up for exploration and exploitation, the number of petroleum firms increased to fifty nine. In fact, more than 46 of them went into intensive exploitation of crude oil and condensate. For this reason, 91 of the 177 Oil prospecting Licenses (OPL's) were converted to Oil Mineral Leases (OML's) and 22 new oil blocks were given to both indigenous and multi-national oil firms in the country in the year 2000 (Awajiokwaan 2004:8). The indigenous firms include Monipulo of Chief O. B. Lulu-Briggs of Rivers State, Zebra, Dubri, Consolidated Oil and not the least is Amni International that is one of the oil players in the Eastern Obolo (Andoni) platform of the Niger Delta offshore (Daukoru, 2004:21-26). Their activities contributed not only to the increase of Nigerian oil production, but also to making the Niger Delta a world class oil region in Africa. Between 2000

and 2006, crude oil production in the region increased as shown below.

Table 2: Nigerian Crude Oil Production in the Niger Delta Region, 2000-2006 in Thousand Barrels Per Day and Its Export Values in US Dollars

Year	Daily Average		Cumulative	Amount in (US$ million)
2000	2,250		20,964,067	20,040
2001	2,300		21,8 03,567	17,188
2002	2,240		22,621,167	17,083
2003	2,330		23,471,617	22,184
2004	2,500		24,384,117	33,309
2005	2,600		25,333,117	46,770
2006	2,600		26,282,117	46,770
TOTAL				203,344

Sources: Emmanuel O. Egbogah, "Fifty Years of Petroleum Exploitation in Nigeria: Public Lecture Presented at the University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria, in 2006," (Port Harcourt: MSS, 2006), pp.12-13, 23. *OPEC Statistical Annual Bulletin, 2003-2006.*

Conclusion

This work examined the Niger Delta of Nigeria as a world class petroleum region. It centered on the drilling campaigns that took place in the first six years of the twenty-first century. The campaign stabilized the daily crude oil production to about two million barrels. This actualization further developed the capacity of the petroleum fields. Seventeen of the petroleum fields became recognized worldwide as world class oil fields: they contributed to the daily production of 2.6 million barrels of crude oil in the Niger Delta of Nigeria in 2006. Between the years of 2000 and 2006, Nigeria derived a total of US$ 203,344,000,000 from crude oil sales in the world market.

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Biographical Note

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The Poverty of Critical Thinking in Post-colonial Zimbabwean Journalism

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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to show that until and unless there is a paradigm shift from the method of training journalists to a deeper educational paradigm, the Zimbabwean journalist will continue to lag behind in so far as the global requirements for critical thinking and objectivity in journalism is concerned. The paper argues that the traditional methods of training journalists which include but are not limited to the impartation of journalism skills somewhat through indoctrination and rote learning do not suffice. Empirical research has shown that our journalists cannot critically explore and penetrate issues when gathering and processing news. Through the method of content analysis of newspaper articles, the paper advocates for a change from the method of training to a more critical and reflective method of education that permeates all forms of indoctrination and drilling.

Key words: Journalism, training, education and Afro-philosophy

Introduction and background to the study

While society benefits from media products; a plethora of multicultural, axiological and epistemological problems almost outweigh these benefits. Some influential sections of society continue to blame the media for corrupting or contaminating its moral fabric and stirring despondency thereby misinforming the public about events on the ground. In this paper we argue that, with the advent of information technology and the 'wiring of the world into a global village,' the job of the journalist is becoming more and more complex and challenging and the Zimbabwean journalist should not be left behind by this global tide. Yes, we are aware of the positive effect of the lowering of access to enabling technologies such as word processors, blogs and wikis which have meant that traditional gatekeepers such as *The Herald*, *The Chronicle*, *The Sunday Mail*, *The Standard*, *The Zimbabwe Independent* and *The Financial Gazette* which fall under the print category and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (ZBH) which falls under the electronic category no longer have monopoly on news dissemination meaning that almost everyone who has access to these enabling technologies has become a 'journalist' in a way. We do not have problems with this fact. We believe that the increasing number of media outlets while it has a positive effect on media consumers in terms of uses and gratification; it brings with it challenges to the journalist who is expected to produce quality news in-keeping with a competitive media environment.

It is in view of this fact that we advocate for a paradigm shift from mere training to comprehensive education that results in competitive, diligent and responsible journalism. By 'diligent'

and 'responsible' we mean that journalists must be industrious and accountable for their actions, that is, they must be free moral agents. We propose an education that fosters reflective judgment and a sense of Pan-Africanism in journalism.[i] This study is motivated by the fact that most journalism schools and colleges in Zimbabwe have produced journalists who have failed to penetrate issues and interpret the meaning of events as they unfold. As fiduciaries to the public, society expects a lot from journalists and yet they seem to give very little.

The Zimbabwean media scene and the research problem

We begin this section by posing a crucial research question: *What are the benefits of educating journalists as compared to merely training them?*

A close look at Zimbabwe's media scene will set the tone for a philosophical exposition guided by the above research question. To this end, the article seeks to unravel the disadvantages of merely training journalists and the need to move towards a deeper educational paradigm in post-colonial African journalism. In order to test our thesis statement, we carried out a study in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008. The reason for choosing this period is simply that this is the time when media outlets increased while at the same time political polarization reached its peak.

The whole idea was to look at the scope and aims of the journalism curricula as presented by these journalism schools, colleges and university departments and see how the curricula impacted on the quality of journalism in Zimbabwe. Quite

substantially, we found that in terms of quantity, roughly more than 150 journalists were churned out every year by journalism colleges, schools and university departments which we studied. This is quite a big number considering the limited number of media houses in Zimbabwe. Fig.1 below gives projected figures of the journalists that graduates from some of the five institutions that train and educate journalists every year from 2000 to 2008:

Institution	**Number of Journalists produced yearly**
University of Zimbabwe	12
Harare Polytechnic	50
Christian College of Southern Africa	45
Midlands State University	35
National University of Science and Technology	40

Fig. 1

It is important, however, to note that our study was not so much about the number of journalists produced relative to the availability of journalism jobs, rather the study was interested in the quality of the journalists who were being produced and how most of these fell short of the requirements for critical and objective news reporting. We compared journalism graduates from the three University departments mentioned above and those from colleges and schools of journalism, in terms of their critical approach to news production in sport, politics and business in the print category. We chose sport, politics and business because we thought these were areas that require

specialized writing skills. The results of our comparison will be outlined and discussed in the following section.

Sampling and analysis of data

After considering the aims and objectives of the journalism curricula, we sampled four daily newspapers and these included; *The Daily News* (no longer publishing), *The Zimbabwe Mirror* (no longer publishing), *The Herald* and *The Chronicle*. As part of our sampling and analysis, we read two hundred and thirty four feature articles written in the period between 2000 and 2008. Fig. 2 below represents a sample of the stories which were written by degreed (media practitioners) and non-degreed (trained journalists) in four daily newspapers between 2000 and 2008 and it confirms our findings. We categorized the stories in terms of whether we considered them to be analytic or descriptive.

Institution	By degreed	By non-degreed	Analytic	Descriptive
The Herald	27	36	24	34
The Daily Mirror	9	36	6	31
The Chronicle	18	27	13	19
The Daily News	36	45	30	39

Fig. 2

The table above shows that out of the 234 (a figure we reached after putting together all the stories which were written by both degreed and non-degreed journalists in the four newspaper

stables above) feature stories that we sampled for research in a period spanning nine years from four daily newspapers, only 73 were analytic while 123 were descriptive. The table shows that most of the stories which we considered to be analytic were written by degreed journalists with the exception of a few which were written by non-degreed journalists and conversely most of the stories which we considered to be descriptive were written by non-degreed (trained) journalists and a few of them were written by degreed practitioners.

Using the method of content analysis of the feature articles we sampled above we concluded, after careful analysis of the stories, that most of the trained journalists lacked the critical tools of analysis while most degreed practitioners were able to critically and objectively communicate through the print media. We deliberately left out the electronic media as we could not come up with a representative sample of broadcasting channels since there is only one state controlled television channel in Zimbabwe and four state controlled radio stations.

Significance of the study

The study is significant in the sense that it will influence recruitment policies and probably push for curriculum review which will see schools and colleges of journalism in Zimbabwe pedagogically adopting policies that lead to journalism education complementing training. The study will also help curriculum designers and instructors/lecturers to take matters of critical news gathering and dissemination seriously as it is our firm belief that Afro-centric education[i], just like its Eurocentric counterpart, is value-laden. It is hypothesized in

this article that an educated journalist and/or media practitioner will positively contribute to nation building than one who is merely trained.

Importance of, and Challenges in, the media fraternity

The world in which journalists are operating today is fast becoming more complex and sophisticated. It is because of information explosion that the contemporary journalist has to deal with more chunks of information which sometimes require axiological, ontological and/or epistemological tools of analysis. But what are these axiological, ontological and/or epistemological tools of analysis in journalism? By 'axiological' we mean that the journalist must be able consider issues of value, norms and customs when gathering and writing news (axiology). Not only that, the journalist must also be able to consider the existential nature of human beings as beings whose nature is determined by how they understand, interpret and appreciate the existence of other beings in the universe (ontology). This ability involves knowledge of what is around them (epistemology).

The sophisticated and multicultural nature of the 'global village' has also brought in challenges of unprecedented levels. The socio-economic and political terrain which the journalist finds himself in is also getting rougher and tougher by each day. In view of the 'ever-shrinking' world (into a global village) and the subsequent 'culture wars', the journalist has to rise above expectations of various cultural persuasions to disseminate news that educate, inform and entertain. The call is made in view of the fact that the media serve as the nerve-centre of society by shaping our opinions

and world views. Although on a negative note the media manipulate and brainwash. Often, the media does more than just set the agenda, either by directly or by subtly dictating issues for its audience.

On the Zimbabwean scene, for instance, it is very easy to see the various motives of public media on one hand and the independent media on the other in the socio-economic and political front. For instance, we have seen how the independent media have negatively responded to Zimbabwe's intervention in the DRC, while the public media on the other hand have hailed and magnified it. We have seen how issues of political violence have been handled by both the public and the independent media and the polarity that has characterized the media fraternity and issues of hate speech, sensationalism and agenda setting that has resulted from this polarity thereof. The period between 2000 and 2008 – apart from experiencing an increased number of media outlets – has also seen the public media probably playing its 'fourth estate' role by unwaveringly supporting all government initiated programmes whether or not they violated democratic principles, while the independent media has allegedly supported the opposition agenda of regime change. This development has led to the polarization of our society. This point is well captured by Phathisa Nyathi, then a columnist with *The Zimbabwe Mirror* who writes:

> *The polarization in our society is best depicted in the press. Basically, the press is either pro-government or anti-government. Sometimes objectivity is sacrificed on the altar of expediency in order to be true to their chosen position… If*

> *you buy newspapers from one divide, you will get half the story (The Zimbabwe Mirror, 14 August 2001).*[ii]

This space is, however, not meant to discuss political polarization in Zimbabwe but rather to discuss the challenges that face the Zimbabwean trained journalist who has to learn and learn very fast the art of critically processing news in times of political and economic crisis. It is sad that some journalists; because of their failure to understand the socio-economic, political and cultural impact of news dissemination to the public, have become biased and irresponsible in the way they disseminate news.[iii] Some have resorted to peddling falsehoods to the extent that readers and viewers have become disenchanted and disillusioned by this kind of prevalent journalism.

It is because of the above-mentioned weaknesses exhibited by contemporary journalists, and the central role that the media play in society, that prompts the need for us to reflect on the education of our journalists today. The paper recommends a shift from mere *training* to a deeper *educational* paradigm in journalism. While training focuses on skills development, deeper education prepares the journalist for greater social responsibility. It prepares the journalist for intricate moral, aesthetic, logical, emotional situations that require professional judgment. This paper further argues that – for any journalist – while training and teaching for critical thought are necessary, they are not sufficient. There are two strands to our argument, one that calls for the need to remain Pan Africanist in our approach and also being mindful of the fact that as Africans, we do not live in a vacuum but we are part of

the global village. As Ronald Nicolson (2008:2) aptly puts it:

> *We live, it is said, in a global village where national boundaries – cultural or geographical – have become blurred, a world in which a single economic system is emerging, where television and satellite telecommunications can(if programmers and watchers choose) bring world events wherever they occur to our homes at the moment that they happen. None of us remains unaffected by other cultures very different from our own.*

It is against this backdrop that we seek to fuse Western with African values in journalism pedagogy in order to promote our cultural values at the same time as we celebrate and appreciate cultural diversity and differences. But when all is said and done, the ultimate goal is to show the deficiencies of training as a method and aim in grooming African journalists. But as we recommend journalism education ahead of training in Africa, we have to ask what the guiding frameworks or principles for this kind of pedagogy are? Before responding to this question, it is crucial to define training and outline its limitations and also to review African scholarship on journalism training and education in Africa in order to give our argument context.

Review of literature

(a) The limits of journalism training: Some philosophical insights

Training refers to the process of preparing someone to a required standard of efficiency or performance by instruction and practice. It (training) aims at the successful performance of specific skills; it is directive in intent as its object is not to produce a certain kind of child but a certain kind of performance in the child (Akinpelu, 1995: 192). This is precisely why training has always been condemned as a method of teaching by those interested in the development of character and personality. *Training* is often blamed for being too specific in purpose and too narrow in scope and content.

It must be noted, however, that besides the above-mentioned limitations, training remains an essential element in teaching. For one to master various elements in the learning process there is need for instruction (initiation), and repeated exercise. This subsequently leads to deeper understanding if enough intellectual effort is exerted. Proficiency in gathering and writing news requires serious training too. No one is born a writer; renowned writers went through processes of training.

However, the ability to capture juicy stories and reporting them as they are from the war zone does not make one a good war reporter. Capturing sizzling pictures of horrific events does not make one an excellent photojournalist. Good journalism goes beyond merely taking information to the people as it is. The point we are making here is that, training

one to be a prolific information gatherer and dynamic writer is not enough for good journalism. One great philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead criticized the habit of relying on unexamined information when he said, 'a merely informed man is the most useless bore on God's earth' (R.S. Peters, 1967: 100). But equally boring, for R.S. Peters, are those for whom being critical is a substitute for being well informed about anything.

Immanuel Kant expressed this point explicitly when he said, '[…] content without criticism is blind, but criticism without content is empty' (1967: 100). The point is that both training and critical thinking must complement each other. What is required by the journalist is not just the ability to collect information, but also the ability to reflect on why things are the way they are and why certain events need to be published the way they are while caution need to be exercised on others. *Training* is insufficient for journalism because it fails, as a teaching method, to address the comprehensive development of this aspect of judgment. Moral quagmires that transverse the practice of journalism require more than mere training. Deciding what to show on TV, what to present and how to present it on radio, in a conservative society or in a society at cultural crossroads requires more than just training.

Reporting horrific events at the battlefront (war reporting) requires going beyond training. Questions as to whether truth, objectivity and justice are always overriding in journalism require more of cognitive capacity and moral judgment than mere sense perception. Issues of rights, freedom and democracy which are current in the contemporary world

require more of conceptual analysis, which cannot be fulfilled through training. Conceptual analysis requires insight, reflection, focus, or critical reflection of issues. But is journalism education, therefore, all about *being critical*? In answering this question, we will begin by defining *being critical*.

Being critical can be understood as being inquisitive and expressive. But is this inquisitiveness sufficient for good journalism? Is the ability to ask questions and convince the same as *being critical*? Does rejection of authority and unpatriotic reporting signify *being critical*? Does *being critical* imply negativism? There is no doubt that being vocal, being resourceful and interrogative may meet the first view of *being critical* but are insufficient for good journalism. The second view of *being critical* implies the height of intellectual prowess and reflection, in line with rules or principles of reason. As John Passmore puts it, 'a critical person, in this sense, must possess initiative, independence, courage, imagination, of a kind which may be completely absent in the skillful critic of the performance of a laboratory technician.'[iv]

(a) Journalism training in post-colonial Zimbabwe: Pedagogical insights and challenges

There is no doubt that journalism training in Zimbabwe is still influenced by colonial innuendos. This is so because the journalism curricula in most Zimbabwean journalism schools and colleges today still put emphasis on skills acquisition which was also typical of colonial training that was meant to equip the black African with mere skills to perform his or her duties efficiently without question. While training is

necessary and required in some situations, we argue that it is merely a first order activity which does not help a journalist to adequately engage with and rationally dialogue issues. This is so because in post-colonial Africa, journalism training has produced a journalist who is able to hit the ground running that is one who is able to write a story and nothing more. No emphasis has been put on the rationale behind the writing of a story.

On the contrary, all the universities that offer media studies in Zimbabwe have done very well in that score as demonstrated by the fact that most of their products have excelled and participated in policy formulation and media research. Commenting on the launch of the postgraduate diploma programme in Media and Communication Studies at the University of Zimbabwe's Department of English in 1993, Rino Zhuwarara states:

> *We felt that for media to function effectively within the parameters of our national and regional aspirations, they ought to be guided by knowledge arising from constant investigation and enquiry. The course content of the Diploma is deliberately designed to arm a new generation of students with the necessary theoretical, practical and analytical competence to fit into the media industry as potential policy makers, media managers, researchers and communicators (Zhuwarara et al, 1997: v).*

The following is a list of some of the media practitioners from the University of Zimbabwe who have excelled in their careers and have been promoted based on competence, diligence and

responsible journalism: Geoffrey Nyarota, Robson Mhandu, Lovemore Banda, Stanley Katsande, Tazzen Mandizvidza, Henry Muradzikwa, Bill Saidi, Farai Gonzo, Tendai Chari, Susan Makore, Laura Chiweshe and Caesar Zvayi. There is also a list of media practitioners who, after acquiring their first or second degrees, have enrolled with colleges of journalism in and outside the country. These include among others: Fainos Mangena, Munyaradzi Madambi, Tawanda Majoni, Sugar Chagonda, Sheuneni Kurasha and Edson Madondo to mention just but a few. But what is so special about these media practitioners that give them an urge over journalists from colleges and polytechnics? In responding to this question, Kimani Gecau (2010) remarks:

> *The conflict between journalism and media studies is the conflict between theory and practice. While journalism training emphasizes on skills acquisition to enable the journalist to practically do the work, media studies – being a post-graduate programme – emphasizes on the theoretical aspect of the practice which gives the media practitioner the critical tools of news analysis and interpretation.*[vi]

Media practitioners lack the practical aspect of the trade but they make up for it through internship. It is important to acknowledge the point that through experience and interaction with media practitioners some trained journalists have also done very well in their trade. The following names quickly come to mind: Joram Nyathi (political writer), Constantine Chimakure (political writer), Robson Sharuko (sports writer), Sandra Nyaira (political writer) and Shame Makoshori (business writer). In fact some of our journalists

have done very well in their areas of specialty that they do not require any further pedagogy. In this paper we argue that education should complete the training process if the quality of our news products is to improve. To this end and as intimated earlier on, we argue for the integration of both Western and African models of education in order to produce a journalist who appreciates both Pan Africanism and the demands of the global village.

It is our firm belief that we must be able to chart our own destiny as Africans rather than interpret African realities through Eurocentric lances. What is rather disturbing is the sinking feeling that the African educated elite and those responsible for offering journalism tuition seem not to be ready to embrace change that should bring a new dispensation in the teaching of the African journalist who is abreast with the interests, needs, values and realities of Black Africa. As Jimada aptly puts it:

> *The educated Africans have become encapsulated and cannot see beyond the Eurocentric walls that trap them, hence the perpetuation of the present system of communication education. The present system of communication education through which the communication industry (radio, television, newspapers and so on) is being supplied with its personnel needs only further perpetuates the existing use of the media, which in itself is a negation – and even a destruction – of society's cultural values and identity* (Jimada, 1992: 367).

As can be discerned from the above quotation, there seems to

be no viable models of education which Africa can adopt in order to prepare professional journalists who are committed to national service. By national service we mean the ability of the journalist to devote him or herself to nation-building through objective and constructive journalism. Besides the inadequacies of training, whatever models Africa has adopted seem to be carbon copies of the Western forms of journalism training which puts more emphasis on individual liberalism than a communitarian way of life.

Rita Cruise O'Brien (in Jimada, 1992: 366), argues that 'media professionalism in the so-called Third World is an incorporation of the Third World into the metropolitan base.' This is true in two ways: First, the direct influence of foreign consumption patterns and lifestyles fostered through training acts as an impediment to autonomous development by limiting initiatives and originality of individuals and groups. Second, the influence on standards and norms of training cause various occupations to identify with their metropolitan counterparts and ultimately draw the media away from the cultural base and resources of poor countries.

In Europe, most notably in Britain, the system of training news people and broadcasters has been by means of highly developed in-service training. In Europe, Africa and the rest of the world, the creative skills associated with journalism are said to be innate, although technical skills are recognized as requiring training […] For example, the Thompson newspaper organization and the BBC both have major training institutions (1992: 368). It is worth noting that Third World countries with a British colonial influence such as Zimbabwe

have also adopted similar models and every now and then, state and privately owned media institutions such as *The Herald*, *The Chronicle*, *The Sunday Mail* and *The Sunday News, The Zimbabwe Independent, The Standard* and *The Financial Gazette* provide in-house training services to their own media personnel.

While there seems to be nothing wrong with such initiatives, we argue that this form of training is insufficient if it is not aided by education, which emphasizes the 'why' instead of 'what' of things. While we agree with both Domatob (1987) and Jimada (1992) on the need to chart the African destiny on Journalism education, we believe that it will be futile to ignore some Western theories of education, after all, not all Western theories and models have colonial innuendos. To this end, we consider some guiding philosophical injunctions in the integration of both Afro and Western values in journalism pedagogy.

(b) Journalism education: Integrating African with occidental values

Personal feelings, inclinations, wishes and fears as well as our cultural backgrounds do interfere with the way we look at and interpret reality. In this treatise, we discuss these issues […] under the gamut of subjectivism and cultural relativism. Subjectivism, as an ethical world view, holds that an individual person's sentiments, inclinations, choices, interests, needs and desires determine what is right and what is wrong, good or bad. As put by Judith Lichtenberg, '[…] no one can totally escape his or her biases; no one can be completely objective' (Curran and Gurevitch, 1991: 217). If this is true,

then it becomes difficult for a journalist to know what is right for other people and be able to generalize it via the media.

Though subjectivism is not always about individualism, randomness and chaos, we argue that good journalism is not about boosting an individual's ego. Thus, subjective thinking leads to rugged individualism which according to Peters is a recipe for *paranoia* (1993: 109). Transposed to the journalism fraternity it means that mere training does not liberate the journalist from subjective thinking which does not sit well with African communalism. So, when a journalist chooses to peddle falsehoods based on his or her own interpretation of reality, he or she reduces himself or herself to a thing that should not belong to a community of relational beings; that being does not deserve any respect and does not fit into the African philosophical schema of *munhu munhu muvanhu* or its Ndebele equivalence of *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu* (A person is a person through other persons).[vii]

We are what we are because of people around us. So, when our journalists gather and write news, they should always ask themselves what impact the news will have to the community at large. Will the news corrupt or enhance the community's moral fabric or well-being? When one begins to ask such questions; he or she is now operating in the realm of education. We believe that a combination of both the Western and African model of education will help our cause.

By 'The Western model of education' we mean that model of education which emphasizes on liberal values such as the freedom and autonomy of the individual over and above those

of the community. It will be important in this paper to show that the Western model of education is influenced by subjective thinking while the African model is influenced by cultural relativism. While we are aware of the challenges posed by subjectivism as outlined above, we do not think that there will be a misnomer in fusing Western and African models of education in order to produce a journalist who goes beyond knowledge of his or her locality in terms of ontology and valuation.

(i) The Western model of journalism education, in brief

The Western model of education takes the form of the *insight model* of teaching as proffered by Israel Scheffler (Peters, 1967: 127). It looks at knowledge as a vision and stress the importance of understanding. It advocates students' own search for reality, and vision thereof, through personal engagement with reality. Teachers inspired by the *insight model* strive to encourage individual insight into the meaning and use of public knowledge. While insight is very important and necessary, it is not sufficient for good journalism. Construing knowledge in terms of an intellectual inspection of reality is not at all satisfactory, unless we restrict ourselves to very simple cases of truths accessible through observation or introspection. Journalism requires powers of deliberation, argument, judgment, weighing of evidence, appeal to principles and decision-making.

The *insight model* is specifically cognitive in emphasis but cannot be stretched so as to cover important aspects required in grooming a good journalist. Insight also fails to cover the

concept of character and the related notions of attitude and disposition (Peters, 1967: 128). But since this is not a paper with a thrust on journalism ethics, we argue that journalism training must be based on the *insight model* as proffered by Scheffler because it promotes critical thinking in journalism. But it will be unreasonable to suppose that journalism education should exclude notions of conduct and character as this will defeat the whole purpose of critical thinking.

To this end, we believe that through the *insight model*, individually based moral principles such as respect for persons and the golden rule will be enhanced. A good journalist must be cognizant of the fact that whatever he or she writes must not violate other people's freedoms and rights. This is possible because the *insight model* of education – because of its emphasis on cognitive thinking – enables the journalist to sift through the mind's eye and summon powers of judgment to know what is right or wrong when disseminating news. But some very interesting questions emerge regarding the practicality of this model when applied to Africa: Do we have enough model mentors in our media fraternity for this paradigm shift? Is the time given for journalism training sufficient for this new paradigm? Is a diploma in journalism sufficient in view of the challenges and complexities of journalism in contemporary Africa? These questions and many others will be addressed in the next section.

(ii) The African model of journalism education, in brief

'The African model of education' on the other hand relates to

education with emphasis on collective African goals of *hunhu/ubuntu*. It is our firm belief that every journalism curriculum must hammer on the importance of community, social harmony as well as issues of restoration and reconciliation as these concepts are truly African. Indigenous religions and cultures must also be part of the package of the journalism curriculum, for we believe that the multidisciplinary nature of the journalism curriculum will produce an all rounder journalist who is not only equipped with the writing skills but who also appreciates and understands the cultural, religious, political and social influence his or her story will impact to the reader.

So, when all have been said and done, we are calling for a repackaging of the journalism curriculum to combine both Western and African models of education. There are, however, a few challenging questions against some of our basic assumptions. For instance, what is the role of education to a journalist reporting under the likes of Adolf Hitler? Does education help a journalist on the verge of starvation, whose only lifeline is a proprietor who demands unwavering loyalty in fighting his cause against the government and undesirable competitors and social groups? R.S. Peters' definition of education - as some sort of processes in which desirable states of mind develop - would get us out of this predicament. This is a value laden view of education which results in the cultivation of a responsible and dignified journalist.

Cultural relativism, on the other hand, is a belief that truth is not always universally valid, but should be contextualized. This view eliminates the possibility of universal right or wrong. While this view cuts across all cultures, it is an Afro-

centric philosophy, a perspective on culture, communication and history centred on the original emerging values of African people (Asante, 1979).[ii] This philosophy is, however, valid for African people but becomes invalid for others if imposed as the dominant world view.

We argue that journalism education must hinge on the importance of African culture, religion, politics and philosophy. For instance, there is an interesting trend in African politics where the ballot box is slowly being replaced by inter party dialogue when it comes to the election of leaders. This is based on Africa's philosophy of *hunhu* or *ubuntu* which puts emphasis on dialogue when resolving disputes. This article is written at a time when three political parties in Zimbabwe –The MDCT-T, the MDC-M and ZANU PF – have come together to form a coalition government following the aborted March 29, 2008 elections. The same scenario also obtained in Kenya in 2007.

Against this background, a journalism curriculum based on the African model of journalism education will equip the journalist with the knowledge of how to conceptualize the dynamics of African politics and culture and how to define his or her role in the promotion of good governance. There are some who believe that some of the economic and political problems that Zimbabwe has encountered are of a journalistic nature and so this work could not have come at a better time than this. Repressive legislation like Public Order and Security Act (POSA), Access to Information and the Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) are often cited as the cause of the economic

and political crisis that has gripped Zimbabwe since 2000.

Challenges and Recommendations

While efforts can be made to introduce the African model of education in our journalism schools and colleges, such efforts are bound to hit a snag as journalism education is hampered by shortage of experienced and knowledgeable teachers as a result of the brain drain that has seen Zimbabwe losing its best brains since 2000 because of political and economic crisis. Most journalism schools and colleges now employ inexperienced teachers to train journalists further worsening the situation which is already critical. The other challenge has to do with lack of political accountability given that Zimbabwe is being run by a coalition government and hence efforts to review the journalism curriculum can viewed with suspicion from some quarters.

Our recommendation is that as Zimbabwe is embarking on the process of formulating a new constitution, issues related to media and journalism curriculum must be debated and incorporated into the new constitution. We also recommend that journalism schools and colleges must be upgraded to offer degrees and that the duration for the diploma in journalism must be three years with the final year being reserved for journalism theory.

Conclusion

The article began by giving a picture of the Zimbabwean media scene and the research problem therein. The observation was that approximately 150 journalists were churned by colleges of journalism, schools and university

departments every year from 2000 to 2008. It was also observed that most of these practitioners lacked the critical tools of analysis and that there was need to fuse Western and African models of education to produce diligent, critical and responsible journalists. Journalism training was considered necessary but insufficient in a world driven by critical thinking and close analysis of events as they unfold in the globe. Against this background the article recommended the upgrading of schools and colleges of journalism so that they can also offer degrees and the need to revisit the journalism curriculum in light of the recent developments in Zimbabwe where there talk of a new constitution.

End notes

i. As a philosophy, Pan-Africanism represents the aggregation of the historical, cultural, spiritual, artistic, scientific and philosophical legacies of Africans from past times to the present. Pan-Africanism as an ethical system traces its origins from ancient times, and promotes values that are the product of the African civilization and the struggles against slavery, racism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. It (Pan-Africanism) sets aside cultural differences, asserting the principality of these shared experiences to foster solidarity and resistance to exploitation (H:/Pan-Africanism –Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.htm accessed May 2009).

ii. The philosophy of Afro-centricity is well defended by Molefi Kete Asante of the Temple school. According to Asante, this philosophy is a way of answering all cultural, economic, political and social questions related to African people from a centred position. It is a revolutionary philosophy because it studies ideas, concepts, events, and personalities, political and

economic processes from the standpoint of black people as subjects and not as objects (M.K Asante. (2009), *Afro-centricity, at http://asante.net/articles/1/afrocentricity/ Accessed 28 June 2009).*

iii. Courtesy of the Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe, 2005, p. 87.

iv. This is a serious challenge considering that modern society requires journalists to be multi-disciplinary in their endeavor to gather and write balanced news. Appreciating the socio-cultural, political, religious and economic backgrounds of individuals and groups is vital in critical news reporting.

v. In short, a critical journalist must go beyond the technical know-how of story writing to a deep reflection of the content and its implications to the reader. Most Zimbabwean journalists lack the critical hunch for accuracy and objectivity and this article is timely and relevant.

vi. Dr. Kimani Gecau is a Senior Lecturer of Media and Communication Studies in the Department of English at the University of Zimbabwe. Dr. Gecau believes that the dichotomy between theory and practice leads to animosity in the newsroom, as trained journalists feel they have the bragging rights in the newsroom based on their practical skills while degreed media practitioners believe they have a lot to tell their newsroom colleagues based on their intellectual orientation. This problem has its historical roots dating back to the days of cadet-type in-house training of the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company that trained the crop of older editors in the country to the establishment of the first journalism school at Harare Polytechnic and subsequently the introduction of Media and Communication Studies at the University of Zimbabwe

in 1993. Nevertheless, Dr. Gecau believes that there is no need for such animosity because the trained journalist and the degreed media practitioner should complete each other.

vii. The idea of *hunhu/ubuntu* as a philosophy and an overarching ethical principle runs throughout Southern Africa and is premised on the idea: *I am because we are; since we are therefore I am (Mbiti, 1969:204-215).* Asante, M.K. (1979), 'International/intercultural relations', in M. Asante and A. Vandi (eds) *Contemporary Black thought: Alternative analyses in social and behavioural sciences,* Beverly Hills: CA: Sage.

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